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COMMENT
The Ideology of Shame: An Analysis of First Amendment and
Eighth Amendment Challenges to Scarlet-Letter Probation
Conditions
INTRODUCTION
There is a crisis in our criminal justice system. Although
statistics indicate that crime rates are down in the country as a
whole,' the American people, fed daily reports of local murders and
rapes and criminals getting "off" on "technicalities," 2 perceive crime
as a major threat to their security. Expressing dissatisfaction with
the criminal courts and law enforcement in general, the American
people have insisted that the nation as a whole get tougher on crime
Politicians, who are quick to pick up on the public's
dissatisfaction, have fed the frenzy. Looking for a quick fix, they
have implemented mandatory sentencing statutes,6 especially for
1. See Sara Sun Beale, What's Law Got to Do with It? The Political, Social,
Psychological, and Other Non-Legal Factors Influencing the Development of (Federal)
Criminal Law, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 23, 44 (1997) (noting that rates of major crimes,
including murder, rape, robbery, aggressive assault, burglary, larceny, and auto theft,
dropped 21% between 1975 and 1994); Neil A. Lewis, Crime Rates Decline; Outrage
Hasn't, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 8, 1993, at B6 (reporting that the FBI's 1993 semiannual
statistics showed that crime dropped 5% in the first six months of the year as compared to
the same period the year before, and that the rate of violent crime dropped 3%).
2. See Gerald G. Ashdown, Federalism, Federalization, and the Politics of Crime, 98
W. VA. L. REv. 789,794 (1996); Beale, supra note 1, at 44-50.
3. See Peter J. Benekos & Alida V. Merlo, Three Strikes and You're Out!: The
Political Sentencing Game, FED. PROBATION, Mar. 1996, at 3,4.
4. See id. at 3; Harry A. Chernoff et al., The Politics of Crime, 33 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 527,527 (1996).
5. See generally Benekos & Merlo, supra note 3, at 3 (discussing how the new
mandatory life imprisonment statutes for third-time felons is a product of political
manipulation of fear of crime); Chernoff et al., supra note 4, at 527 (discussing the role
politics plays in the "war against crime"); Michael G. Turner et al., "Three Strikes and
You're Out" Legislation: A National Assessment, FED. PROBATION, Sept. 1995, at 16, 19
(discussing how political maneuvering is the main impetus of "three-strikes" legislation).
6. For some examples at the federal level, see 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1994)
(requiring, after a second conviction, a mandatory 20 year sentence for using a weapon
during violent or drug related crime); 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (1994) (requiring a mandatory
five year sentence for possession of five grams of crack-cocaine). For some examples at
the state level, see CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.7 (West 1998) ("three-strikes" legislation);
GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-6.1 (1997) (requiring mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years
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juvenile offenders.7 Death penalty sentences are handed down at an
unprecedented rate.8 New prisons are being built at an astonishing
pace,9 and new prisoners are filling the cells." Probation also has not
escaped this changing political climate. An era of more creative,
experimental probation conditions has begun." Some of these
conditions, such as chemical therapy for sex offenders, forced birth
control, and in one instance, castration, are harsh.'2
In this changing political climate, judges also are showing their
exasperation with the criminal justice system. Some trial courts are
creating "shaming" probation conditions. 3 These so-called "scarlet-
letter"'4 conditions force defendants to wear T-shirts, place bumper-
for armed robbery, kidnapping, rape, aggravated child molestation, aggravated sodomy,
or aggravated sexual battery convictions); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-1340.10-.23 (Supp.
1996) (explaining the process of structured sentencing whereby a defendant is categorized
according to his offense and his criminal history, and imposing minimum and maximum
sentences for each particular category). For an argument against mandatory minimum
sentences, see generally Henry Scott Wallace, Mandatory Minimums and the Betrayal of
Sentencing Reform: A Legislative Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, FED. PROBATION, Sept. 1993,
at 9.
7. See Jennifer M. O'Connor & Lucinda K. Treat, Note, Getting Smart About
Getting Tough: Juvenile Justice and the Possibility of Progressive Reform, 33 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 1299, 1311-14 (1996) (discussing a nev trend waiving juveniles into adult court);
Julianne P. Sheffer, Note, Serious and Habitual Juvenile Offender Statutes: Reconciling
Punishment and Rehabilitation Within the Juvenile Justice System, 48 VAND. L. REV. 479,
489-92 (1995) (discussing new "get tough" juvenile statutes).
8. See Laurence A. Grayer, Comment, A Paradox: Death Penalty Flourishes in U.S.
While Declining Worldwide, 23 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 555, 556 (1996); Derrick A.
Carter, Reflections of the Proposed Federal Crime Bill, NAT'L B. ASS'N MAG., June 1994,
at 23, 23.
9. See, e.g., Lisa C. Phellan, Making Prisons Work, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1789, 1798
(1997) (noting that California has built 17 new prisons in the past 15 years).
10. See Joseph W. Rogers, The Greatest Correctional Myth: Winning the War on
Crime Through Incarceration, FED. PROBATION, Sept. 1989, at 21, 22; The Supreme Court
1996 Term-Leading Cases, 111 HARV. L. REV. 197, 390 (1997); cf. Phellan, supra note 9,
at 1789 (noting an increase in incarceration rates in California).
11. For some examples of these, see Janet W. Steverson, Stopping Fetal Abuse with
No-Pregnancy and Drug Treatment Probation Conditions, 34 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 295,
333-34 (1994) (proposing a probation condition of no pregnancy for fetal abusers); Janet
F. Ginzberg, Note, Compulsory Contraception as a Condition of Probation: The Use and
Abuse of Norplant, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 979, 979-80 (1992) (discussing how some courts
are forcing female probationers to take Norplant); Jeffrey N. Hurwitz, Comment, House
Arrest: A Critical Analysis of an Intermediate-Level Penal Sanction, 135 U. PA. L. REV.
771, 772 (1987) (discussing house arrest).
12. See Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L.
REV. 1880, 1885-86 (1991).
13. See id. at 1886-89.
14. The term "scarlet letter" is based on Nathaniel Hawthorne's novel The Scarlet
Letter, in which Hester Pryne, the heroine, is forced to wear a scarlet "A" on her dress,
proclaiming her an adulteress. See NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE, THE SCARLET LETTER 58
(Chatham River Press 1984) (1850). It is not clear who first applied the term to shaming
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stickers on their cars, or post signs in their yards proclaiming their
guilt.' Other conditions force probationers to publish apologies in
local newspapers. 16  The effects of these conditions, both on the
probationers and on society at large, remain unclear. 17 Also unclear
is whether such scarlet-letter probation conditions are even
constitutional. Courts have been unwilling to define the
constitutional rights of probationers and to analyze the
constitutionality of scarlet-letter probation conditions. 8
Scarlet-letter probation conditions are interesting not only
because they are unusual but als6 because they illustrate some of the
problems and inconsistencies of probation law.'9 This Comment,
therefore, not only analyzes the validity of scarlet-letter probation
conditions under current law, but also gleans some insight into how
to improve this area of the law. Part I looks at cases in which scarlet-
letter probation conditions have been challenged in the state courts,
both successfully and unsuccessfully.' It discusses various analyses
of these conditions, noting the courts' assumptions and different
standards of review.2' Part II examines the idea of shaming as
probation conditions, but the term was used as early as 1982 when the Eighth Circuit
expressed its approval of probation conditions for white-collar crimes that had the effect
of shaming both the probationers and their corporate employers. See United States v.
William Anderson Co., 698 F.2d 911, 912-15 (8th Cir. 1982) (upholding a probation
condition allowing a corporate defendant to pay part of a fine to a charitable organization
where its officers, as part of their probation, were performing community service).
15. See, e.g., People v. Hackler, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 681, 682 (Ct. App. 1993) (reviewing
trial court's requirement that defendant wear a T-shirt proclaiming he was on felony
probation for theft); State v. Burdin, 924 S.W.2d 82, 84 (Tenn. 1996) (reviewing trial
court's decision to order the defendant to display a sign in his front yard proclaiming
himself a child molester).
16. For a discussion of various scarlet-letter conditions, see infra notes 45-174, 331-40
and accompanying text.
17. See People v. Johnson, 528 N.E.2d 1360, 1362 (Il. App. Ct. 1988) (noting that the
court could not determine the psychological effects on the defendant of a forced public
apology); Burdin, 924 S.W.2d at 87 (noting that the effects of a scarlet-letter probation
condition are "unforeseen and unpredictable"). For a discussion of these cases, see infra
notes 116-23 and accompanying text (discussing Johnson) and infra notes 165-74 and
accompanying text (discussing Burdin).
18. Until recently the courts have been unwilling to hear challenges to probation
conditions. See infra notes 290, 483-500 and accompanying text. Even today, not all
courts consider a probationer's constitutional rights when analyzing the legality of a
probation condition. See, e.g., infra notes 536-43 and accompanying text.
19. It is unclear why judges are now more likely to use shaming penalties. Perhaps it
is general frustration with probation as a method of rehabilitation that has led judges to
create these new shaming conditions. See infra notes 509-30 and accompanying text
(discussing problems with probation as rehabilitation and the trend toward viewing
probation as punishment).
20. See infra notes 37-177 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 45-174 and accompanying text
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punishment, discussing the Supreme Court's current definition of
punishment as well as its standards for what constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment. 2  Applying these standards to scarlet-letter
probation conditions, this Comment argues that such conditions do
not violate the Eighth AmendmentP
Because scarlet-letter probation conditions compel probationers
to "speak" of their convictions, Part III reviews the development of
the First Amendment right not to speak, concluding that current law
forbids both compelled beliefs and facts. 4  Part IV discusses
probation law,' examining older theories of probation that courts
used to justify their refusal to review probation conditions, 26 and then
analyzing how the primary purposes of probation are now changing.
Part IV then addresses both old and new standards for reviewing
probation conditions, dividing the different tests into three main
categories.28
Part V addresses the problem with current standards for
reviewing the constitutionality of probation conditions: They do not
adequately protect the probationer's constitutional liberties.29 The
Comment proposes a standard that requires the trial courts to explain
their reasons for imposing special probation conditions and that
requires reviewing courts to consider the probationer's liberty
interest in their analysis of probation conditions." This standard,
however, does not adequately allow appellate courts to review
scarlet-letter probation conditions because of the difficulties in
narrowly tailoring compelled speech."1
Part V thus speaks to the question of how to analyze a compelled
speech challenge to scarlet-letter probation conditions.32 It argues
that such conditions are ideological messages and perhaps should be
struck down for this reason.3 3 Because courts probably will not
embrace this line of reasoning, however, the Comment considers
three approaches for ensuring that a scarlet-letter probation
22. See infra notes 178-287 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 288-359 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 360-472 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 473-567 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 483-500 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 501-30 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 531-67 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 568-93 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 594-604 and accompanying text.
31. See infra note 605 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 605-31 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 607-18 and accompanying text.
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condition is as narrowly tailored as possible.34 The Comment
concludes that the proper approach is to require appellate courts to
scrutinize carefully a scarlet-letter probation condition that is
extremely long in duration, that might endanger the defendant's
safety, or that contains content that states more than bare facts."
Such a test allows for flexibility in designing probation conditions,
but still affords probationers adequate constitutional protection. 6
I. STATE COURT CHALLENGES TO SCARLET-LETtER PROBATION
CONDITIONS
As scarlet-letter probation conditions have become more
common, so too have challenges to them at the appellate level
become commonplace. So far, only six state courts-California,37
Florida,3 8 Georgia, 39 Illinois,4" New York,4 1 and Tennessee 4 -- have
ruled on the legality of these conditions, and only three have
considered the constitutionality of the measures.43 Looking at these
cases in turn, this Part will explore the different analyses courts have
employed when considering the validity of these provisions. As will
be seen, some courts have invalidated scarlet-letter conditions,
though only one has done so on constitutional grounds.'
A. California
In People v. McDowell,45 a defendant convicted of his third
shoplifting offense challenged a probation condition requiring him
not to leave his house unless he was wearing tap shoes.46 Defendant
34. See infra notes 621-31 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 630-31 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 630-31 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 45-76 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 77-103 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 104-15 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 116-35 and accompanying text.
41. See infra notes 136-47 and accompanying text.
42. See infra notes 165-74 and accompanying text.
43. Although a challenge to a scarlet-letter probation condition has come before the
Oregon Court of Appeals, the court ruled that the issue was not within its scope of
review. See State v. Bateman, 771 P.2d 314, 318-19 (Or. Ct. App. 1989) (en banc); infra
notes 160-64 and accompanying text. North Carolina is currently considering a challenge.
See State v. Mewborn, No. COA98-28 (N.C. Ct. App. filed Feb. 28, 1998); infra notes 148-
59 and accompanying text.
44. See People v. Hackler, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 681, 686-87 (Ct. App. 1993); infra notes
57-76 and accompanying text.
45. 130 Cal. Rptr. 839 (Ct. App. 1976), overruled on other grounds by People v.
Welch, 851 P.2d 802, 808 (Cal. 1993).
46. See id. at 843.
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argued that the condition was a form of cruel and unusual
punishment, and therefore unconstitutional, because it was
"tantamount" to having a sign around his neck stating, "I am a
thief."47
The California Court of Appeal decided that this argument was
unconvincing, noting that the defendant had offered no support for
his supposition that wearing tap shoes would notify the public that he
was a purse-snatcher.48 The court maintained that "[m]erely because
a condition is out of the ordinary does not make it constitutionally
unreasonable. '49  It determined that the probation condition was
related to the defendant's crime, to his rehabilitation, and to the
safety of the public.50 It also decided that the condition would deter
the defendant from snatching a purse in the future by reminding him
that he was on probation .5  Nevertheless, the court of appeal
remanded the case to the trial court because the probation condition
was too imprecise.52 In an unusual analysis, the court wondered
whether the condition meant that the defendant had to wear the tap
shoes only while leaving the house-rendering the condition
ineffective-or whether he had to wear them at all times while out of
the house-meaning that he could not participate in any athletic
activities. 3
Although commentators typically cite McDowell when
discussing scarlet-letter probation condition cases,54 the case differs
from other cases in that the admission of guilt in McDowell was not
in writing.55 Because the average person probably would not
47. Id.
48. See id.
49. Id.
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. See, e.g., Jeffrey C. Filcik, Signs of the Times: Scarlet Letter Probation Conditions,
37 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 291, 317-18 (1990); Jon A. Brilliant, Note, The
Modem Day Scarlet Letter: A Critical Analysis of Modern Probation Conditions, 1989
DUKE L.J. 1357, 1362-63.
55. Compare McDowell, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 843 (requiring the defendant to wear tap
shoes as a probation condition), with Goldschmitt v. State, 490 So. 2d 123, 124 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1986) (requiring the defendant to place a bumper sticker on his car as a
probation condition), People v. Johnson, 528 N.E.2d 1360, 1361 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988)
(requiring as a condition of probation that the defendant place an advertisement in a
newspaper with her mug shot and an apology), and State v. Bateman, 771 P.2d 314, 316
(Or. Ct. App. 1989) (en banc) (requiring the defendant to post a sign in his yard as a
condition of probation).
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presume that a person wearing tap shoes is a convicted thief,56 this
probation condition is arguably not a scarlet-letter condition at all.
The McDowell court did not address the legality of a probation
condition that explicitly proclaims a defendant's guilt.
Seventeen years later, though, the California Court of Appeal
addressed this issue. In People v. Hackler,7 the defendant was
convicted of petty theft when he and another man stole two twelve-
packs of beer from a store.58 As a condition of his probation, Hackler
was required to wear a T-shirt whenever he left his home that stated
on the front: "My record plus two six-packs equals four years," and
on the back, "I am on felony probation for theft."59 He was also
required to report to the court daily until he found work.6 Hackler
challenged the probation condition on the grounds that it was "vague,
overbroad, and not reasonably related to the goal of rehabilitation. '61
The California Court of Appeal considered both the state
probation statutes and the state constitution in its analysis of the
legality of the T-shirt probation condition.62 The court first noted
that trial courts have broad discretion in creating reasonable
probation conditions that promote rehabilitation or protect public
safety.63  This discretion, however, "'"is not boundless,"'" but is
limited by both the California Penal Code and Constitution.' If a
probation condition forces the defendant to waive his constitutional
rights,' then that condition must be "narrowly drawn. '66  If the
56. See McDowell, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 843.
57. 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 681 (Ct. App. 1993).
58. See id. at 682.
59. Id Evidently the trial court mistakenly thought that the defendant had only
stolen two six-packs, not two twelve-packs. See id. at 682 n.2.
60. See id- at 682.
61. Id. at 683.
62. See id. at 686-87.
63. See id. at 686 (citing In re Bushman, 463 P.2d 727,732 (Cal. 1970)).
64. Id. (quoting People v. Burden, 253 Cal. Rptr. 130, 130 (Ct. App. 1988) (quoting
People v. Keller, 143 Cal. Rptr. 184, 187 (Ct. App. 1978))). The opinion did not mention
whether the challenge was made under the California State Constitution or the United
States Constitution.
65. The U.S. Supreme Court has never spoken on the exact scope of probationers'
constitutional rights. The Tenth Circuit has described a probationer's rights as less than
that of the ordinary citizen: "[The probationer] forfeits much of his freedom of action
and even freedom of expression to the extent necessary to successful rehabilitation and
protection of the public programs." Porth v. Templar, 453 F.2d 330, 334 (10th Cir. 1971).
Unfortunately, there is no uniform standard for analyzing the constitutionality (or
legality) of probation standards. See infra notes 531-67 and accompanying text
(discussing various standards for analyzing legality of probation conditions). This
Comment considers only First and Eighth Amendment challenges to certain probation
conditions; a discussion of all the possible constitutional challenges to probation
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condition is overbroad, " ' "it is not reasonably related to [the]
compelling state interest"'" and is therefore unconstitutional. 67
Because the condition infringed on Hackler's right to privacy under
the California Constitution,61 the condition had to meet the
"narrowly drawn" standard.69
The primary concern of the court of appeal was that the trial
court's true intention was not to rehabilitate but to humiliate the
defendant, as evidenced by the trial judge's description of the
probation order as "going back ... to the era of stocks," and the
judge's statement that the defendant "would 'become a Hester Prin
[sic].' "70 The court also was concerned that the scarlet letter made it
difficult, if not impossible, for Hackler to meet another condition of
probation-obtaining steady employment. 71
The court of appeal then reviewed McDowell,2 determining that
in Hackler's case "the court below did precisely what the McDowell
court hinted was impermissible: it literally hung a sign around
Hackler's neck publicly identifying him as a thief."73 Although the
court of appeal stated that the probation condition had some
connection with Hackler's future criminality, it believed that
relationship "so incidental" as to be unreasonable.74 Although the
condition arguably would have made it more difficult for Hackler to
conditions is beyond this Comment's scope.
66. See Hackler, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 686. It is easier to discuss what kinds of speech
are not protected under the First Amendment than it is to discuss what kinds of speech
are protected. In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), the Supreme Court
listed several categories of speech that are not protected under the Constitution-"the
lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting' words." Id. at
572. This categorical approach, however, has "largely been discredited and abandoned."
RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A TREATISE ON
THE FIRST AMENDMENT § 3.04[2][a] at 3-101 (3d ed. 1994). Obscenity is the one class of
speech for which the Court still reduces First Amendment protection on the basis of
subject matter alone. See id. § 3.04[2][b], at 3-102. The "default" standard that the Court
will apply when analyzing a content-based regulation of speech is strict scrutiny, see id.
§ 3.03[1][a], at 3-82, though for certain kinds of speech the Court has devised different
tests for content-based regulation, see id. § 3.03[1][b]-[c] at 3-82 to 3-83. The government
always must be viewpoint neutral in its regulation of speech. See id. § 3.03[2][a][ii] at 3-
85.
67. Hackler, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 686 (quoting Burden, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 130-31
(quoting People v. Mason, 488 P.2d 630, 635 (Cal. 1971) (Peters, J., dissenting))).
68. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1.
69. See Hackler, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 686; see also Burden, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 130-31
(discussing the "narrowly drawn" standard).
70. Hackler, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 686 (quoting the trial court).
71. See id. at 686-87.
72. See supra notes 45-56 and accompanying text (discussing McDowell).
73. Hackler, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 687.
74. See id.
[Vol. 77790
1999] SCARLET-LETTER PROBATION CONDITIONS 791
shoplift, the court declared the conditions overbroad because
Hackler would have to wear the shirt not only at times when he might
shoplift, but also at any time he left his place of residence.' The
court was concerned that wearing the T-shirt would interfere with
noncriminal activities.76
B. Florida
On two occasions, the Florida District Court of Appeal has
affirmed scarlet-letter probation conditions.77 In Goldschmitt v.
State,78 the defendant appealed a probation condition requiring him
to place on his automobile a bumper sticker that read
"CONVICTED DUI-RESTRICTED LICENSE."7 9 The court first
considered Goldschmitt's argument that the probation condition
constituted a new, judicially-created punishment. The court,
however, was wary to hold that a trial court could not create a special
probation condition any time it wished (assuming the special
condition is lawful otherwise).80 The court held that a condition is
lawful if it is somehow related to the "nature" of the convicted
offense and has "some reasonable rehabilitative basis."81
The court of appeal then considered Goldschmitt's argument
that the bumper sticker constituted compelled speech in violation of
the First Amendment.' The court compared Goldschmitt's case to
Wooley v. Maynard,83 in which a Jehovah's Witness successfully
challenged a New Hampshire statute that forced him to bear the state
motto "Live Free or Die" on his license plate.' The court, however,
distinguished the license plate in Wooley from Goldschmitt's bumper
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. See Lindsay v. State, 606 So. 2d 652,658 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Goldschmitt v.
State, 490 So. 2d 123, 126 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
78. 490 So. 2d 123 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
79. Id. at 124.
80. See id. at 125.
81. Id. at 125 n.3; see also Rodriguez v. State, 378 So. 2d 7, 9 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1979) (applying the reasonably related test). The Florida District Court of Appeal in
Goldschmitt discussed the rehabilitative branch of this requirement when it analyzed the
Eighth Amendment issues, see Goldschmitt, 490 So. 2d at 125-26, but seemed to assume
that the bumper sticker was sufficiently related to the offense charged. The Rodriguez
standard is based on a standard once applied by California state courts, the Dominguez-
Lent test. See infra notes 541-44 and accompanying text (discussing the Dominguez-Lent
test).
82. See Goldschmitt, 490 So. 2d at 125.
83. 430 U.S. 705 (1977). For a more detailed discussion of the First Amendment
compelled speech cases, see infra notes 364-472 and accompanying text.
84. See Wooley, 430 U.S. at 707.
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sticker because in Wooley, the issue was whether the state's interest
in advertising its state motto overrode the defendant's objections that
criminal penalties could be imposed for defacing the license plate,
while in Goldschmitt, the criminal behavior already had been
committed prior to the requirement that the defendant advertise the
message.85 Moreover, the bumper sticker was not an ideological
message like the state motto in Wooley; instead, it served as a kind of
penance for the defendant and as a warning to others.86
Goldschmitt's Eighth Amendment argument fared no better.
The court of appeal first noted that the "mere requirement" of
displaying a scarlet letter did not necessarily offend the
Constitution.' Although the court expressed some concern that new
and innovative probation conditions might reach such extremes that
they could violate the U.S. Constitution, the court did not believe
that the bumper sticker was "sufficiently humiliating" to implicate
constitutional concerns.18
Notably, the court of appeal in Goldschmitt never really
questioned whether the bumper sticker was truly rehabilitative.
Unable to state that a finding of potential rehabilitative effect was
"utterly without foundation," the court of appeal felt it was
constrained to hold that it could not substitute its judgment for that
of the lower court.8 9 Yet the court of appeal itself seemed to agree
with the lower court when it stated that "[t]he deterrent, and thus the
rehabilitative, effect of punishment may be heightened if it 'inflicts
disgrace and contumely in a dramatic and spectacular manner.' 90
Furthermore, this statement and the court's description of the
bumper sticker as a kind of penance 91 suggest that it was not
distinguishing between rehabilitative and punitive objectives.
In Lindsay v. State,' the Florida District Court of Appeal put to
rest the argument that a condition which is primarily punitive in
purpose cannot be rehabilitative. 93 Probationer Lindsay challenged
85. See Goldschmitt, 490 So. 2d at 125.
86. See id. This analysis of Wooley may no longer be persuasive, for in Riley v.
National Federation of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781 (1988), the Supreme Court held that a state
cannot compel speech even if that speech is not ideological. See id. at 797-98. For further
discussion of Riley, see infra notes 427-45 and accompanying text.
87. See Goldschmitt, 490 So. 2d at 125.
88. See id. at 126.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 125 (quoting United States v. William Anderson Co., 698 F.2d 911, 913 (8th
Cir. 1982)).
91. See id.
92. 606 So. 2d 652 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
93. See id. at 656.
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on constitutional grounds a condition requiring him to place and pay
for a newspaper advertisement containing his mug shot and the
caption "DUI-Convicted."94  The court first looked to the
applicable state probation statutes, specifically the statutory section
that allowed the trial court to devise probation conditions not
otherwise listed in the statute. 5 The court interpreted this language
to mean that trial courts have "breathtaking" discretion to design
probation conditionsf5
The court of appeal then rejected Lindsay's claim that the
advertisement was not rehabilitative in its effect: "Rehabilitation
and punishment are not mutually exclusive ideas. They can co-exist
in any single, particular consequence of a conviction without robbing
one another of effect."'  Although the court insisted that a condition
of probation could be both punitive and rehabilitative, 98 it never
actually discussed whether this particular condition was in fact
rehabilitative. Instead, it seemed to assume that whatever was
punitive was also rehabilitative, and the court therefore held the
probation condition valid.99 The court then briefly addressed the
94. Id. at 653.
95. See id. at 654-55; see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 948.03(6) (West Supp. 1998)
(providing the current version of the statute cited in Lindsay). The subsection states in
part: "The enumeration of specific kinds of terms and conditions shall not prevent the
court from adding thereto such other or others as it considers proper." FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 948.03(6).
96. See Lindsay, 606 So. 2d at 655. Florida's probation statutes do not have a general
purpose of rehabilitation and give the trial court wide latitude in fixing probation
conditions. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 948.03. Subsection 948.03(1) lists regular conditions
of probation, including the requirement that the probationer must "[w]ork faithfully at
suitable employment insofar as may be possible." Id. § 948.03(1)(c). One method of
attacking the legality of a scarlet-letter probation condition is to argue that the condition
makes it impossible for the probationer to fulfill her other probation conditions. See infra
notes 536-37 and accompanying text. The defendant in Lindsay argued that the
advertisement "unreasonably interfere[d] with his right to pursue employment." Lindsay,
606 So. 2d at 655. The court seemed to view the argument as a constitutional right to
work claim. See id. at 656. The court did not address any possible conflicts with the
statutory probation condition that Lindsay be employed, perhaps because the statute only
required work "insofar as may be possible." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 948.03(1)(c) (West
1996).
97. Lindsay, 606 So. 2d at 656. The court of appeal seems to have relied on the
Rodriguez test to determine the validity of the probation condition. See Rodriguez v.
State, 378 So. 2d 7, 9-10 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (holding that probation conditions may
infringe upon First Amendment rights).
98. For this assertion, the court relied on the probation statute, which allowed a
period of incarceration to be imposed as a condition of probation. See Lindsay, 606 So. 2d
at 656 (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 948.03(5) (1991) (current version at FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 948.03(6) (West 1996))). However, the court still seemed to accept that the primary
purpose of probation is rehabilitation. See id. at 655.
99. See id. at 658. The court of appeal also determined that the advertisement was
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constitutional rights allegedly infringed upon by the probation
condition. Relying partly on Goldschmitt and Rodriguez v. State,100
the court decided that "the fact that a valid condition of probation
burdens constitutional rights is no basis by itself to set it aside.'' 101
The problem with the analysis of the court of appeal in Lindsay
is that there is no actual analysis of whether the advertisement served
a rehabilitative purpose; instead, the court assumed that what was
punitive was also rehabilitative.'02 It is difficult to imagine a
probation condition that would be declared invalid under this ruling.
The appellate court deferred to the trial court's finding that the
probation condition was reasonably related to the defendant's crime,
thus satisfying the first prong of the Rodriguez test. 3 If an appellate
court is willing to defer completely to the trial court as to whether the
Rodriguez test is met, then it is not clear that the test is particularly
useful.
C. Georgia
In Ballenger v. State,"° the Georgia Court of Appeals upheld a
scarlet-letter probation condition requiring a convicted DUI felon to
wear a fluorescent pink plastic bracelet bearing the words "DUI
CONVICT."'0 5 The defendant argued that the condition violated his
equal protection rights and constituted cruel and unusual punishment
because it fell outside statutory limits."0 6 Unconvinced by this
argument, the court of appeals held that Georgia case law conferred
broad authority on the trial court to design probation conditions,
despite the absence of a catch-all provision in the Georgia probation
reasonably related to the defendant's criminal conduct. See id. at 657. The court of appeal
deferred to the trial court because "[t]he question whether there is a reasonable
relationship between criminal conduct and a condition of probation is one of fact, or at
least mixed fact and law. As in all such matters, the trial judge decides the factual basis
for the condition." Id.
100. 378 So. 2d 7 (1979).
101. Lindsay, 606 So. 2d at 657; see Goldschmitt v. State, 490 So. 2d 123,126 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1986); Rodriguez, 378 So. 2d at 9-10.
102. It should be noted that the court of appeals was responding directly to the
defendant's argument that a probation condition that is punitive could not also be
rehabilitative. See Lindsay, 606 So. 2d at 656. Although the court may have had a point
that what is punitive may also be rehabilitative, the court seemed to take this point
further, asserting that what is punitive also must be rehabilitative. See id. at 657 ("There
is an inherent irony that the stronger [the defendant] makes the case for humiliation and
ridicule, the more he tacitly concedes that it is reasonably appropriate to its penal ends.").
103. See id.
104. 436 S.E.2d 793 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993).
105. Id. at 794.
106. See id.
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statute permitting the trial court to create its own conditions. 0 7 The
court noted further that the two goals of probation are rehabilitation
and protection of society.108 Yet the court chose to defer to the trial
court's decision that the fluorescent bracelet requirement would
accomplish these purposes, stating: "Being jurists rather than
psychologists, we cannot say that the stigmatizing effect of wearing
the bracelet may not have a rehabilitative, deterrent effect on
Ballenger."'' 9
In dissent, Judge Blackburn argued that the fluorescent bracelet
did not serve a legitimate probation purpose because the purpose of
the condition was to humiliate the probationer."' Although he
admitted that some courts had accepted the theory that scarlet-letter
probation conditions serve rehabilitative ends, for Judge Blackburn a
probation condition designed to humiliate the defendant goes beyond
the trial court's authority."' He argued that "the role of prescribing
punishment ... lies with the legislature and a rationale of
rehabilitation may not be used to vest such authority in the
judiciary.""'
The definition of "rehabilitation" seemed to be the true point of
contention between the majority and the dissent. The majority used
"rehabilitative" and "deterrent" almost interchangeably, and in its
suggestion that the "stigmatizing effects" of the bracelet, that is, the
punitive effects, could lead to rehabilitation, one sees a blurring of
the distinctions between rehabilitation and punishment. The dissent,
on the other hand, distinguished between an intent to punish and
humiliate and an intent to rehabilitate."' As discussed later, this case
illustrates the current debate concerning the purposes of probation
and whether a punishment may have rehabilitative effects."5
107. See id.
108. See id. (citing Hancock v. State, 424 S.E.2d 77, 78 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) (citing
Owens v. Kelley, 681 F.2d 1362, 1366-67 (11th Cir. 1982))).
109. Id. at 794-95. The court emphasized the trial court's broad discretion in creating
probation conditions. See id. at 794. Apparently, the possible stigmatizing effects of the
bracelet did not trouble the court. See id. at 795 ("Balancing the possible beneficial
purpose of this condition of probation, we do not find as a matter of law that the possible
embarrassment of being required to wear the bracelet constitutes an unreasonable
infringement on Ballenger's constitutional rights.").
110. See id. at 795-96 (Blackburn, J., dissenting) ("[T]he clear purpose of requiring
Ballenger to wear a fluorescent pink bracelet proclaiming him to be a DUI convict was
simply to punish him by humiliation.").
111. See id. at 796 (Blackburn, J., dissenting).
112. Id. (Blackburn, J., dissenting).
113. See id. at 794-95.
114. See id. at 795-96 (Blackburn, J., dissenting).
115. A short discussion of the punishment/rehabilitation debate seems in order.
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D. Illinois
In People v. Johnson,n6 the defendant, who was convicted of
driving under the influence of alcohol, challenged the propriety of a
probation condition requiring her to place an advertisement in a
newspaper that included her mug shot and an apology for her
crime." 7  The Illinois appellate court looked to the applicable
probation statute, which included a catch-all provision that allowed
the court to devise its own probation conditions as long as they were
reasonably related either to the offense or to the defendant's
rehabilitation.118 The court concluded that the permitted conditions
did not refer to general deterrence, nor did they suggest exposing a
defendant to ridicule."1 9 The court decided that the state legislature
Traditionally, rehabilitation or reformation has been seen as one of the several purposes
of punishment. See IGOR PRIMORATZ, JUSTIFYING LEGAL PUNISHMENT 11 (1989)
(listing theories underlying the utilitarian view of punishment). At least one
commentator, however, has urged that rehabilitation and reformation are two different
concepts: the former relates to altering a criminal's behavior "by non-punitive means";
the latter relates to altering a criminal's behavior through punishment. JACK P. GIBBS,
CRIME, PUNISHMENT, AND DETERRENCE 72 (1979). It is not clear, though, that
probation conditions can be classified either as rehabilitative or punitive because in
actuality most conditions contain both elements. See infra notes 514-19 and
accompanying text (discussing punitive elements in probation conditions).
It does not appear that incarceration as a method of punishment furthers the
reformation of the criminal. See GIBBS, supra, at 74, 77; HEINRICH OPPENHEIMER, THE
RATIONALES OF PUNISHMENT 252 (1975). Gibbs also suggests that "[r]ehabilitation is
difficult in a punitive context, and custody is perceived by offenders as punitive under the
best of conditions." GIBBS, supra, at 76. As probation becomes more punitive, see infra
notes 514-26 (discussing this trend), the debate can be formulated in two different ways:
(1) whether punitive probation conditions reform criminals; and (2) whether punitive
probation conditions have enough punitive elements in them that they are not truly
rehabilitative at all. The courts in State v. Burdin, 924 S.W.2d 82 (Tenn. 1996), and People
v. Letterlough, 655 N.E.2d 146 (N.Y. 1995), take this second approach. See infra notes
165-74 and accompanying text (discussing Burdin); infra notes 136-47 and accompanying
text (discussing Letterlough). The Florida District Court of Appeal, however, takes the
first approach, though it seems to assume that a punitive probation is rehabilitative. See
supra notes 77-103 and accompanying text (discussing Goldschmitt and Lindsay). This
Comment addresses the broader question of whether punitive probation conditions
reform or rehabilitate criminals. For an argument that alternative methods of
punishment can reform criminals, see GIBBS, supra, at 77-78. For an argument that all
forms of punishment fail to reform, see OPPENHEIMER, supra, at 251-54.
116. 528 N.E.2d 1360 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
117. See id. at 1361.
118. See id. at 1361-62. The court stated that it" 'may in addition to other reasonable
conditions relating to the nature of the offense or the rehabilitation of the defendant as
determined for each defendant in the proper discretion of the court require that the
person [fulfill certain specified conditions of supervision listed in the statute].' " Id.
(quoting 38 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-6-3.1(c) (West 1987) (current version at 730 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-6-3.1(c) (West 1997 & Supp. 1998))).
119. See id. at 1362.
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intended probation conditions to help the defendant rehabilitate and
avoid future criminal behavior, 120  and it concluded that the
advertisement exceeded these bounds because of its potential for
subjecting the defendant to public ridicule.121  The court also
expressed concern about the possible effects of the newspaper
advertisement on the defendant: "Neither the trial court nor this
court, without professional assistance, can determine the
psychological or psychiatric effect of the publication. An adverse
effect upon the defendant would certainly be inconsistent with
rehabilitation and with the statutory provision allowing the court to
require psychological or psychiatric treatment."'2 For these reasons,
the court eliminated the newspaper advertisement condition of
probation.123
In the most recent scarlet-letter case in Illinois, a defendant
convicted of aggravated battery was forced to erect a large sign at all
entrances to his family farm stating "Warning! A Violent Felon lives
here. Enter at your own risk!"' 24 Analyzing whether the trial court
had the authority to order the erection of the signs, the Illinois
Supreme Court looked to the Illinois Code of Corrections, which
allows the trial court to devise its own probation conditions.'2 To
decide whether erecting the signs was a reasonable condition, the
court looked to the purpose of probation: "to benefit society by
restoring a defendant to useful citizenship, rather than allowing a
defendant to become a burden as an habitual offender.' 2 6 The court
noted that probation conditions contain both rehabilitative and
punitive elements.' The court added, however, that the fact that a
probation condition may serve as punishment does not mean that it is
reasonable under the statute.'2
120. See id.
121. See id.
122. Id.
123. See id. The concurrence agreed that the newspaper advertisement went beyond
the statutory limits, but did not share the majority's concern over the possible negative
side-effects of the advertisement. See id. at 1362-63 (Green, J., specially concurring).
124. People v. Meyer, 680 N.E.2d 315,316 (Ill. 1997).
125. See id. (noting that Illinois law provides trial courts with a listing of permissible
probation conditions" 'in addition to other reasonable conditions relating to the nature of
the offense or the rehabilitation of the defendant as determined for each defendant in the
proper discretion of the [c]ourt'" (quoting 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/5-6-3(b) (West
1994)(current version at 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/5-6-3(b) (West 1997 & Supp. 1998)))).
126. Id. at 318.
127. See id.
128. See id. ("Although the sign may foster the goals of probation to the extent that it
punishes the defendant and protects the public, furtherance of these two goals alone does
not render the condition reasonable.").
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
The court then discussed several problems with the required
signs. First, the court was concerned with "unpredictable or
unintended" consequences of posting such a sign that would not be
consistent with probation's rehabilitative function.12 9 Second, the
court was concerned that the probation condition might serve to
humiliate or ridicule the defendant publicly because it formally
announced the defendant's offense. 10 The court pointed out that
shame was not the purpose of the statute's enumerated probation
conditions, and that the purpose of the signs was primarily to
punish. 31 The court noted that the legislature, not the judiciary, had
the authority to "define and fix punishment.' 31 2  The court's final
concern was that the signs would have an "adverse effect"1 33 on the
innocent people who lived with defendant, including the defendant's
wife and his elderly mother.' 34 For these reasons, the court held that
in forcing the defendant to post the signs, the trial court exceeded its
authority and abused its discretion. 35
E. New York
New York's highest court has been unwilling to uphold a scarlet-
letter probation condition. In People v. Letterlough,36 the court
struck down a probation condition that forced a repeat DWI offender
to place a fluorescent sign on his bumper saying "Convicted DWI"
because the condition was not reasonably related to the defendant's
rehabilitation and because the imposition of the condition was
outside the trial court's authority. 37 The court first looked to the
appropriate probation provision of the New York Penal Code, which
states that a court has discretion to create a probation condition that
129. See id. at 320. The court seemed to think the appellate courts' concerns in People
v. Johnson, 528 N.E.2d 1360 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988), and State v. Burdin, 924 S.W.2d 82
(Tenn. 1996), were important. See Meyer, 680 N.E.2d at 319. The Johnson court was
concerned with the psychological harm on the probationer of a forced newspaper apology.
See Johnson, 528 N.E.2d at 1362. The Burdin court's concern was that no one could
predict the effects of the scarlet-letter condition (a sign similar to the one in Meyer) on
both the defendant and society. See Burdin, 924 S.W.2d at 87. For a discussion of
Johnson, see supra notes 116-23 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Burdin, see
infra notes 165-74 and accompanying text.
130. See Meyer, 680 N.E.2d at 320.
131. See id.
132. Id.
133. See id. The court did not explain the nature of the adverse effect.
134. See id. The court also was concerned about the adverse effects on two adult
children and young grandchildren who sometimes visited the defendant's farm. See id.
135. See id.
136. 655 N.E.2d 146 (N.Y. 1995).
137. Id. at 146-47.
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is "reasonably necessary" to the defendant's rehabilitation. 8
Besides a list of general probation conditions, the current New York
Penal Code also provides a catch-all provision allowing the trial court
to fashion its own probation conditions so long as they are
"'reasonably related to [defendant's] rehabilitation.' "139
Looking to the legislative intent of the statute, the court noted
that "[d]espite the inherent overlap and the difficulty in drawing lines
between rehabilitative and punitive or deterrent sanctions, the
Legislature did not mention punishment or deterrence as goals to be
obtained through the imposition of probationary conditions."14'
Because the statute focused only on rehabilitation, the court
concluded that the statute only authorized conditions that were
"fundamentally 'rehabilitative' in the sense of that word that
distinguishes it from the societal goals of punishment or
deterrence." 4 More serious sanctions, such as imprisonment, better
serve the goals of punishment and deterrence and are reserved for
those convicted of more serious crimes.'
The problem with the fluorescent sign, the court decided, was
that its primary purpose was not to rehabilitate but to warn society
against the defendant.43 The court determined not only that the
probation condition was so punitive and deterrent in its effect as to
"overshadow" any possible rehabilitative effects but also that the
probation condition might even negate the other more therapeutic
probation conditions.'" The court concluded that the decision to
authorize such probation conditions was best left for the
legislature. 45
The New York Court of Appeals relied on the traditional
138. See id. at 148. The court noted that a probation condition "'shall be such as the
court, in its discretion, deems reasonably necessary to insure that the defendant will lead
a law-abiding life or to assist him to do so.'" Id. (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW § 65.10(1)
(McKinney 1987)).
139. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 65.10(2)(1) (McKinney 1998).
140. Letterlough, 655 N.E.2d at 149.
141. Id.
142. See id.
143. See id.
144. See id. at 150.
145. See id. The court stated that probation conditions require "[s]tate-wide
uniformity and the kind of policy choices that only an elected Legislature can make." Id.
The court did not address any constitutional questions. The defendant's counsel argued
at trial that the sign violated both the state and federal constitutions, see id. at 147, and it
seems likely that these same issues were raised on appeal. Because the court determined
that the fluorescent sign violated New York's probation statute, it did not reach the
constitutional dimensions of the case.
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distinction between punishment and rehabilitation in its analysis,
though it did note that drawing a line between the two is often
difficult.146 Yet as the dissent was quick to point out, the creation of
such distinct categories is itself problematic: "The sentencing
environment does not abide a theoretical purity that would cabin
'punishment' and 'rehabilitation' into such discrete, mutually
exclusive universes .... [O]ne could hardly imagine the actuality of a
purely rehabilitative condition, no less countenance a legal principle
that would require such unattainable segregation.' 47
F. North Carolina
The North Carolina Court of Appeals is now considering its first
scarlet-letter probation case. In State v. Mewborn,'4 the defendant is
challenging a probation condition that forces him to wear each day
either a black sweatshirt or a black T-shirt with blaze orange printing
that reads "Convicted Dope Dealer" if he chooses to live in the
state.49 The defendant is arguing that the condition violates a North
Carolina statute that gives the trial court general power to impose
probation conditions as long as the conditions "are reasonably
necessary to insure that the defendant will lead a law-abiding life or
to assist him to do so.""' The defendant claims that the condition is
not reasonably related to rehabilitation or to insuring that he lead a
law-abiding life.15' The condition makes it impossible, the defendant
maintains, for him to stay gainfully employed, another required
condition,"2 and the "choice" of whether to wear the T-shirt and
remain in the state or to leave the state amounts to de facto
banishment.53 The defendant also is alleging that the condition
146. See id. at 149. For a discussion of this distinction, see 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE &
AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 1.5, at 31,33 (1986).
147. Letterlough, 655 N.E.2d at 153 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting). For an argument that
the Letterlough court's analysis "offers an unduly narrow view of punishment and vastly
oversimplifies the reality of incarceration and probation," see Developments in the Law-
Alternative Punishments, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1863, 1975 (1998) [hereinafter Alternative
Punishments].
148. No. COA98-28 (N.C. Ct. App. filed Feb. 28,1998).
149. Defendant-Appellant's Brief at 2, Mewborn (No. COA98-28).
150. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1343 (1988).
151. See Defendant-Appellant's Brief at 7, Mewborn (No. COA98-28).
152. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1343(b)(7) (requiring as a general condition of
probation that the defendant remain gainfully employed).
153. See Defendant-Appellant's Brief at 7-8, Mewborn (No. COA98-28) (citing State
v. Doughtie, 237 N.C. 368, 74 S.E.2d 922 (1953); State v. Setzer, 35 N.C. App. 734, 242
S.E.2d 509 (1978); State v. Culp, 30 N.C. App. 398,226 S.E.2d 841 (1976)).
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violates the Eighth Amendment as a cruel and unusual punishment1 54
and that it violates the First Amendment because it is forcing him to
speak. 55
The State's argument is that the probation condition is
reasonably related to the defendant's rehabilitation because the
condition will remind him that he is being punished for his crime and
will force him to assume the full consequences of his actions.156 The
defendant will come to know the true implications of what he has
done and will be less likely to commit future crimes. 57 Furthermore,
the State maintains that the condition does not amount to cruel and
unusual punishment.158 Finally, the State argues that the condition is
not a violation of the defendant's First Amendment free speech right
because the defendant "still has the right to say anything protected by
the First Amendment.' 5 9
G. Oregon
A famous scarlet-letter probation condition occurred in Oregon,
where, as a condition of probation, a man convicted of sexual abuse
was forced to post a sign on his home and one on his automobile for
five years that read "Dangerous Sex Offender."' 60 He challenged the
probation condition, but the Oregon Court of Appeals held that the
case was moot 6' because his probation was revoked after he filed his
154. See id. at 9; see also U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (prohibiting "cruel and unusual
punishments"). Interestingly, the defendant also is arguing that the condition is either
cruel or unusual under the state constitution. See Defendant-Appellant's Brief at 8-9,
Mewborn (No. COA98-28); see also N.C. CONST. art. I, § 27 ("[N]or [shall] cruel or
unusual punishments [be] inflicted."). Justice Harry Martin of the North Carolina
Supreme Court has interpreted this clause to be "more inclusive than the Eighth
Amendment." Medley v. North Carolina Dep't of Correction, 330 N.C. 837, 846, 412
S.E.2d 654, 660 (1992) (Martin, J., concurring); see Defendant-Appellant's Brief at 8-9,
Mewborn (No. COA98-28).
155. See Defendant-Appellant's Brief at 9-10, Mewborn (No. COA98-28) (citing Riley
v. National Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781 (1988); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705
(1977); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)). For a
discussion of these compelled-speech cases, see infra notes 427-45 and accompanying text
(discussing Riley); infra notes 388-403 and accompanying text (discussing Wooley); infra
notes 364-78 and accompanying text (discussing Barnette).
156. See Brief for the State at 15-16, Mewborn (No. COA98-28).
157. See id. at 15.
158. See id. at 16. The State offers no analysis on this point, and it does not touch
upon the defendant's "cruel or unusual" argument under the North Carolina Constitution.
See id.; supra notes 150-54 (discussing the defendant's argument).
159. Brief for the State at 16, Mewborn (No. COA98-28). The State does not address
the compelled speech argument.
160. State v. Bateman, 771 P.2d 314,316 (Or. Ct. App. 1989) (en banc).
161. See State v. Bateman, 765 P.2d 249,249 (Or. Ct. App. 1988).
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appeal.16 In his appeal of the probation revocation, the defendant
argued that the revocation was invalid because it was based on his
having violated an unlawful probation condition; because the
revocation was invalid, any sentence imposed automatically exceeded
the maximum allowed by law. 6' The court of appeals, however,
determined that it had the authority to decide only whether the
length of the sentence itself was lawful and that the defendant's
claims were beyond its scope of review."6 Consequently, the legality
of the probation condition was never resolved.
H. Tennessee
In State v. Burdin,65 a convicted child molester challenged a
probation condition requiring him to post a sign in his yard for six
months that stated: "Warning, all children. Wayne Burdin is an
admitted and convicted child molester. Parents beware. '166
Tennessee's probation statute, like that of New York, has the
primary purpose of rehabilitation.1 67 The probation statute has a
catch-all provision, requiring a probationer to meet any other
conditions that reasonably relate to his sentence and that do not
unduly restrict his liberty. 68 The court in Burdin rejected the State's
argument that the primary purpose of probation was no longer
rehabilitation,69 maintaining that the catch-all provision did not grant
the trial court "unfettered authority" to create punishments that go
"beyond the bounds of traditional notions of rehabilitation. 17 O Thus,
the court struck down the probation condition on statutory
grounds.'7'
162. See Bateman, 771 P.2d at 316. His probation was revoked because he had
violated his probation conditions, including the requirement that he post the sign, and he
was incarcerated. See id
163. See id. at 318.
164. See id. at 318-19.
165. 924 S.W.2d 82 (Tenn. 1996).
166. Id. at 84.
167. See id. at 84-85 (citing TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-35-102, 40-35-303 (Supp. 1995));
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 65.10(1) (McKinney 1998).
168. See id. at 85 (noting that the probationer must "'[s]atisfy any other conditions
reasonably related to the purpose of the offender's sentence and not unduly restrictive of
the offender's liberty, or incompatible with the offender's freedom of conscience, or
otherwise prohibited by this chapter'" (quoting TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-303(d)(9)
(Supp. 1995)).
169. See id. at 86.
170. Id. at 87.
171. The defendant also challenged the probation condition on Eighth Amendment
grounds. See id. at 84. The court, however, refused to rule on the constitutional issue
because it had already declared the probation condition invalid under the probation
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Although the court insisted that the purpose of probation was
primarily to rehabilitate, it made no attempt to analyze whether the
sign at issue actually had a rehabilitative purpose." Indeed, the
court's main concern with the probation condition was that its effects
were uncertain because of the lack of "normal safeguards of
legislative study and debate.' 1 73 The court noted: "Posting the sign
in the defendant's yard would dramatically affect persons other than
the defendant and those charged with his supervision ....
[C]ompliance with the condition would have consequences in the
community, perhaps beneficial, perhaps detrimental, but in any event
unforeseen and unpredictable."' 4
As these cases illustrate, there is some conflict concerning the
validity of scarlet-letter probation conditions. The most successful
arguments against scarlet-letter probation conditions seem to rely on
state probation statutes rather than the Constitution. Yet such
conditions do raise constitutional concerns. The conditions'
similarities to colonial shaming penalties 5 implicate the Eighth
Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.176
Furthermore, such conditions allow judges to compel probationers to
"speak" publicly of their own convictions, which raises First
Amendment concerns. 77 Parts II and III provide background on
these constitutional issues.
II. SCARLET-LETTER PROBATION CONDITIONS AS PUNISHMENT:
EIGHTH AMENDMENT CONCERNS
Courts have been reluctant to apply the Eighth Amendment to
probation conditions. Yet for jurisdictions that consider probation
statute. See id. at 87.
172. That the court did not analyze whether the sign had a rehabilitative purpose may
have been due to the State's tactics in this case. Apparently, the State did not argue that
the sign had a rehabilitative purpose, but instead argued that the statute no longer
required a rehabilitative purpose, relying heavily on Goldschmitt and Lindsay. See id. at
85-86; see also supra notes 77-103 and accompanying text (discussing Goldschmitt and
Lindsay).
173. Burdin, 924 S.W.2d at 87.
174. Id.
175. See infra notes 186-99, 224 and accompanying text (discussing shaming as a
punishment).
176. See U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII.
177. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. Of course, one response to this is that probationers do
not have a First Amendment right to be silent. For a discussion of the standards used to
determine a probationer's constitutional rights, see infra notes 544-61 and accompanying
text.
17& See infra notes 290,493 and accompanying text.
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a sentence, 79 probation is clearly a punishment. Even in jurisdictions
where the primary purpose of probation is still rehabilitation,18 some
probation conditions contain punitive elements that invoke Eighth
Amendment concerns.'8 ' This Part considers shaming as a
punishment, looking at conflicting theories concerning whether
shaming in American society can serve the ends of punishment. This
Part also discusses the Supreme Court's definition of punishment and
its test for determining cruel and unusual punishments. 87 Finally, the
discussion turns to an Eighth Amendment analysis of scarlet-letter
probation conditions. It argues that scarlet-letter probation
conditions are essentially punitive in nature' 8' and then analyzes
whether such conditions constitute "cruel and unusual" punishment
under the Eighth Amendment.184 This Part concludes that scarlet-
letter probation conditions probably will survive Eighth Amendment
scrutiny.8 5
A. Shaming Penalties in Colonial America
Shaming penalties or scarlet-letter conditions have their
precursors in colonial America." 6 Early colonists employed a wide
range of shaming devices. 7  Besides the infamous stocks and
pillories, where criminals often had to bear signs listing their
offenses,' penalties included forced public apologies,8 9 stigmatizing
labels,19 the bilbo,' 9' the ducking stool,' 92 and public whippings. 93
179. See infra notes 520-21 and accompanying text.
180. See infra note 508 and accompanying text.
181. See infra notes 513-19 and accompanying text.
182. See infra notes 225-87 and accompanying text.
183. See infra notes 288-323 and accompanying text.
184. See infra notes 324-59 and accompanying text.
185. See infra note 359 and accompanying text.
186. For a discussion of colonial shaming penalties, see Massaro, supra note 12, at
1912-15; Brilliant, supra note 54, at 1361-62; Courtney Guyton Persons, Note, Sex in the
Sunlight: The Effectiveness, Efficiency, Constitutionality and Advisability of Publishing
Names and Pictures of Prostitutes' Patrons, 49 VAND. L. REv. 1525, 1533-34 (1996).
187. For a list of these devices, see Massaro, supra note 12, at 1912-14.
188. See id. at 1913. One student commentator has noted that "[t]he stocks and pillory
inflicted primarily psychological rather than physical punishment." Brilliant, supra note
54, at 1361.
189. This practice was documented in seventeenth century Virginia and was practiced
by both the church and the state. See Massaro, supra note 12, at 1913. An "offender" was
forced to confess her sin publicly to the congregation, sometimes while wearing a white
cloth, and beg for forgiveness. See id.
190. One example is the "A" that Hester Pryne was forced to wear in The Scarlet
Letter. See HAWTHORNE, supra note 14, at 58. Branding, a form of permanent labeling,
also was practiced. See Massaro, supra note 12, at 1913.
191. The bilbo was an iron bar that had two sliding shackles that locked together a
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Yet it was the particular cultural context of the colonies that made
these shaming punishments effective. 194 As one commentator has
written: "The colonial shaming practices can only be understood in
light of the community's religious beliefs, childrearing techniques,
and other culture-specific features."' 95 Because of the small size and
isolation of the communities, there was a peculiar intimacy among
individuals within each community. 96 The criminal in the pillory
could be one's next door neighbor. 97 Furthermore, there was
considerable interdependence within a small, sometimes struggling
colony; therefore, the fear of losing face in the community was
increased. 98 In the New England colonies, the Puritan method of
child-rearing, with its emphasis on strict obedience to parental
authority, also increased the individual's sensitivity to shame and
public exposure. 99
These shaming punishments lost popularity during the early
prisoner's legs. See Massaro, supra note 12, at 1913.
192- See id. at 1914. The ducking stool was a seat attached to a plank over water. The
culprit, tied to the chair, would be "ducked" into the water. See WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW
COLLEGIATE DIcTIoNARY 387 (9th ed. 1988). The ducking stool was a common
punishment device for women. See Massaro, supra note 12, at 1914.
193. See James E. Robertson, Houses of the Dead: Warehouse Prisons, Paradigm
Change, and the Supreme Court, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 1003, 1015-16 (1997). One of the first
public acts passed in Boston provided for the construction of a whipping post in the
town's marketplace. See JOSIAH HENRY BENTON, THE STORY OF THE OLD BOSTON
TOWN HOUSE 1658-1711, at 7 (1908).
194. See Massaro, supra note 12, at 1916-17.
195. Id. at 1915.
196. See Adam J. Hirsch, From Pillory to Penitentiary: The Rise of Criminal
Incarceration in Early Massachusetts, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1179, 1223-24 (1982); Massaro,
supra note 12, at 1912; Brilliant, supra note 54, at 1361 (describing early societies,
including colonial societies, as "close-knit"). Indeed, when Boston was first settled, the
settlers would not allow new inhabitants to move into the settlement without the consent
of the town. See BENTON, supra note 193, at 7. A townsperson was not allowed to keep
strangers in the town for more than 14 days without the permission of the selectmen
(town council). See id. Benton noted what he called "contradictory tendencies" between
the early Bostonians' "claim for unrestricted liberty" and their "most detailed supervision
of personal conduct." Id. at 9.
197. According to Benton, the early Bostonians did not "respect sex or age" in their
use of punishments. BENTON, supra note 193, at 42.
198. See GEORGE IvES, A HISTORY OF PENAL METHODS: CRIMINALS, WITCHES,
LUNATICS 55 (1914).
199. See Massaro, supra note 12, at 1915. Professor Peter Gregg Slater discusses the
writings of Timothy Dwight, a New England authority on child-rearing during the late
eighteenth century. See PETER GREGG SLATER, CHILDREN IN THE NEW ENGLAND
MIND 95 (1977). Professor Slater notes that "[tiotal subordination to the parental will
began as soon as the child was capable of reason." Id. at 107. If parents correctly instilled
this subordination in their children, "acquiescence to their authority became an
internalized principle in the child, a central element of his character." Id.
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nineteenth century, though commentators offer different reasons why
this occurred. One argument is that both humanitarian and practical
concerns led to a preference for incarceration over public
spectacles.200 An opposing argument maintains that the preference
for imprisonment over shaming penalties at that time stemmed from
the belief that the shaming penalties had lost their power to shame.2"'
One student commentator has stated that shaming penalties
disappeared when America became more populous and more urban
and "universal community norms disappeared.""°  Regardless of
which theory is espoused, shaming declined in use as a punishment.
Today, shaming punishments are gaining in popularity again, yet
modern America is a far cry from the small, close-knit colony
communities.0 3 One commentator has proposed five conditions that
must be satisfied in order for shaming penalties to be effective.2 °4
First, the offender must belong to an identifiable group, like a
religious or ethnic community.20 5 Second, the form of the shaming
penalty must be sufficient to compromise the offender's social
standing in this group.20 6  Third, the punishment must be
communicated to the offender's community, and the community
200. See Massaro, supra note 12, at 1929. At that time, rehabilitation came to be
viewed as a proper goal of punishment, so the fact that shaming penalties declined in
popularity suggests that people did not believe that shaming penalties could serve this
function. See id.
201. See Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV.
591,631 (1996).
202. Persons, supra note 186, at 1534.
203. See Massaro, supra note 12, at 1882, 1916, 1923, 1935-36.
204. See id. at 1883 (summarizing the five conditions). Professor Kahan, in contrast,
offers three conditions for successful shaming penalties: (1) The punishment must be
imposed by "an agent invested with the moral authority of the community"; (2) the
punishment must send a message that the offender's conduct is wrong; and (3) the
punishment must "ritualistically" separate the offender from the community. Kahan,
supra note 201, at 636 (citing Harold Garfinkel, Conditions of Successful Degradation
Ceremonies, 61 AM. J. Soc. 420, 422-23 (1956)). One problem with applying this
definition to modem shaming conditions is that many communities do not view the police
as moral agents, but instead view them with suspicion and hostility. See Massaro, supra
note 12, at 1922. Also, because there is no method for reintegrating the offender into
society, the separation of the offender from society might be more than a ritualistic one.
See id. at 1924.
205. See Massaro, supra note 12, at 1883, 1901-02, 1916-17; see also Stephen P. Garvey,
Can Shaming Punishments Educate?, 65 U. CHI. L. REv. 733, 748 (1998) ("Shame
depends on an offender['s] having attachments to others in whose eyes he or she can, as a
result of these attachments, suffer shame." (footnote omitted)).
206. See Massaro, supra note 12, at 1883, 1902, 1916. Professor Massaro writes that if
the individual "must depend greatly on the group for social, economic, or political
support, or cannot leave the group easily, then a social sanction will have a tremendous
impact." Id. at 1916.
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must in fact withdraw or shun him.2" Fourth, the offender must
actually fear being shunned."8 Finaly, there must be some method
for regaining social status by bringing the offender back into her
community, unless the offense is so grave that the offender must be
permanently shunned.0 9
Some problems immediately arise when employing scarlet-letter
probation conditions in modem American society. First, although all
individuals are classifiable according to some group (for example,
class, race, or national origin), not all Americans are members of a
close-knit community to which they feel they belong.210 As one
commentator argues, "[r]esidential and occupational mobility,
coupled with a generally eroded sense of community, can undermine
the effectiveness of stigma punishments, even for the social groups
traditionally most sensitive to stigma."21' Second, a judge who
imposes scarlet-letter probation conditions must be sensitive to the
standards and morals of the offender's community in order to ensure
both that the community finds the offense worthy of punishment and
that the punishment will have the desired shunning effect. This may
require a busy judge to be part anthropologist, part psychologist.212
Finally, and most importantly, our culture's emphasis on
individualism may mean that we do not have the strong social
cohesiveness necessary for reintegration of the offender, 213 nor do our
207. See id. at 1883, 1903. Professor Massaro also discusses how the lack of a moral
consensus in American society may make it difficult for the government to create
-widespread attempts to shame criminals. See id. at 1923.
208. See Garvey, supra note 205, at 748; Massaro, supra note 12, at 1883, 1916, 1923.
209. See Massaro, supra note 12, at 1883, 1924, 1928.
210. See id. at 1922-23. Professor Kahan, however, states:
The breakdown of pervasive community ties at the outset of the industrial
revolution may have vitiated the stake that many individuals had in social status;
but the proliferation of new civic and professional communities-combined with
the ... new technologies for disseminating information-has at least partially
restored it for many others.
Kahan, supra note 201, at 642.
211. Massaro, supra note 12, at 1935.
212. See Massaro, supra note 12, at 1918, 1920, 1923-24; see also Garvey, supra note
205 at 748 (noting that if shaming penalties depend on the offender feeling shame, judges
will have difficulty determining which offenders can be shamed and which cannot, and
will likely be wrong in some instances).
213. See Massaro, supra note 12, at 1924-28; Persons, supra note 186, at 1539-40. For
many Americans, the criminal is an irredeemable deviant who must be locked away, not a
fellow citizen capable of rehabilitation. See Massaro, supra note 12, at 1926-27. But see
Kenneth Shuster, Halacha as a Model for American Penal Practice: A Comparison of
Halachic and American Punishment Methods, 19 NovA L. REv. 965, 1004 (1995) (finding
that this criticism of shaming penalties is "infirm since ... the criminal need not be
outside society to be embarrassed by his or her conduct"). Shuster, however, seems to
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criminal courts have a procedure for him to regain his lost status.21 4
Without this reintegration, a scarlet-letter probation condition may
be no more than "a retributive spectacle. 215
While some might find retribution a sufficient reason to justify
imposing such conditions,216 some concerns remain. First, from an
ethical perspective, it is alarming that modem American courts
impose conditions that are reminiscent of colonial shaming penalties,
especially if the probation conditions offer no hope of reintegrating
the offenders into society. Ethical considerations aside, however,
there is still the question of whether the conditions will effectively
punish offenders.1 7 Ironically, the individuals most capable of being
shamed are those who are strongly socialized, yet these individuals
are the least likely to commit a crime. 1 8 Another problem is that
members of certain subcultures may not feel shame from certain
punishments.219
miss Massaro's point that the shaming penalty itself may irreparably sever the criminal's
ties with the community. See Massaro, supra note 12, at 1928. Shuster admits that for
shaming penalties to work, the criminal must feel part of the social "family" and that
Americans must not view the criminal as an outsider. See Shuster, supra, at 1004. Yet, as
Professor Massaro points out, many Americans see criminals as outsiders. See Massaro,
supra note 12, at 1926-27.
214. See Massaro, supra note 12, at 1919.
215. Id. at 1884; cf. Lisa Anne Smith, The Moral Reform Theory of Punishment, 37
ARIz. L. REv. 197, 206 (1995) (analogizing shaming punishments "to making one who
fails his lessons sit in the comer in a dunce-cap"). Professor Kahan, however, argues that
shaming penalties fulfill the three different mechanisms necessary for deterrence: (1)
preference adaptation, in which the punishment sends a message to the offender that the
behavior is contrary to society's norms; (2) belief-dependent dispositions, in which the
punishment reinforces already-existing propensities to follow the law; and (3) goodwill, in
which the punishment causes the surrounding community to feel that the law accords with
its moral values. See Kahan, supra note 201, at 638-40; see also Shuster, supra note 213, at
1004-05 (arguing that even excessive shaming penalties are valuable because they enable
the public to protect itself from offenders); cf. Persons, supra note 186, at 1535
("[M]odem-day shame punishments denounce conduct outside shared moral norms.").
216. Cf. Kahan, supra note 201, at 645 ("[E]ven if we assume that shaming penalties
are uniquely and irreparably stigmatizing, the critics have failed to demonstrate that they
are self-defeating."); Persons, supra note 186, at 1535 ("Shame punishments allow courts
and communities dissatisfied with existing modes of punishment to strike back.").
217. See Kahan, supra note 201, at 637 (arguing that shaming practices can be
"effective and just"). But see Massaro, supra note 12, at 1884 (arguing that public
shaming will not be an effective punishment and generally will not serve to deter crime;
Donna DiGiovanni, Comment, The Bumper Sticker: The Innovation That Failed, 22 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 643, 670 (1988) (concluding that bumper sticker shaming conditions fail to
meet "any of the acceptable goals of punishment fully").
218. See Massaro, supra note 12, at 1918.
219. See Garvey, supra note 205, at 749; Kahan, supra note 201, at 636; Massaro, supra
note 12, at 1923. This problem occurs within juvenile delinquent subcultures, where a
gang member may receive greater respect from his peers for being incarcerated. See
FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON J. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT IN
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Even if there are social norms that all Americans can agree
upon, some individuals will be willing to defy these norms and may
not be affected by shaming penalties.' 0 The rich, by virtue of their
wealth, are able to defy social norms, and the poor may have nothing
to lose in defying them."1 It is the middle-class, more so than the rich
and the poor, that may be most susceptible to shaming penalties,
because its members are in constant fear of losing social status and
slipping into a lower class.' Yet even many middle-class offenders
may be impervious to shaming punishments because of the
opportunity to move to a new community and because of the general
lack of a sense of community.'
B. The Supreme Court's Definition of Cruel and Unusual
Punishment
Historically, shaming an offender was a form of punishment, and
though commentators disagree as to the effectiveness of shaming
criminals in modern America, they do seem to agree that the new
shaming techniques are a form of punishment as well.' To
CRIME CONTROL 216-17 (1973).
220. See Kahan, supra note 201, at 636. Professor Kahan notes, however, that even if
an offender is not disgraced by the punishment, it can still serve as a symbol of the
community's disapproval; in fact, if the community perceives the offender as not shamed,
this perception may reinforce its condemnation of him. See id. at 636-37.
221. See Massaro, supra note 12, at 1916-17. Professor Kahan finds this argument
plausible as applied to the poor, but thinks that it merely means judges should be selective
about the use of shaming. See Kahan, supra note 201, at 644.
222. See Massaro, supra note 12, at 1933-34. Professor Massaro notes that the middle-
class is "precariously balanced" because its members have not achieved, and probably will
never achieve, the "immunity" from shunning that great wealth or social standing afford.
Id. at 1934. Yet being demoted to a lower class is "always a distinct possibility" because
middle-class status "hinges on steady income and observation of middle-class rules of
behavior." Id. If bad luck occurs and there is a "[loss of one's job, major illness, divorce,
or notorious violation of middle-class norms," a member of the middle-class may slide
into a lower class. Id.
223. See Kahan, supra note 201, at 642 (noting "[t]he breakdown of pervasive
community ties at the outset of the industrial revolution"); Massaro, supra note 12, at
1935 (noting the "generally eroded sense of community"). Professor Massaro finds that
shaming penalties work best "within relatively bounded, close-knit communities, whose
members 'don't mind their own business' and who rely on each other." Massaro, supra
note 12, at 1916 (quoting JOHN BRAITHvAITE, CRIME, SHAME, AND REINTEGRATION 8
(1989)). Professor Massaro believes that "[p]opulation increases and geographical
expanse confound ... efforts" to reestablish the tradition of shaming. Id. at 1922.
224. See Filcik, supra note 54, at 323 (concluding that scarlet-letter probation
conditions "reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote, respect for the law, and
provide just punishment"); Massaro, supra note 12, at 1886 (describing shaming
techniques as "penalties" that are "one strand of a larger movement to expand the
sentencer's arsenal of penalties"); Brilliant, supra note 54, at 1360 (arguing that "[a]
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determine if scarlet-letter probation conditions amount to
unconstitutional punishment under the Eighth Amendment,
however, one must consider how the Supreme Court analyzes
whether a condition is a punishment.
The Supreme Court has never devised a test for what constitutes
a punishment under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the
Eighth Amendment. It has, however, offered conflicting tests for
determining what constitutes a punishment in other types of cases.
One analysis the Court has employed is found in Kennedy v.
Mendoza-Martinez,225 in which the Court held that statutes which
divest draft dodgers of citizenship are unconstitutional because,
although punitive, they do not afford the procedural safeguards
guaranteed by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. 26 In determining
whether the statutes were punitive, the Court looked at several
factors, including "[w]hether the sanction involve[d] an affirmative
disability or restraint, whether it ha[d] historically been regarded as a
punishment,... [and] whether its operation [would] promote the
traditional aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence." 227 In
Hudson v. United States,' the Supreme Court made it clear 29 that
the Mendoza-Martinez factors "provide useful guideposts" in
survey of scarlet-letter type probation conditions suggests that the premise that probation
is 'punishment' holds credence").
225. 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
226. See U.S. CONST. amends. V & VI; Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 164-70.
227. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168. Other factors the Court listed include
"whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter,... whether the behavior to
which it applies is already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may
rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to
the alternative purpose assigned." Id. at 168-69. The Court went on to say that these
factors "may often point in differing directions." Id. at 169.
228. 118 S. Ct. 488 (1997) (holding that statutes under which the Office of Comptroller
of Currency imposed monetary penalties and debarred bank officers did not give rise to a
Double Jeopardy Clause violation).
229. Before Hudson, the Court had employed only one of the Mendoza-Martinez
factors in its double jeopardy analysis: whether the sanction appeared excessive in
relation to its purpose. See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989), overruled
by Hudson, 118 S. Ct. 488 (1997); see also Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168-69 (listing
factors to consider when determining whether a sanction is punitive). The Court held in
Halper that a defendant who "already has been punished in a criminal prosecution may
not be subjected to an additional civil sanction to the extent that the second sanction may
not fairly be characterized as remedial, but only as a deterrent or retribution." Halper,
490 U.S. at 448-49. In Hudson, the Court noted that Halper deviated from "longstanding
double jeopardy principles" in two ways: by bypassing whether the sanction in question
was criminal and by assessing the character of the sanction actually imposed, rather than
assessing the statute that authorized the sanction. Hudson, 118 S. Ct. at 494. The Hudson
Court recognized as problematic the fact that Halper elevated a single Mendoza-Martinez
factor over others, while Mendoza-Martinez emphasized no one single factor. See id.
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determining whether a legislatively created penalty constitutes a
criminal punishment for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause.3
It is unclear, however, whether the Mendoza-Martinez factors
apply to the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause."3  The Court held in Austin v. United States"2 that the
Mendoza-Martinez factors do not apply to the Excessive Fines
Clause.33 In its analysis of a civil forfeiture, the Court stated, "the
question is not ... whether forfeiture ... is civil or criminal, but
rather whether it is punishment."' 4  The Court believed the
government's reliance on Mendoza-Martinez was "misplaced." 35
Ironically, as one commentator has pointed out, the Austin Court in
fact relied on four of the seven Mendoza-Martinez factors. 6 What
this reliance suggests is that the test still has relevancy in determining
whether a probation condition is a punishment. The problem is that
the Court applies different standards of what constitutes punishment
according to different constitutional concerns.
230. Hudson, 118 S. Ct. at 493.
231. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
232. 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
233. See id. at 622; see also U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.").
234. Austin, 509 U.S. at 610.
235. See id. at 610 n.6.
236. See Carol S. Steiker, Punishment and Procedure: Punishment Theory and the
Criminal-Civil Procedural Divide, 85 GEO. L.J. 775, 798 (1997) (citing Austin, 509 U.S. at
618-20). Professor Steiker notes four factors: "relying on the historical understanding of
forfeitures as punishment, the focus on the culpability of the owner in the forfeiture
statutes, the direct connection of the civil forfeiture to the commission of a criminal
offense, and the emphasis on the deterrent effect of forfeitures in the legislative history."
Id. at 798-99 & n.132 (citing Austin, 509 U.S. at 618-20).
237. See Steiker, supra note 236, at 798. Professor Steiker finds it "[m]ost perplexing"
that "the Court held within the space of three years that, while civil forfeitures can be so
'punitive' so as to implicate the Eighth Amendment's proscription against excessive fines,
they cannot be so punitive so as to implicate the Fifth Amendment's prohibition of double
jeopardy." Id. (citing United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 278 (1996); Austin, 509 U.S.
at 618).
To complicate matters further, there also is confusion as to whether the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause applies to civil matters. In Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651
(1977), the Court held that cruel and unusual punishment scrutiny does not apply to
disciplinary corporal punishment in schools, stating that "Eighth Amendment scrutiny is
appropriate only after the State has complied with the constitutional guarantees
traditionally associated with criminal prosecutions." Id. at 671 n.40; see also Browning-
Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 275-76 (1989) (holding that the
Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment does not apply to punitive damages in
a civil suit between two private parties).
Clearly, the Court's statement in Ingraham is contrary to the holding in Austin that in
rem civil forfeitures are subject to the Excessive Fines Clause. See Austin, 509 U.S. at
622. Furthermore, the Austin Court suggested that the Eighth Amendment as a whole is
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Just as the Court has never defined what constitutes punishment
for Eighth Amendment purposes, so also it has never defined
precisely what constitutes a cruel and unusual punishment. 21 In
analyzing whether a punishment is cruel and unusual, the Court has
looked to the Framers' intent to determine what kinds of
punishments were considered cruel and unusual at the time of the
adoption of the Bill of Rights.239 Early cases focused on acts of
tyranny by the English monarchies as illustrative of what the Clause
was meant to prohibit.24 For example, cruel and unusual implied
"something inhuman and barbarous," involving "torture or a
lingering death."241
not tied to criminal matters, because it recognized no such limitation in either the text or
the history of the Amendment. See id. at 608-09. The Court noted in Austin that
"'[a]fter deciding to confine the benefits of the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth
Amendment to criminal proceedings, the Framers turned their attention to the Eighth
Amendment. There were no proposals to limit that Amendment to criminal proceedings
.... '" Id. (quoting Browning-Ferris Indus., 492 U.S. at 294). Although the Austin Court
relied on Halper for the notion that" 'punishment... cuts across the division between the
civil and the criminal law,' "Austin, 509 U.S. at 610 (quoting United States v. Halper, 490
U.S. 435, 447-48 (1989)), this notion is still sound law. See Hudson v. United States, 118 S.
Ct. 488, 495 (1997) ("The Eighth Amendment protects against excessive civil fines,
including forfeitures." (citing Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 554-55 (1993);
Austin, 509 U.S. at 608)). Interestingly, Alexander concerned a criminal forfeiture, not a
civil one. See Alexander, 509 U.S. at 559 n.4. In any event, probation conditions clearly
meet the threshold requirement of Ingraham, as they arise from criminal prosecutions.
See Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 671 n.40.
The Court also had occasion to discuss a definition of punishment for Eighth
Amendment purposes in Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991). In Wilson, the Court held
that prisoners claiming cruel and unusual punishment must show at least deliberate
indifference by prison officials. See id. at 303. The Court quoted Judge Posner: "'The
infliction of punishment js a deliberate act intended to chastise or deter. This is what the
word means today; it is what it meant in the eighteenth century.'" Id. at 300 (quoting
Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 652 (7th Cir. 1985)).
238. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 368 (1910) (holding that 12 years of
labor in irons for the crime of falsifying public records was both cruel-because of its
excessiveness-and unusual and noting that "[w]hat constitutes a cruel and unusual
punishment has never been exactly decided").
239. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405-06 (1986). The Ford Court held that
the Eighth Amendment prohibited a state from executing a person who has become
legally insane after conviction. See id. at 410.
240. See Weems, 217 U.S. at 368. A short review of the history of the Eighth
Amendment is helpful. The text of the Amendment was taken almost verbatim from the
Virginia Declaration of Rights of 1776, which was derived from the English Bill of Rights
of 1689. See Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 664 (discussing the history of the Eighth
Amendment). The English version was designed to limit the excesses of English judges
under the reign of King James II. See id. It was created in reaction to either the "Bloody
Assize," which were trials of treason conducted by Chief Justice Jeffreys after the
rebellion of the Duke of Monmouth, or the prosecution of Titus Oates for perjury. See id.
241. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436,447 (1890); see also Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130,
136 (1878) (noting that torture would be considered cruel and unusual). In Kemmler, the
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As early as 1910, however, the Court began to question whether
the Framers really intended that the clause be applied so narrowly.
In Weems v. United States,24 the Court reasoned that the Framers
must have known there were cruelties besides those involving pain or
mutilation, because they realized that the legislature had the power
both to criminalize behavior and to fix the terms of imprisonment.243
Also, the Framers generally feared that those in power might become
cruel.2' The Court decided, therefore, that the Eighth Amendment
must have a broader application than merely outlawing torture.245
The Court stated that although legislation is enacted "from an
experience of evils," it should not necessarily be confined to the type
of evil that the legislation was originally intended to combat. 46
Because times change, "a principle to be vital must be capable of
wider application than the mischief which gave it birth," and the
Court believed this principal to be especially true for constitutions.247
Yet if the death penalty is not cruel and unusual punishment,24
one wonders about the actual breadth of the Eighth Amendment.
Chief Justice Warren in Trop v. Dulles24 9 made it clear that the death
penalty was not an exemplary constitutional punishment." The
Chief Justice spoke eloquently of the purpose of the Eighth
Amendment, stating that the "basic concept underlying the Eighth
Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man," and that the
Amendment ensures that the government wields its power to punish
only within the bounds of "civilized standards."' 1 He explained that
traditional punishments such as fines, incarceration, and even
execution could be imposed, but that punishments beyond the scope
Court held that death by electrocution was not cruel and unusual. See Kemmler, 136 U.S.
at 443-44. In Wilkerson, the Court held that death by "shooting" was not considered cruel
and unusual punishment. See Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 136-37.
242. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
243. See id. at 372-73.
244. See id. at 373.
245. See id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976) (plurality opinion)' (holding that
the death penalty for the crime of murder does not in all circumstances violate the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments).
249. 356 U.S. 86 (1958). The Court held in this case that the Eighth Amendment
forbids the use of denationalization as a punishment. See id. at 101.
250. See id. at 99 ("[L]et us put to one side the death penalty as an index of the
constitutional limit on punishment .... [T]he existence of the death penalty is not a
license to the Government to devise any punishment short of death within the limit of its
imagination.").
251. Id. at 100.
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of the traditional were "constitutionally suspect."2 52 The meaning of
the Eighth Amendment is not static, but "must draw its meaning
from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society."2 53
The case that best illustrates the method employed by the Court
in analyzing these "evolving standards" is Gregg v. Georgia 4  In
determining the Eighth Amendment's application, Justice Stewart
stated that society's "contemporary values" concerning a particular
punishment should be assessed, but instead of relying on the Court's
subjective decision as to the nature of these values, the Court must
instead look to "objective indicia" that will illustrate current public
attitudes towards the offense.255  In determining "contemporary
values," Justice Stewart wrote that the Court should look to state
statutes. 6 Also, the jury, because of its direct involvement in the
case, is another objective indicia. 7 These standards alone, however,
cannot be conclusive, for "[a] penalty must also accord with 'the
dignity of man.' "258 At the least, Justice Stewart stated, "the
punishment must not be 'excessive.' "219
Justice Stewart then explained the two-part test for determining
whether a punishment is excessive when analyzing it in the abstract:
(1) whether the punishment involves the "unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain"; and (2) whether the punishment is "grossly out of
proportion to the severity of the crime. 2 60  Though courts play a
limited role and occasionally must defer to the legislature, judges do
have an important role to play because the purpose of the Eighth
252. See id.
253. Id. at 101.
254. 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (plurality opinion) (holding that the death penalty for
the crime of murder is not a per se violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments).
Although it was a plurality opinion, the analysis in Gregg has been adopted by a majority
of the Court. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370-73 (1989) (plurality opinion);
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 300 (1987). The McCleskey Court held that Georgia's
capital punishment statute violated neither the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment nor the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. See
McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 319-20; see also GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30 to17-10-44 (1997)
(providing the current version of Georgia's capital punishment statute). For further
discussion of Stanford, see infra notes 279-87 and accompanying text.
255. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173 (plurality opinion).
256. See id. at 176 (plurality opinion).
257. See id. at 181 (plurality opinion).
258. Id. at 173 (plurality opinion) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,100 (1958)).
259. Id. (plurality opinion).
260. Id. (plurality opinion) (citations omitted). By "abstract," Justice Stewart meant
that a court would not be looking at the particular circumstances of the case, but would be
analyzing the punishment as applied in all cases. See id. (plurality opinion).
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Amendment is to limit the legislature's power.2 61 When analyzing a
legislatively created punishment, Justice Stewart pointed out that the
Court would presume the punishment was valid and that it would not
require the legislature to select the least severe punishment "so long
as the penalty selected is not cruelly inhumane or disproportionate to
the crime involved."2 62  Those challenging the punishment would
have a great burden, "in part because the constitutional test is
intertwined with an assessment of contemporary standards," and the
Court would greatly defer to the legislature about the nature of those
standards.263
In determining the first branch of the "excessiveness" test,
Justice Stewart stated that the Court would invalidate a punishment
if it determined that it did not fulfill a penological end such as
deterrence.2  Yet Justice Stewart stressed that the Court would not
invalidate a punishment merely because it decided that a less severe
punishment adequately served the penological end.265 Furthermore,
Justice Stewart noted that retribution as a penological end was not
"inconsistent with our respect for the dignity of men. 266
Nonetheless, he still analyzed whether or not the death penalty had a
deterrent effect. 267 Because the evidence was conflicting, Justice
Stewart concluded that given the death penalty's "social utility as a
sanction," it was not unconstitutional.268 If retribution alone is a valid
purpose of punishment, however, it is unclear what punishment
would not fulfill a retributive end, no matter how harsh the penalty
seemed.269
The Court in Gregg concluded that the death penalty was not
disproportional to the crime of murder,7 0 but did not actually explain
261. See id. at 174 (plurality opinion).
262. Id. at 175 (plurality opinion).
263. Id. (plurality opinion).
264. See id. at 183 (plurality opinion).
265. See id. at 182-83 (plurality opinion); see also Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592
(1977) (plurality opinion) (explaining the excessiveness test). The Court held in Coker
that the death sentence is a disproportionate punishment for rape and is therefore
violative of the Eighth Amendment. See Coker, 433 U.S. at 592 (plurality opinion).
266. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183 (plurality opinion).
267. See id. at 184-87 (plurality opinion).
268. Id. at 187 (plurality opinion).
269. For example, torture can obviously serve a retributive end, yet such a punishment
is considered cruel and unusual. See In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890); Wilkerson
v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136 (1878); supra note 241 and accompanying text. Torture would
probably fail the proportionality branch of the test, however.
270. The Court's analysis of this point was not particularly probing. It stressed that
death as punishment is "unique in its severity and irrevocability." Gregg, 428 U.S. at 187
(plurality opinion) (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 286-91 (1972) (Brennan, J.,
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how the lower courts should analyze the proportionality branch of
the "excessiveness" test.27' In Solem v. Helm,12 however, the Court
explained this analysis more thoroughly.2 73 First, the Court stressed
that although the reviewing court should give great deference both to
the legislature and the trial court, "no penalty is per se
constitutional."'274 The Court admitted that even under this analysis,
challenging the proportionality of a sentence other than the death
penalty would rarely be successful.275 The Court would first examine
"the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty."276
Second, it would compare other criminals' sentences in that same
jurisdiction, and "[i]f more serious crimes are subject to the same
penalty, or to less serious penalties, that is some indication that the
punishment at issue may be excessive."2' Third, it would examine
what kinds of sentences were imposed in other jurisdictions for the
278same crime.
concurring); Furman, 408 U.S. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring)). The Court decided,
however, that "when a life has been taken deliberately by the offender, [it could not] say
that the punishment is invariably disproportionate to the crime," and concluded that
death "is an extreme sanction, suitable to the most extreme of crimes." Id. (plurality
opinion).
271. See id. (plurality opinion).
272. 463 U.S. 277 (1983) (holding that life imprisonment without possibility of parole
is significantly disproportionate to the crime of writing a bad check even when the
defendant has a prior record of six felony convictions). Although citator services list
Solem as overruled by Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991), it is not clear that this
is the case. Justice Scalia, who wrote the majority opinion in Harmelin, did not gain a
majority vote for his assertion that Solem was decided incorrectly because the Eighth
Amendment has no proportionality requirement. See id. at 965 (opinion of Scalia, J.). In
fact, Justice Scalia only received the support of Chief Justice Rehnquist on this issue. See
id. at 957 (opinion of Scalia, J.).
Justice Kennedy, who was joined in his concurring opinion by Justices O'Connor and
Souter, cited Solem extensively. See id. at 996-1006 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment). Justice Kennedy seemed to alter the three part Solem test,
however, stating the second and third prongs of the test need not be considered unless a
comparison of the defendant's crime and his sentence "give[s] rise to an inference of gross
disproportionality." Id. at 1005 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment); see also id. at 1009 (White, J., dissenting) (disputing Scalia's assertion that the
Eighth Amendment does not contain proportionality language); id. at 1028 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (same). What is not clear is which method the Court will employ to determine
proportionality. Thus, this Comment employs the Solem three-part analysis because it is
the last analysis that a majority of the Court embraced.
273. See Solem, 463 U.S. at 289-92.
274. Id. at 290.
275. See id at 289-90.
276. Id at 290.
277. Id at 291.
278. See idt at 291-92.
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The Gregg "contemporary values" analysis279 was followed by a
majority of the Court in Stanford v. Kentucky8 0 In conducting this
analysis, Justice Scalia, speaking for a plurality,21 refused to rely on
public opinion polls or the opinions of interest groupsm in
determining modern American society's ideas of decency.M
Furthermore, again speaking for a plurality,' Justice Scalia refused
to engage in the Gregg Court's proportionality analysis 85  Justice
Brennan argued in his dissent that both the views of respected
organizations and the legislation of other countries are useful in
determining contemporary standards.8 6 He also disagreed with
Justice Scalia's refusal to conduct the Gregg excessive punishment
test, noting that a majority of the Court still embraced this analysis.27
C. Applying the Mendoza-Martinez Factors and an Eighth
Amendment Analysis to Scarlet-Letter Probation Conditions
Although the scarlet-letter probation conditions discussed
earlier were judicial and not legislative creations, the Gregg analysis
might apply to determine whether the conditions constitute "cruel
and unusual punishment." First, however, it is necessary to apply the
Mendoza-Martinez factors?88 to scarlet-letter probation conditions to
determine whether they constitute punishments. Relying on the
279. See supra notes 255-59 and accompanying text.
280. 492 U.S. 361, 369-73 (1989) (conducting Gregg's "objective indicia" analysis).
The Court in Stanford held that the state may constitutionally impose the death penalty
on a person 16 or 17 years old. See id. at 380 (plurality opinion); id. at 381 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). The dissent also conducted a
"contemporary values" analysis, but reached a different result. See id. at 383-89
(Brennan, J., dissenting). The decision was split, with four justices dissenting, see id. at
382 (Brennan, J., dissenting), and Justice O'Connor concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment, see id. at 380 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
281. See id. at 364. Justice O'Connor did not join this part of Justice Scalia's opinion,
see id., though she did not specifically criticize Justice Scalia's refusal to rely on evidence
of public opinion polls and the views of interest groups. See id. at 377 (plurality opinion);
id. at 382 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (discussing
her reasons for not joining all of Justice Scalia's opinion).
282. See iL at 377 (plurality opinion).
283. See id. at 369.
284. Justice O'Connor did not join Justice Scalia's opinion in this part, arguing instead
that the Court "does have a constitutional obligation to conduct proportionality analysis."
Id. at 382 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
285. See id. at 379-80 (plurality opinion).
286. See id. at 388-90 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
287. See id. at 391-94 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
288. See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963); supra note 227
and accompanying text.
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earlier conclusion that shaming can be a form of punishment,U9 the
obvious answer would be "yes." Given the courts' traditional
reluctance to analyze probation conditions under the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause,290 however, it is necessary to explore
this question further.
The Supreme Court has never devised a test to determine
whether a probation condition constitutes punishment for Eighth
Amendment purposes,291 but the Mendoza-Martinez factors may be
useful to the inquiry.292 The first factor, whether the condition
involves a disability or restraint,2 93 is met by all the scarlet-letter
probation conditions discussed so far. A defendant who cannot drive
her car without an incriminating bumper-sticker has had a restraint
placed on her driving.294 Similarly, a defendant who cannot leave his
house without a T-shirt designating him a thief is also restrained.291
Having to post a sign in one's yard proclaiming one as a sex
offender 296 is disabling in that it prevents the person from normal
social interaction. Also, a public apology is disabling in that it harms
the probationer's social standing.29
Relying on the colonists' use of shaming penalties such as the
pillory as a way of punishing deviant behavior,29 3 scarlet-letter
probation conditions meet the second Mendoza-Martinez factor:
289. See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
290. See, e.g., Springer v. United States, 148 F.2d 411, 415 (9th Cir. 1945) ("The
conditions of probation are not punitive in character and the question of whether or not
the terms are cruel and unusual and thus violative of the Constitution of the United States
does not arise for the reason that the Constitution applies only to punishment."); State v.
Macy, 403 N.W.2d 743, 745 (S.D. 1987) (holding that because probation is not a sentence
but a sentence alternative, the Eighth Amendment does not apply).
291. See supra notes 238-87 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's
cruel and unusual punishment jurisprudence).
292. See Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168-69.
293. See id. at 168.
294. See, e.g., Goldschmitt v. State, 490 So. 2d 123, 124 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986)
(bumper sticker stating "Convicted DUI"); People v. Letterlough, 655 N.E.2d 146, 147
(N.Y. 1995) (sign on car reading "Convicted DWI").
295. See, e.g., People v. Hackler, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 681, 682 (Ct. App. 1993) (T-shirt
stating that the defendant was on probation for theft).
296. See, e.g., People v. Meyer, 680 N.E.2d 315, 317 (Ill. 1997) (sign proclaiming
defendant a "Violent Felon"); State v. Bateman, 771 P.2d 314, 316 (Or. Ct. App. 1989)
(en banc) (sign proclaiming defendant a "Dangerous Sex Offender"); State v. Burdin, 924
S.W.2d 82, 84 (Tenn. 1996) (sign proclaiming defendant a "convicted child molester").
297. See, e.g., Lindsay v. State, 606 So. 2d 652, 654 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (public
apology for DUI); People v. Johnson, 528 N.E.2d 1360, 1361 (Il. App. Ct. 1988) (public
apology for DWI).
298. See supra notes 186-99 and accompanying text.
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Historically, they have been viewed as punishment.9 9 Obviously, any
scarlet-letter probation condition also meets the fifth factor-
"whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime"-as all
of the probation conditions are the result of criminal prosecutions.0
Another important factor is whether the purpose of the
condition meets the two traditional goals of punishment-retribution
and deterrence.3 0 1  There seems to be an element of retribution
present in a shaming condition.3° One reason to impose a condition,
the purpose of which is to shame or humiliate the defendant, is that it
seeks to cause the defendant emotional harm.3 3 People who see a
probationer forced to advertise her own guilt may feel vindicated by
this.3°
Another primary reason given to justify scarlet-letter probation
conditions is that they will deter crime,305 either by making it difficult
299. See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144,168 (1963).
300. Id.
301. See id. at 168. The Supreme Court indicated that these are the two goals
considered in the Mendoza-Martinez test. See id. Whether or not rehabilitation is truly a
purpose of punishment remains a controversy. See Massaro, supra note 12, at 1893-95
(discussing the debate about whether a punishment can serve a rehabilitative purpose and
noting some problems with assessing rehabilitation). For a discussion of the differing
viewpoints about whether punishment can rehabilitate, see supra note 115. In the
analysis of the Mendoza-Martinez factors that are applicable to scarlet-letter probation
conditions, only retribution and deterrence will be considered purposes of probation;
rehabilitation will be offered as an alternative purpose.
302. According to retributivist theory, punishment "is an evil the offender has
deserved by his offense, an evil by which the state or society ... pays him back for what
he has done." PRIMORATZ, supra note 115, at 12. Under such a theory the difference
between "justified and unjustified punishment" is the difference between whether the
person being punished is guilty or innocent. Id. at 24. Therefore, under this theory any
punishment of a guilty person would fulfill a retributivist goal.
303. See, e.g., People v. Hackler, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 681, 686 (Ct. App. 1993) (expressing
concern that the trial court's reason for imposing the scarlet-letter probation condition
was to humiliate the defendant); Ballenger v. State, 436 S.E.2d 793, 796 (Ga. Ct. App.
1993) (Blackburn, J., dissenting) (arguing that the trial court's reason for imposing the
scarlet-letter condition was merely to humiliate the defendant); People v. Meyer, 680
N.E.2d 315, 320 (Ill. 1997) (holding that a scarlet-letter probation condition contained "a
strong element of public humiliation or ridicule"); Kahan, supra note 201, at 631-32
("Penalties [that shame] attempt to magnify the humiliation inherent in conviction by
communicating the offender's status to a wider audience."); Massaro, supra note 12, at
1886 ("[T]he shaming sanctions are explicitly designed to make a public spectacle of the
offender's conviction and punishment, and to trigger a negative, downward change in the
offender's self-concept.").
304. See Persons, supra note 186, at 1535 ("Shame punishments allow courts and
communities dissatisfied with existing modes of punishment to strike back.").
305. See Filcik, supra note 54, at 322-23 (concluding that scarlet-letter probation
conditions serve as useful deterrents); Kahan, supra note 201, at 638-41 (concluding that
shaming conditions will serve as deterrents). But see Massaro, supra note 12, at 1918-28
(discussing the effects of shaming in modern America and concluding that American
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or impossible for the probationer to commit another crime"0 6 or by
serving as a constant reminder to the probationer that he already has
been caught by the law and should refrain from future illegal
conduct.30 7 For example, a sign warning children and adults that the
defendant is a sex offender0 8 may make it more difficult for the
defendant to commit future sexual offenses, and a probationer
wearing a T-shirt proclaiming him a thief3 09 may find himself carefully
scrutinized whenever he enters a store. A defendant with a "DWI
Convict" bumper sticker 310 may be afraid to drink and drive because
the police will be more likely to watch his driving, or the bumper
sticker may remind the defendant that drinking and driving has
severe legal consequences.
An alternative purpose for imposing scarlet-letter probation
conditions, however, could be rehabilitation,311 which would suggest
society lacks a moral consensus necessary for shaming conditions to be effective for
rehabilitation and deterrence); DiGiovanni, supra note 217, at 662-65 (concluding that
special bumper stickers for DWI offenders will not deter the crime); cf Persons, supra
note 186, at 1541-45 (concluding that publicizing a defendant's prostitution solicitation
might serve as a general deterrence, though this has not yet been proven, but that such a
shaming device would not specifically deter that particular defendant from committing
the crime).
306. See Meyer, 680 N.E.2d at 315-17 (reasoning that imposing a scarlet-letter
probation condition would "protect society"); People v. Letterlough, 655 N.E.2d 146, 149
(N.Y. 1995) (determining that the primary purpose of a scarlet-letter condition was to
warn the public about the defendant); Shuster, supra note 213, at 1005 ("[T]hrough
shaming the criminal, society is made aware of the criminal's propensities, and is thus in a
better position to either avoid his or her company or to judge for itself whether he or she
poses a danger to the community.").
307. See, e.g., People v. McDowell, 130 Cal. Rptr. 839, 843 (Ct. App. 1976) (stating
that forcing the defendant to wear tap shoes would remind him that he was on probation
and would reduce his temptation to snatch someone's purse); cf Smith, supra note 215, at
206 (concluding that at least some shaming penalties may serve to force a probationer to
realize the wrongfulness of her crime).
308. See, e.g., State v. Bateman 771 P.2d 314,316 (Or. Ct. App. 1989) (en banc).
309. See, e.g., People v. Hackler, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 681, 682 (Ct. App. 1993).
310. See, e.g., Goldschmitt v. State, 490 So. 2d 123, 124 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
311. See Filcik, supra note 54, at 322-23 (concluding that scarlet-letter probation
conditions serve a rehabilitative purpose because they are constant reminders to the
defendant both of his guilt and that society does not tolerate his behavior); cf. Smith,
supra note 215, at 206 (suggesting that penalties that inspire shame based on the
probationer's sense of wrongdoing are permissible, but that conditions that have as their
purpose shaming the probationer herself are improper because they do not serve to
reform her). But see Massaro, supra note 12, at 1921-28 (concluding that shaming
penalties will not serve a rehabilitative purpose in our society because there is currently
no method for reintegrating the shamed offender back into society); Brilliant, supra note
54, at 1378-80 (noting that scarlet-letter probation conditions that involve a great deal of
public humiliation are "far removed, and indeed almost antithetical to" the goal of
rehabilitation); DiGiovanni, supra note 217, at 665-68 (concluding that special bumper
stickers for DWI convicts would not serve a rehabilitative purpose); Persons, supra note
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that such conditions are not simply punitive in purpose. By
reminding the defendant of her guilt and that society does not
approve of such behavior, a probation condition may cause the
defendant to repent. A few courts have upheld scarlet-letter
conditions on the belief that such conditions may serve a
rehabilitative purpose;312 others have flatly rejected this argument. 313
Even assuming that the purpose of a scarlet-letter probation
condition is primarily to rehabilitate, the condition may be excessive
in relation to that purpose,314 which is another Mendoza-Martinez
factor to be considered. 15 Other conditions might better serve the
goal of rehabilitation without being so harsh, such as psychiatric
treatment,316 an alcohol rehabilitation program,31 7 or community
service.31
8
One problem arises from this discussion about the purposes of
scarlet-letter probation conditions: the problem of distinguishing
purpose from effects. Although one can look to the analyses of
commentators and courts to determine the purposes of scarlet-letter
probation conditions,319 the actual consequences of the conditions are
186, at 1538-40 (concluding that shaming penalties for prostitute solicitors would not
rehabilitate them).
312 See Lindsay v. State, 606 So. 2d 652, 657 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (assuming,
without explaining why, that a scarlet-letter probation condition served a rehabilitative
purpose); Goldschmitt, 490 So. 2d at 126 (deciding that the trial court's belief that a
scarlet-letter probation condition served a rehabilitative purpose was not "utterly without
foundation"); Ballenger v. State, 436 S.E.2d 793, 794-95 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993) (refusing to
question the trial court's assessment that a scarlet-letter condition served a rehabilitative
purpose).
313. See Hackler, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 686 (stating that the trial court's true purpose in
imposing a scarlet-letter probation condition was not to rehabilitate, but to humiliate the
defendant); People v. Johnson, 528 N.E.2d 1360, 1362 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (expressing
concern that a public apology could have disastrous psychological effects on the
defendant and would work against rehabilitation); People v. Letterlough, 655 N.E.2d 146,
150 (N.Y. 1995) (noting that the punitive nature of a scarlet-letter condition outweighed
its possible rehabilitative potential).
314. See, e.g., People v. Meyer, 680 N.E.2d 315, 320 (Ill. 1997) (striking down a scarlet-
letter probation condition because of the possible unpredictable consequences of
imposing the condition and because of the public humiliation inherent in the condition,
but admitting that probation conditions served both rehabilitative and punitive purposes).
315. See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144,169 (1963).
316. See, e.g., Meyer, 680 N.E.2d at 317.
317. See, e.g., Letterlough, 655 N.E.2d at 147.
318. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-303(d)(3) (1997) (allowing courts to require
community service of probationers).
319. See supra notes 45-174 and accompanying text (discussing courts' approaches to
scarlet-letter probation conditions); supra notes 203-23 and accompanying text (discussing
commentators' views on scarlet-letter probation conditions).
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still unclear.30 The deterrent and rehabilitative effects of these
conditions remain to be proven.321 Even the retributive result of such
conditions is unclear.322 For example, a sign proclaiming a person a
violent felon may well humiliate one defendant; on the other hand,
the same sign could be a symbol of pride to another defendant.
Despite uncertainty as to the true effects of scarlet-letter
probation conditions, balancing all of the Mendoza-Martinez
factors323 arguably leads to the conclusion that such probation
conditions are indeed punitive, which in turn triggers the Eighth
Amendment's guarantee that the punitive condition will not be cruel
and unusual.324 To determine whether or not scarlet-letter conditions
are cruel and unusual, one must look to the "dignity of man"
standard in Trop v. Dulles3"' to ascertain the "evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.""' 6
Chief Justice Warren may have been optimistic in his assumption
that such standards are evolving.3 7 As far as shaming penalties go,
the standards seem to have regressed, or at least are coming back
full-circle. Although shaming penalties were generally disavowed in
the nineteenth century,"' public opinion now seems to embrace their
320. See State v. Burdin, 924 S.W.2d 82, 87 (Tenn. 1996) ("[C]ompliance with the
[scarlet-letter probation] condition would have consequences in the community, perhaps
beneficial, perhaps detrimental, but in any event unforeseen and unpredictable.").
321. See Kahan, supra note 201, at 638 (admitting that there have been no empirical
studies to prove the deterrent effects of shaming penalties); Persons, supra note 186, at
1542 (noting that no evaluation has been done to analyze the deterrent effect of shaming
conditions). Persons finds that although some cities that publicize the convictions of
people who solicit prostitutes have noted a drop in arrests for this crime, some cities that
use these same shaming penalties have not noticed a deterrent effect. See id. at 1542-43
nn.92 & 95. Although no actual studies were done, Judge Titus, who began the bumper
sticker program in Florida, claims that drunk driving incidents decreased by 33% in
Sarasota County, Florida, after the program began. See Massaro, supra note 12, at 1887.
Determining whether a scarlet-letter probation condition serves a rehabilitative purpose
is difficult to determine, because it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to quantify the
rehabilitation of a person. See id. at 1894-95. Professor Garvey argues that shaming
penalties can specifically deter, but he questions their rehabilitative power. See Garvey,
supra note 205, at 757.
322. See supra notes 211, 217-21 and accompanying text.
323. The Court in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963), noted that the
factors "may often point in differing directions," so the suggestion seems to be that this is
a balancing test. Id. at 169.
324. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
325. 356 U.S. 86 (1958). For a discussion of Trop, see supra notes 249-53 and
accompanying text.
326. Trop, 356 U.S. at 101.
327. See id.; supra text accompanying note 253.
328. See supra notes 200-02 and accompanying text.
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use.329 Because a plurality of the Court refused to rely on public
opinion polls in Stanford v. Kentucky,330 however, it is wise to look to
another indication of the acceptance of scarlet-letter probation
conditions: legislative endorsement of such conditions. 331
While scarlet-letter probation conditions have not been widely
adopted by state legislatures, many have been created by trial courts
that are given discretion by their legislatures to devise special
probation conditions. 32 The examples already offered in the cases
challenging scarlet-letter probation conditions3 3 are by no means
exhaustive.3 3 For example, in South Carolina, a man was ordered to
sit outside a courthouse for ten days with a sign reading "I am a
Drunk Driver. ' 335  In Miami, Florida, Boston, Massachusetts, and
Canton, Ohio, the names of convicted "johns" are broadcast on cable
television.36 The city of Kent, Washington, broadcasts on television
the names of convicted "johns" and drug offenders. 37 Some Texas
judges require drunk drivers to attach bumper stickers to their cars.338
A New Hampshire defendant was ordered to publicize his conviction
for sexually assaulting a minor.339 A thief in Oregon was also ordered
329. See Jonathan Alter & Pat Wingert, The Return of Shame, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 6,
1995, at 21, 24 (noting that a majority of Americans support shaming conditions for
certain offenses but are skeptical about their effectiveness).
330. 492 U.S. 361,377 (1989) (plurality opinion).
331. Currently, only a few states have legislatively enacted scarlet-letter probation
conditions. Nevada requires a DUI defendant to perform 48 hours of work for the
community while wearing clothes that identify her as a DUI convict. See NEv. REv.
STAT. § 484.3792(1)(a)(2) (1986). Ohio currently requires a person driving an automobile
that has been impounded to display license plates that are a different color from regular
plates. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4503.231, 4507.02(F)(2) (Anderson 1997).
332. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 948.03(6) (West 1996) (allowing trial court to create
probation conditions that "it deems proper"); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 65.10(1) (McKinney
1998) (allowing trial courts to devise special probation conditions as long as they are
"reasonably related to rehabilitation"). The Supreme Court, in Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion), stressed the need to examine state statutes in order to
determine contemporary standards. See id. at 176 (plurality opinion). However, because
legislatures often give judges leeway to devise their own probation conditions, judicially-
created conditions must also be examined.
333. See supra notes 45-174 and accompanying text.
334. For an excellent discussion of the prevalence of scarlet-letter probation
conditions, see Kahan, supra note 201, at 631-34.
335. Across the USA: News from Every State, South Carolina, USA TODAY, Apr. 22,
1993, at A8.
336. See David Talbot, Johns Face Shame with TV Fame, BOSTON HERALD, Feb. 19,
1995, Sunday § 1, at 6.
337. See Danny Westneat, Humiliation Is Latest Weapon in Crime Fight, SEATrLE
TIMES, Jan. 27, 1995, at Al.
338. See Tagging Drunks, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1983, § 1, at 49.
339. See Flogging?, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 22,1991, at 6.
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to publicize his conviction °40 These examples suggest that the use of
scarlet-letter probation conditions is widespread. Given the general
"get tough on crime" sentiment of the times,341 it seems unlikely that
any of these conditions would be viewed by a court as against
contemporary standards of decency, especially because it appears
that such conditions are gaining in popularity4 2
That is not the end of the analysis, however. There is still the
separate question of whether scarlet-letter probation conditions are
excessive in their severity. 3 The test for excessiveness is whether the
punishment involves "the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,"
and whether the punishment is "grossly out of proportion to the
severity of the crime."'  For the first branch of the test, one must
look to see if the punishment fulfills a proper penological end.345 It is
important to remember, however, that the Court will not invalidate a
punishment merely because it finds that a less severe punishment
would fulfill the penological end.M Although it is unclear whether
scarlet-letter probation conditions have deterrent or rehabilitative
effects,347 they do seem retributive.4 8 Because the Supreme Court
has stated that retribution is a valid goal of punishment, 349 scarlet-
letter probation conditions would seem to pass the first branch of the
test for excessive punishment.350
For the second branch of the excessiveness analysis, the
proportionality test,351 perhaps an Eighth Amendment challenge
340. See Clarence Peterson, The Power of Public Humiliation, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 2,
1986, § 5, at 1.
341. See supra notes 1-12 and accompanying text (discussing the American public's
dissatisfaction with the criminal justice system and the trend toward harsher penalties).
342 See Kahan, supra note 201, at 635 (noting the "growing popularity of shaming
penalties").
343. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,173 (1976) (plurality opinion).
344. Id. (plurality opinion).
345. See id. at 183 (plurality opinion).
346. See id. at 182-83 (plurality opinion).
347. See supra notes 305-13 and accompanying text (discussing possible deterrent and
rehabilitative effects of scarlet-letter probation conditions).
348. See supra notes 302-04 and accompanying text (discussing the retributive nature
of scarlet-letter probation conditions).
349. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183 (plurality opinion).
350. The Court in Gregg declined to hold the death penalty unconstitutional because it
served a retributive purpose, although there was conflicting evidence of the death
penalty's deterrent effects. See id. at 183-87 (plurality opinion). That the Court would
find a scarlet-letter probation condition unconstitutional because its deterrent effects
were unproven seems rather unlikely. Because the Court has stated that retribution is a
valid penological goal, see id. at 183 (plurality opinion), it is hard to imagine a punishment
that would fail the first branch of the test for excessiveness.
351. See id. at 173 (plurality opinion); supra notes 270-78 and accompanying text. It is
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could succeed if a probationer could show that, in a particular
jurisdiction, more serious crimes received less severe probation
sentences-sentences that did not include shaming penalties. 2
Another way of challenging a condition might be to prove that in
other jurisdictions defendants convicted of the same crime did not
receive scarlet-letter probation conditions.35 3 This argument might
have more success in jurisdictions where the probation statutes limit
the sentencing court's discretion to create probation conditions,354
because in such jurisdictions, imposition of scarlet-letter probation
conditions constitutes "judicial legislation. '355  Proportionality
challenges to scarlet-letter probation conditions, however, face same
tough obstacles. First, the Court has stated expressly that
proportionality challenges which do not involve the death penalty
rarely will be successful.356 Second, the current Court, though it
probably still would find some kind of proportionality requirement in
the Eighth Amendment, would likely require only a very rough
proportionality between the crime and the punishment.357 Given the
reluctance of the courts in the past to hear Eighth Amendment
challenges to probation conditions,358 it seems doubtful that the
Supreme Court would hold a scarlet-letter probation condition
unconstitutional under the proportionality test.359
wise to distinguish between different kinds of scarlet-letter probation conditions, as the
underlying conviction to which they are attached varies as does the severity of the
punishment inflicted. For example, a probation condition requiring a defendant to
publish an apology for driving while intoxicated is probably, less severe in its
consequences than a probation condition requiring a convicted sex offender to post a sign
in front of his house for five years that warns the public of his dangerousness. However,
one could easily argue that a sexual offense is a more serious crime than driving while
intoxicated. Compare, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-202.1(b) (1993) (noting that taking
indecent liberties with a child is a Class F felony), with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-138.1(d)
(1993) (noting that driving while impaired is a misdemeanor).
352. See Solem, 463 U.S. at 291.
353. See id. at 291-92.
354. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 65.10(2) (McKinney 1998); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-
303(d)(9) (1997).
355. See Brilliant, supra note 54, at 1362; see, e.g., People v. Letterlough, 655 N.E.2d
146,150 (N.Y. 1995); State v. Burdin, 924 S.W.2d 82, 87 (Tenn. 1996).
356. See Solem, 463 U.S. at 289.
357. See supra note 272.
358. See supra note 290 and accompanying text.
359. If a probationer could have been incarcerated, the Court may be unwilling to hold
unconstitutional a scarlet-letter probation imposed by a trial court. The Court may
assume that the probation condition is less harsh than imprisonment. See Kahan, supra
note 201, at 640-41 (noting that incarceration is a harsher penalty than shaming
conditions). But see Persons, supra note 186, at 1540 (arguing that incarceration may over
time be less harsh than shaming penalties because the defendant will one day be released
from prison but perpetually will have a lowered "self-perception" from the shaming
825
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III. SCARLET-LETrER PROBATION CONDITIONS AS COMPELLED
SPEECH
Even if scarlet-letter probation conditions do not violate the
Eighth Amendment, they still raise First Amendment36 concerns
because they involve compelled speech. While the First Amendment
is usually cited for protecting citizens' right to speak without
governmental restraint, a particular line of First Amendment cases
also has held that the government may not compel its citizens to
speak. In order to understand the current law on compelled speech,
it is helpful to review the major cases in this area. 61 The applicability
of the compelled speech doctrine-also called the "negative free
speech right"-to compelled facts is the newest application of the
doctrine.3 62 Because a scarlet-letter probation condition compels a
probationer to "speak" the fact of her own conviction,363 this section
will focus on whether this application of the doctrine would be
accepted by the Supreme Court today.
The first case involving compelled speech, West Virginia State
Board of Education v. Barnette,364 involved a West Virginia statute
requiring all teachers and pupils to salute and pledge allegiance to
the American flag. The statute regarded any refusal to salute the flag
"'as an act of insubordination, and [would] be dealt with
accordingly.' ,,365 The case arose when children who refused to salute
the flag for religious reasons were expelled from school. 66 The Court
punishment). This argument, however, is not particularly convincing.
360. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
361. The compelled speech cases include those dealing with commercial speech;
however, commercial speech cases are beyond the scope of this Comment. Some of these
cases include: Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, 117 S. Ct. 2130 (1997); Pacific Gas &
Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 475 U.S. 1 (1986) (plurality opinion);
Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
362. See infra notes 427-45 and accompanying text.
363. But see infra notes 611-15 and accompanying text (arguing that scarlet-letter
probation conditions do more than just compel facts).
364. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). Although concurring separately, Justices Black and Douglas
agreed "substantially" with the majority opinion. See id. at 643 (Black & Douglas, JJ.,
concurring). Justice Murphy joined with the majority opinion in his concurrence. See id.
at 644 (Murphy, J., concurring).
365. Id. at 626 (quoting W. VA. CODE § 1734 (Supp. 1941)). The legislation resulted
from the Court's decision in Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 600
(1940), overruled by Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642, which held that there is no constitutionally
granted immunity for school children who for religious reasons will not salute the
American flag. According to the Court in Barnette, the Gobitis decision "assumed ...
that power exists in the State to impose the flag salute discipline upon school children in
general," and the Court "only examined and rejected a claim based on religious beliefs of
immunity from an unquestioned general rule." Barnette, 319 U.S. at 635.
366. As in Gobitis, the plaintiffs challenging the requirement were Jehovah's
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first noted that "[t]he freedom asserted by these [students] does not
bring them into collision with rights asserted by any other individual
.... The sole conflict is between authority and rights of the
individual. '367 The Court determined that the statute infringed upon
the students' First Amendment freedom of expression.368  After
noting that forcing an individual to pledge allegiance to the flag
coerces her to affirm a particular belief,369 the Court stated that the
Constitution allowed censorship only when an expression amounted
to a clear and present danger.7 0 Forcing someone to affirm a belief,
however, "could be commanded only on even more immediate and
urgent grounds than silence. ' 371 In this case, the State did not allege
that a refusal to salute the flag created a clear and present danger.372
Nor did the Court accept the argument that such matters were best
left to the state legislatures, 73 responding that the Bill of Rights
exists in order to place certain subjects out of the reach of
governmental officials. 74
The Court indicated that to rule any other way would be
illogical. It noted that "[t]o sustain the compulsory flag salute we are
required to say that a Bill of Rights which guards the individual's
right to speak his own mind, left it open to public authorities to
compel him to utter what is not in his mind." 375 While the majority
opinion clearly seemed to limit the holding to matters of opinion,
theology, and ideology,376 Justice Murphy expressed a willingness to
Witnesses, whose religious beliefs forbade them from giving allegiance to "'any graven
image.'" Barnette, 319 U.S. at 629 (quoting Exodus 20:4-5).
367. Id. at 630.
368. See id. at 642.
369. See id. at 633 ("[C]ompulsory flag salute and pledge requires affirmation of a
belief and an attitude of mind.").
370. See id.
371. Id.
37Z See id. at 634.
373. This argument was one of the rationales behind the decision in Gobitis. See
Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 597-98, 600 (1940), overruled by Barnette,
319 U.S. at 642 (1943). Essentially, the Court in Barnette evaluated the arguments in
Gobitis and refuted them. See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 635-42. The Barnette Court also
rejected the argument that interfering with a local school board "'would in effect make
[the Court] the school board for the country.'" Id. at 637 (quoting Gobitis, 310 U.S. at
598).
374. See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 638 ("The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to place
[certain subjects] beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as
legal principles to be applied by the courts.").
375. Id. at 634.
376. See id. at 642 ("If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is
that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or
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further expand this holding. In his concurrence he wrote: "The right
of freedom of thought ... includes both the right to speak freely and
the right to refrain from speaking at all, except insofar as essential
operations of government may require it for the preservation of an
orderly society." '377 Probably because of the controversial nature of
this ruling, however, the Court did not speak again on compelled
speech for thirty-four years. 7
The issue in the next important case, Miami Herald Publishing
Co. v. Tornillo,3 79 was whether a state statute that required
newspapers to give political candidates equal space to reply to
criticism violated the newspaper's First Amendment right to free
speech.38 0  The Florida Supreme Court had held that the statute
"'enhanced,' " and did not limit, free speech because it increased
"'the free flow of information to the public.' "381 Though he
admitted that this argument was valid, Chief Justice Burger, speaking
for the Court, expressed concern that right-of-access statutes may
amount to "governmental coercion. ' '131 In reviewing prior case law,
Chief Justice Burger noted that the Court previously had stressed the
importance of a press free from governmental interference38 3 and had
"expressed sensitivity" about whether a governmental requirement
or restriction actually forced a newspaper to publish something it
would not have published otherwise, because such compulsion was
unconstitutional.3" Consequently, the Court held the statute
unconstitutional.3 5 Barnette was not cited, though Justice Rehnquist
would later describe Tornillo as a case in which the Court applied a
"negative" First Amendment right to newspapers rather than
act their faith therein.").
377. Id. at 645 (Murphy, J., concurring). Justice Murphy offered the example of a
court compelling someone to give testimony as one example of when the government may
legitimately require a citizen to speak. See id. (Murphy, J., concurring).
378. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977). For a more detailed discussion of
this case, see infra notes 388-403 and accompanying text.
379. 418 U.S. 241 (1974). Although this case is not actually a compelled speech case, it
is noteworthy because the Court later treated it as one. See, e.g., Riley v. National Fed'n
of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781,797 (1988); Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714.
380. See Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 243.
381. Id. at 245 (quoting Tornillo v. Miami Herald Publ'g Co., 287 So. 2d 78, 82 (Fla.
1973)).
382. Id. at 254.
383. See id. at 257 ("Government-enforced right of access inescapably 'dampens the
vigor and limits the variety of public debate.'" (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254,279 (1964))).
384. See id. at 256.
385. See id. at 258.
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individuals only.3 86 Justice Brennan would later note that the holding
in Tornillo "did not rely on the fact that Florida restrained the press,
and has been applied to cases involving expression generally. ' 387
Soon after Tornillo, the Supreme Court again addressed the
issue of compelled speech in Wooley v. Maynard.388  Petitioners389
challenged a New Hampshire statute requiring all noncommercial
license plates to bear the state motto "Live Free or Die. '390  The
issue, as described by the Court, was whether a state could force an
individual to disseminate an ideological message on her private
property with the purpose of having the message read by the
public. 39
1
The Court began its analysis of the statute's constitutionality by
citing Justice Murphy's concurrence in Barnette, stating that the First
Amendment includes "both the right to speak freely and the right to
refrain from speaking at all.''392 The Court continued in this vein: "A
system which secures the right to proselytize religious, political, and
ideological causes must also guarantee the concomitant right to
decline to foster such concepts. The right to speak and the right to
refrain from speaking are complementary components of the broader
concept of 'individual freedom of mind.' ,393
In comparing the statute in Wooley to the statute in Barnette, the
Court admitted that compelling someone to salute the flag
affirmatively infringed personal freedoms more than forcing
someone to bear the state motto on a license plate, which is a more
passive act.394  The difference, however, was "essentially one of
386. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1986)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
387. Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781,797 (1988).
388. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
389. As in Barnette, the challengers to the statute were Jehovah's Witnesses. See
Wooley, 430 U.S. at 707; West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 629
(1943).
390. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 707.
391. See id. at 713.
392. Id. at 714 (citing Barnette, 319 U.S. at 645 (Murphy, J., concurring)). The Court
claimed to be citing to both the majority opinion and Justice Murphy's concurrence, but
the language is identical to Justice Murphy's statement. See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 645
(Murphy, J., concurring) (noting that the rights under the First Amendment include "both
the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all, except insofar as
essential operations of government may require it for the preservation of an orderly
society").
393. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714 (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637). These ideas are
illustrated, the Court noted, in Tornillo. See id. (citing Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241,258 (1974)).
394. See id. at 715.
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degree.'395  "Here, as in Barnette," the Court wrote, "we are faced
with a state measure which forces an individual, as part of his daily
life-indeed constantly while his automobile is in public view-to be
an instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideological point
of view he finds unacceptable. 3 96  Recognizing an infringement on
petitioner's First Amendment rights to free speech, the Court then
employed a strict scrutiny test,397 which the State failed.391
In dissent, Justice Rehnquist suggested that he agreed with the
holding in Barnette but believed that the majority incorrectly
assumed that the license plate constituted speech.399 "The issue," he
wrote, "unconfronted by the Court, is whether appellees, in
displaying, as they are required to do, state license tags, the format of
which is known to all as having been prescribed by the State, would
be considered to be advocating political or ideological views. '400 He
believed that "for First Amendment principles to be implicated, the
State must place the citizen in the position of either apparently or
actually 'asserting as true' the message. "401
In Wooley, the Court expanded the holding in Barnette. The
difference between being forced to salute the flag and being forced to
drive around with the state motto on one's license plate may be "one
of degree, '' 401 but the Court seemed to stretch Barnette to include the
passive endorsement of a state-sanctioned message. Clearly, the
395. Id.
396. Id.
397. If the government engages in content-based regulation of speech, the Supreme
Court will analyze the regulation under a strict scrutiny test. See, e.g., Simon & Schuster,
Inc. v. New York State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 123 (1991) (holding a Son of Sam
statute unconstitutional because though the state's interest in compensating victims from
the fruits of crime is compelling, the law was not narrowly tailored to advance that
purpose); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 323, 334 (1988) (holding that a statutory provision
which prohibited the display of signs criticizing foreign governments within 500 feet of an
embassy violated the First Amendment).
398. See Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715-17. The State offered two justifications for the state
motto: (1) that it enabled law-enforcement officers to determine whether passenger
vehicles were carrying the correct plates; and (2) that the State wanted to communicate
an ideological message about its history. See id. at 716-17. The Court determined that the
first justification did not warrant stifling individual liberties when a more narrow means
could be achieved and that the State's interest in disseminating an ideology could never
outweigh the individual's First Amendment right of free speech. See id.
399. See id. at 720-21 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (discussing the differences between
the present case and Barnette but never questioning Barnette's holding). Justice
Rehnquist also joined part of Justice White's dissent on procedural grounds. See id.
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); id. at 717-19 (White, J., dissenting in part).
400. Id. at 720-21 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
401. Id. at 721 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
402. Id. at 715.
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focus in Wooley was still on ideological compelled speech. °3
In Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,404 the petitioners
challenged Michigan legislation permitting a union and a local
government employer to form an "agency shop" arrangement, which
forced each employee who was represented by a union, regardless of
whether he was a member, to pay to the union as a condition of
employment a service fee that was equal to the amount of union
dues.40 5 In analyzing the constitutionality of the legislation, the Court
cited Buckley v. Valeo4 6 for the proposition that contributions to an
organization whose purpose is to spread a political message are
protected by the First Amendment.4  The Court then stated that
citizens have a First Amendment right not to contribute to an
organization as well: "The fact that the appellants are compelled to
make, rather than prohibited from making, contributions for political
purposes works no less an infringement of their constitutional
rights."4 The Court stressed that the First Amendment forbids the
State to coerce an individual's beliefs. 49 Again, the Court appeared
willing to expand the scope of the meaning of compelled speech, this
time to political contributions.410
The next compelled speech case, Harper & Row Publishers, Inc.
v. Nation Enterprises,41 ' involved an analysis of the applicability of
the Copyright Revision Act of 1976.412 In March of 1979, The Nation
magazine had published an unauthorized manuscript of A Time to
Heal: The Autobiography of Gerald R. Ford.413 Time magazine had
already agreed to purchase exclusive rights to the manuscript but
canceled its agreement after The Nation published the article.4 14
Harper & Row, the copyright holders of the manuscript, sued Nation
403. See id. at 717 ("[W]here the State's interest is to disseminate an ideology, no
matter how acceptable to some, such interest cannot outweigh an individual's First
Amendment right to avoid becoming the courier for such message.").
404. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
405. See id. at 211.
406. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
407. See Abood, 431 U.S. at 234 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 22-23 (per curiam)).
408. Id.
409. See iL at 234-35.
410. For two related cases, see Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 372-73 (1976) (holding
that the state may not condition employment on the employee's association with a
particular political party), and Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 496 (1961) (holding that
the state may not condition employment on the employee's affirming a belief in God).
411. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
412. Copyright Revision Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, tit. 1, § 108, 90 Stat. 2541,
2546 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 108 (1994)).
413. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 542.
414. See id.
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Enterprises for copyright infringement. 415 The Second Circuit, in a
split decision, reversed a ruling for the plaintiffs, finding that The
Nation's act constituted a "fair use" under the copyright act.416
Although the court admitted that part of The Nation's article
constituted expression protected by copyright,417 it noted that the
"purpose of the article was essentially factual in nature" and that the
part of the article that was protected expression was "insubstantial"
compared to the entire piece .41  The Second Circuit maintained that
the "copyright attaches to expression, not facts or ideas. '419
The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit's decision.420 It
determined that such a broad definition of "fair use" would
"effectively destroy an expectation of copyright protection in the
work of a public figure."4 1 Although the Supreme Court agreed with
the Second Circuit that the information in The Nation's article was
newsworthy and that such information should be made available to
the public, "[t]he fact that the words the author has chosen to clothe
his narrative may of themselves be 'newsworthy' is not an
independent justification for unauthorized copying of the author's
expression prior to publication." 422
As part of its justification for reversing the Second Circuit, the
Supreme Court cited Wooley.423 Though the right to "refrain from
speaking" would not "sanction abuse of the copyright owner's
monopoly as an instrument to suppress facts, 42 4 the Court asserted
that " '[t]here is necessarily, and within suitably defined areas, a ...
freedom not to speak publicly, one which serves the same ultimate
ends as freedom of speech in its affirmative aspect."' By
describing the copyright laws' protection of individual expression as
synonymous with the protection afforded the petitioners in Wooley,426
415. See id. at 544-46.
416. See id. at 544-45.
417. The copyrighted material included part of a conversation between President Ford
and Henry Kissinger and some of Ford's impressions about Nixon. See id. at 545.
418. Id.
419. Id. at 544.
420. See id. at 542.
421. Id. at 557.
422. Id.
423. See id. at 559 ("[Fjreedom of thought and expression 'includes both the right to
speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all.'" (quoting Wooley v. Maynard,
430 U.S. 705,714 (1977))).
424. Id.
425. Id. (quoting Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 244 N.E.2d 250, 255
(N.Y. 1968)).
426. See Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714.
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the Court suggested that the compelled speech doctrine has general
applicability to other branches of First Amendment law.
In Riley v. National Federation of the Blind,4 27 the Court first
applied the compelled speech doctrine to "compelled facts."4' The
North Carolina Charitable Solicitations Act429  required that
professional fundraisers disclose to potential donors "the average
percentage of gross receipts actually turned over to charities by fund-
raisers for all charitable solicitations conducted in North Carolina
within the previous 12 months.""43 Petitioners, composed of various
charitable organizations and professional fundraisers, challenged the
statute as an infringement on their First Amendment freedom of
speech.4 31 The State of North Carolina argued that the required
disclosure constituted commercial speech and therefore was not
entitled to full First Amendment protection;432 that because
compelled speech is different than compelled silence the Court
should apply a more deferential test in determining the statute's
constitutionality;433 and that prior compelled speech cases were
distinguishable because they "involved compelled statements of
opinion" rather than "compelled statements of 'facts.' "I
Justice Brennan, speaking for the Court, first noted that the Act
was a content-based regulation of speech because the content of
speech is altered when the government forces a person to speak.435
He rejected the State's argument that the required disclosures
constituted commercial speech, pointing out that even if the
disclosure was commercial speech, it was "inextricably intertwined
with otherwise fully protected speech," thus making an endeavor to
apply different tests "both artificial and impractical." 436 Turning to
the compelled speech issue, Justice Brennan refused to apply a more
427. 487 U.S. 781 (1988).
428. See id. at 797-98.
429. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131C (1986), repealed by Act of July 15, 1994, ch. 759, § 1,
1993 N.C. Sess. Laws 629.
430. Riley, 487 U.S. at 786.
431. See id. at 787. The petitioners actually challenged three sections of the Act:
§ 131C-17.2, a fee requirement; § 131C-16.1, the disclosure requirement; and § 131C-6, a
licensing requirement. See Riley, 487 U.S. at 785-86 nn.2-4.
432. See id. at 795. The state could not argue that charitable solicitations were
themselves commercial speech, as the Court in Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better
Environment, 444 U.S. 620 (1980), held that "charitable solicitations ... have not been
dealt with as 'purely commercial speech.'" Riley, 487 U.S. at 788 (quoting Schaumburg,
444 U.S. at 632).
433. See Riley, 487 U.S. at 796.
434. Id. at 797.
435. See id. at 795.
436. Id. at 796.
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deferential standard than strict scrutiny,437 stating that although there
is some difference between compelled speech and compelled silence,
this "difference is without constitutional significance" because
freedom of speech comprises "the decision of both what to say and
what not to say.""43  Tornillo, Justice Brennan noted, established
"[t]he constitutional equivalence of compelled speech and compelled
silence in the context of fully protected expression. 439
Justice Brennan did not accept that Riley was distinguishable
from Tornillo in that the charitable solicitation statute involved
compelled facts rather than compelled opinion.440 He then analyzed
the statute under the strict scrutiny test, determining both that the
State did not offer a compelling interest and that the statute was
unduly burdensome and not narrowly tailored.441
Three justices, all of whom still sit on the Court, dissented.
Justice Stevens joined the Court's opinion that the state could not
compel statements of fact but disagreed with the Court about the
constitutionality of another provision of the statute.42 Chief Justice
Rehnquist, with Justice O'Connor joining, believed that these
particular charitable solicitations constituted commercial speech.443
Even if a strict scrutiny test was applicable, however, the Chief
Justice believed that the State had met its burden. 4  Neither the
dissenting opinions nor the concurring opinion by Justice Scalia 445
437. The Court will usually apply strict scrutiny to a statute that infringes upon a
citizen's right to free speech. See supra note 397 and accompanying text (discussing the
Court's standard of review in free speech cases).
438. Riley, 487 U.S. at 796-97.
439. Id. at 797 (citing Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241,256 (1974)).
440. See id. at 797-98. Justice Brennan maintained that "either form of compulsion
burdens protected speech." Id. He cited to all of the compelled speech cases discussed
previously in this section. See id. at 797.
441. See id. at 798.
442. See id. at 804 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). North
Carolina General Statutes Section 131C-6 (1986) required professional fundraisers to get
a license before they could solicit funds. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131C-6 (1986), repealed
by Act of July 15, 1994, ch. 759, § 1, 1994 N.C. Sess. Laws 629, 629; Riley, 487 U.S. at 786
n.4. A licensing statute must allow the licensee to take the licensor to court if a license is
not granted within a specific time period. See Riley, 487 U.S. at 802 (citing Freedman v.
Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 59 (1965)). The Court in Riley struck down the statute as
unconstitutional because it allowed "a delay without limit." Id. However, Justice Stevens
would have held the licensing statute constitutional because it did not impose a significant
burden on the fundraisers' ability to speak and there was no evidence that the state would
be slow to process the licensing applications. See id. at 804 (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
443. See Riley, 487 U.S. at 805-07 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
444. See id. at 808 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
445. See id. at 803-04 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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challenged the applicability of the compelled speech doctrine to
compelled facts.
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group"6
involved an annual parade through Boston, which the South Boston
Allied War Veterans Council ("the Council") had organized and
conducted for fifty years. 7  In 1992, the Irish-American Gay,
Lesbian and Bisexual Group ("GLIB") formed for the purpose of
marching in the parade and to show the public that gays and lesbians
were part of the Irish community." 8  The Council denied the
organization's application to march in the parade, but GLIB obtained
a court order forcing the Council to include it."9 After the Council
refused again in 1993, GLIB sued the Council, claiming that the
Council had violated the state and federal constitutions as well as the
state public accommodations law, which prohibited discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation in any public place.45 The case
eventually made its way to the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts, which affirmed a holding for GLIB.451
The Council appealed to the Supreme Court, claiming that by
forcing it to include a group expressing a message that the Council
did not wish to express, the State of Massachusetts was infringing
upon the Council members' First Amendment rights.452 Justice
Souter, speaking for the Court, noted that the public
accommodations statute did not, "on its face, target speech or
discriminate on the basis of its content."453 He then pointed out that
the statute in this situation "ha[d] been applied in a peculiar way,"
for the Council did not seek to exclude individual gays and lesbians
but rather GLIB as an organization. 454
Justice Souter considered the parade an expressive activity:
"[T]he Council clearly decided to exclude a message it did not like
from the communication it chose to make, and that is enough to
invoke its right as a private speaker to shape its expression by
speaking on one subject while remaining silent on another."455
Consequently, the Court applied a compelled speech analysis,
446. 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
447. See id. at 560.
448. See id. at 561.
449. See id.
450. See id. (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 98 (1992)).
451. See id. at 563.
452 See id. at 559.
453. Id. at 572.
454. Id.
455. Id. at 574.
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holding that the state courts' application of the permissive
accommodations statute to the Council's decisions about what
organizations to include violated the First Amendment.4 6 Justice
Souter concisely summarized the compelled speech doctrine and its
general applicability: "'Since all speech inherently involves choices
of what to say and what to leave unsaid,' one important manifestation
of the principle of free speech is that one who chooses to speak may
also decide 'what not to say.' ,457 This rule "applies not only to
expressions of value, opinion, or endorsement, but equally to
statements of fact the speaker would rather avoid. '458 Not only the
press, but corporations and individuals, including publishers, have the
right to speak and to be silent.4 59 The aim of the rule is to protect
choices concerning content that some might consider wrong.4 6 A
unanimous Court accepted this description of the First Amendment
right to be silent.46'
Case law indicates that the compelled speech doctrine is firmly
entrenched in First Amendment jurisprudence as applied to
statements of opinion and belief as well as to statements of fact. The
only time a court has applied the compelled speech analysis to a
scarlet-letter probation condition, however, occurred in Goldschmitt
v. State,46 which was decided prior to the Supreme Court's decision in
Riley that the government cannot compel facts.463 Therefore, it must
be determined whether the compelled speech doctrine is applicable
to such conditions.4 4
456. See id. at 559, 573-75.
457. Id. at 573 (quoting Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1,
11, 16 (1986) (plurality opinion) (citation omitted)).
458. 1& at 574.
459. See id. For his supposition that the First Amendment applies "equally to
statements of fact," id. at 573, Justice Souter cited McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Commission, 514 U.S. 334 (1995), which held that a state may not make it illegal to
publish or disseminate an anonymous political message, see McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 341-42.
However, this case did not rely on a compelled speech rationale.
460. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 574 (noting that the purpose of the rule is "to shield just
those choices of content that in someone's eyes are misguided, or even hurtful").
461. See id. at 559.
462. 490 So. 2d 123 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986). For a discussion of Goldschmitt, see
supra notes 78-91.
463. See Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 797-98 (1988); supra notes
427-45 and accompanying text (discussing Riley).
464. This inquiry admittedly begs the question of whether or not courts will apply a
First Amendment compelled speech analysis to a probation condition; however, this
Comment considers the problem of challenging probation conditions on constitutional
grounds and some of the standards that courts have devised to test the validity of
probation conditions in the next section. See infra notes 473-567 and accompanying text.
Several examples illustrate some of the problems in applying these standards to a
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If a state forces a person to post a sign or put a bumper sticker
on her car, stating an idea that the person does not wish to convey,
Wooley suggests that this action is compelled speech. 65 Even if what
is being compelled are facts, the Court held in Riley that this also
raises First Amendment concerns.466  Some scarlet-letter probation
conditions compel probationers to convey the facts of their own
convictions.467 When a state compels a person to print an apology in
the newspaper,46S it compels a person to express the belief that what
the person did was wrong. Signs proclaiming a person "dangerous '469
or warning others against entering the person's property470 at the very
least force the person to convey facts.471 The question is not whether
the states compel speech in these cases, but whether the Constitution
grants them the power to do so.472 Put differently, the question is,
"To what extent do probationers have a First Amendment right to
refuse to speak?" To begin to answer this question, it is necessary to
explore the sometimes confusing terrain of probation law.
compelled speech case. See infra notes 571-93 and accompanying text.
465. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705,715 (1977).
466. See Riley, 487 U.S. at 797-98.
467. See, e.g., People v. Hackler, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 681, 683 (Ct. App. 1993);
Goldschmitt, 492 So. 2d at 124; Ballenger v. State, 436 S.E.2d 793, 794 (Ga. Ct. App.
1993). For a discussion of these cases, see supra notes 57-76 and accompanying text
(discussing Hackler); supra notes 78-91 and accompanying text (discussing Goldschmitt);
supra notes 104-15 and accompanying text (discussing Ballenger).
468. See, e.g., People v. Johnson, 528 N.E.2d 1360, 1362 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988)
(invalidating probation condition forcing the defendant to print an apology for a DUI);
supra notes 116-23 and accompanying text (discussing Johnson).
469. See, e.g., State v. Bateman, 771 P.2d 314, 316 (Or. Ct. App. 1989) (en bane)
(refusing to rule on the validity of a probation condition that forced defendant to post a
sign that he was "dangerous"); supra notes 160-64 and accompanying text (discussing
Bateman).
470. See, e.g., People v. Meyer, 680 N.E.2d 315, 316 (Ill. 1997) (invalidating a
probation condition forcing the defendant to post a sign warning others of his violent
nature); State v. Burdin, 924 S.W.2d 82, 84 (Tenn. 1996) (invalidating condition requiring
the defendant to post a sign warning children to stay away); supra notes 124-35 and
accompanying text (discussing Meyer); supra notes 165-74 and accompanying text
(discussing Burdin).
471. If the court has made findings that these people are dangerous, then such signs
could be compelling facts, but by forcing a person to call himself "dangerous," the court
may also be compelling opinions.
472. For a discussion of possible approaches that courts should take when analyzing
whether scarlet-letter probation conditions violate the First Amendment, see infra notes
621-31 and accompanying text. For an argument that all scarlet-letter probation
conditions compel an ideological message, see infra notes 611-15 and accompanying text.
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IV. THE CHANGING FACE OF PROBATION LAW: SHIFTING
THEORIES, SHIFTING STANDARDS
Probationers traditionally have had a difficult time challenging
probation conditions because the courts have created various
theories to justify denying probationers' constitutional challenges.473
Although some of these theories have fallen into disuse,474 their
effects on our criminal system persist and help to explain the unusual
deference that appellate courts still show to the trial courts when
reviewing the validity of probation conditions.475 Moreover, the
purposes of probation are changing, as probation is increasingly
viewed as an alternative method of punishment rather than as a
method of rehabilitation.476 As this occurs, the standards for
reviewing the constitutionality of probation conditions, some of
which have been tied to the idea of probation as rehabilitation,
change as well.477 The result is a chaotic hodgepodge of different
standards for testing the constitutionality of probation conditions4 7
and systems that put probationers between the metaphorical rock
and a hard place. These systems dole out punishment but maintain a
peculiar unwillingness to review the constitutionality of the
punishment.
To make sense of the current situation, this Part first considers
the older theories of probation that justified limiting constitutional
challenges, and how and why these theories have fallen into
disrepute.479 This Part then looks to the traditional purpose of
probation-rehabilitation-and examines the trend toward viewing
probation as a punitive sentence 0 Finally, this Part discusses the
various tests that have developed for reviewing the constitutionality
of probation conditions,411 concluding with an overview of the new
federal standards for reviewing probation conditions.4
473. See infra notes 484-500 and accompanying text.
474. See infra notes 490-91, 499 and accompanying text (discussing how theories of
probation as an "act of grace" or a contract are no longer widely accepted).
475. See infra notes 492-93, 500 and accompanying text.
476. See infra notes 501-30 and accompanying text.
477. See infra notes 527-30,562-66 and accompanying text.
478. See infra notes 531-67 and accompanying text.
479. See infra notes 483-500 and accompanying text.
480. See infra notes 501-30 and accompanying text.
481. See infra notes 531-67 and accompanying text.
482. See infra notes 562-66 and accompanying text.
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A. Traditional Justifications for Not Allowing Probationers to
Challenge Their Conditions
The United States Supreme Court invoked the "act of grace"
doctrine in Escoe v. Zerbst 3 as a justification for not requiring a
hearing to revoke a defendant's probation.4 4 This theory was later
used by courts to justify not allowing probationers to challenge their
probation conditions."5 The idea behind the "act of grace" theory
was that because the probationer could have been incarcerated, he
should not be heard to complain about the more lenient probation
condition.486 Probation was a privilege, not a right; therefore, one's
constitutional rights as a probationer were not rights at all but merely
privileges that a trial court could take away.'" One student
commentator has noted that under the act of grace theory, "should
[the judge] decide to offer the offender [probation], he may make the
grant subject to any conditions he believes to be proper. The
probationer will not be heard to complain of this voluntary act of
clemency, even though the conditions imposed are arbitrary, unfair,
vague, or otherwise invalid. ' '4 8 The act of grace theory "den[ies] the
existence of constitutional limitations upon the conditions which may
be attached to the government's grant of a privilege."" 9 Because of a
series of later Supreme Court decisions,490 the act of grace theory has
483. 295 U.S. 490 (1934).
484. See id. at 492-93 ("Probation or suspension of sentence comes as an act of grace
to one convicted of a crime, and may be coupled with such conditions in respect of its
duration as Congress may impose."); see also Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216, 220
(1932) ("[Probation] is a matter of favor, not of contract."). The Court in Burns held that
revocation of probation need not be preceded by specific charges and a formal hearing.
See Burns, 287 U.S. at 221.
485. See Tracy Ballard, The Norplant Condition: One Step Forward or Two Steps
Back?, 16 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 139, 168 (1992); Hurwitz, supra note 11, at 791-92; Note,
Judicial Review of Probation Conditions, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 181, 188-90 (1967)
[hereinafter Judicial Review]; Sunny A.M. Koshy, Note, The Right of [All] the People to
Be Secure: Extending Fundamental Fourth Amendment Rights to Probationers and
Parolees, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 449, 466-67 (1988).
486. See Judicial Review, supra note 485, at 189.
487. See id. at 190.
488. Id. at 189.
489. Id. at 190.
490. See, e.g., Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 n.4 (1973) ("It is clear.., that a
probationer can no longer be denied due process, in reliance on the dictum in Escoe v.
Zerbst that probation is an 'act of grace.'" (citation omitted)); see also Morrisey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1971) (holding that the liberty of a parolee is within the
protection of the Fourteenth Amendment); Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 136 (1967)
(holding that an indigent defendant is entitled to counsel when sentencing occurs after
revocation of probation).
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fallen into disfavor.491 Effects of the theory linger,49 however, most
notably in the courts' reluctance to apply the Eighth Amendment to
probation conditions.493
Another theory used to justify not reviewing probation
conditions is that probation is a covenant between the probationer
and the court in which the court agrees not to imprison the
probationer if she will abide by certain conditions.494 Under this
theory, a probationer waives her constitutional rights in exchange for
exemption from incarceration. 495 A defendant may only appeal if she
refuses the probation conditions and is sentenced to jail.496
One obvious problem with the covenant theory is that the
defendant, who faces prison if she does not agree to the probation
conditions, is hardly in an equal bargaining position with the trial
court.497 One commentator has noted that "[i]f probation were to be
treated as a contract, many probation conditions would be
491. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.01 cmt. at 225 (1985) (describing the "act of
grace" theory as "out of date and unrealistic"); GEORGE G. KILLINGER & PAUL F.
CROMWELL, JR., CORRECTIONS IN THE COMMUNITY: ALTERNATIVES TO
IMPRISONMENT 157-58 (1974) ("[Pirobation is a good bit more than [a] 'matter of grace'
.... Probation is an affirmative correctional tool, a tool which is used not because it is of
maximum benefit to the defendant.., but because it is of maximum benefit to the society
.... "); Ballard, supra note 485, at 168 (noting that the act of grace theory "has been
largely rejected by the judiciary"); Hurwitz, supra note 11, at 792-93 (noting that "[b]oth
the act of grace and waiver ... theories have been largely undermined by a series of
Supreme Court decisions.., that include parole and probation revocation hearings within
the coverage of the due process clause"); Judicial Review, supra note 485, at 190, 202
(noting the decline of the act of grace theory).
492. See United States v. Pastore, 537 F.2d 675, 679 (2d Cir. 1976) (noting "the general
unwillingness of appellate courts until recently to entertain challenges to the validity of
[probation] conditions"); Bruce D. Greenberg, Comment, Probation Conditions and the
First Amendment: When Reasonableness Is Not Enough, 17 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS.
45, 56 (1981); Hurwitz, supra note 11, at 793 & nn.146-48. The Second Circuit held in
Pastore that a probation condition requiring the defendant to resign from the bar was
improper, given that alternative well-defined procedures existed which would give him
procedural rights denied by the condition. See Pastore, 537 F.2d at 683.
493. According to one student commentator, the State of Oregon in its brief for State
v. Bateman, 771 P.2d 314 (Or. Ct. App. 1989) (en banc), argued that probation is
generally not considered punishment but is an "act of grace"; therefore, the Eighth
Amendment is inapplicable. See Brilliant, supra note 54, at 1366. For a discussion of
Bateman, see supra notes 160-64 and accompanying text. For a more in-depth discussion
of the applicability of the Eighth Amendment to probation conditions, see Brilliant, supra
note 54, at 1372, 1380-84; supra notes 288-359 and accompanying text.
494. See Judicial Review, supra note 485, at 191-93; Koshy, supra note 485, at 466.
495. See Hurwitz, supra note 11, at 792.
496. See id.; Judicial Review, supra note 485, at 191.
497. See Judah Best & Paul I. Birzon, Judicial Review of Probation Conditions, in
JUSTICE, PUNISHMENT, TREATMENT: THE CORRECTIONAL PROCESS 65, 66 (Leonard
Orland ed., 1973); Koshy, supra note 485, at 468.
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unenforceable under the established rules of contract law. '498  For
this reason, this theory also has fallen into disrepute,499 though it, too,
remains influential.0 0
B. The Changing Purposes of Probation: From Rehabilitation to
Punishment
Although one of the traditional goals of incarceration was
rehabilitation,0 1 commentators in the 1960s and 1970s realized that
imprisonment did not serve to rehabilitate but actually had the
opposite effect.50 With prison overcrowding5 3 and a general trend in
criminal law towards reformation,5  probation was viewed as a viable
method for rehabilitation of criminals. 5  In part because probation
498. Judicial Review, supra note 485, at 192.
499. See Hahn v. Burke, 430 F.2d 100, 104 (7th Cir. 1970) ("Probation is in fact not a
contract. The probationer does not enter into the agreement on an equal status with the
state."); Greenberg, supra note 492, at 59. Also, in United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez,
521 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1975) (en bane), the Ninth Circuit explained that the Supreme
Court rejected the contract theory as applied to parole in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471, 487-90 (1972). See Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d at 265 n.15. The Ninth Circuit
added: "We feel that the custody and contract theories are equally inappropriate when
applied in the probation setting." Id. For a discussion of Consuelo-Gonzalez, see infra
notes 546-52 and accompanying text.
500. See Hurwitz, supra note 11, at 793; Koshy, supra note 485, at 467-68; Robert C.
Little, Comment, Rights of Maryland Probationers: A Primer for the Practitioner, 11 U.
BALT. L. REv. 272,274 n.14 (1982).
501. See LouIs P. CARNEY, PROBATION AND PAROLE: LEGAL AND SOCIAL
DIMENSIONS 85 (1977) ("Rehabilitation is probably the most overworked word in the
correctional lexicon. It is also the least understood and the most misused.").
502. See id. ("The evidence is overwhelming that prisons do not and cannot
rehabilitate."); KILLINGER & CROMWELL, supra note 491, at 168 (noting the "debilitating
effects [of incarceration] on inmates, who have great difficulty in reintegrating themselves
into the community"); see also Brilliant, supra note 54, at 1357-58 (noting that "both
commentators and the United States Sentencing Commission have rejected the notion
that in our modem day the purpose of punishment is rehabilitation").
503. See James C. Weissman, Constitutional Primer on Modern Probation Conditions,
8 NEW ENG. J. ON PRISON L. 367, 369 (1982).
504. See, e.g., HARRY E. ALLEN ET AL., PROBATION AND PAROLE IN AMERICA 36
(1985) (noting the beginnings of the reformist movement in America during the last
decade of the eighteenth century and the blossoming of the movement after the Civil
War); cf. CARNEY, supra note 501, at 84-85 (noting that "the recovery of human dignity"
is "not enhanced by such treatment" as "[b]rutal physical punishments and long periods
of imprisonment").
505. See State v. Simpson, 25 N.C. App. 176, 179, 212 S.E.2d 566, 569 (1975). The
Simpson court noted that "[t]he primary purpose of a suspended sentence is to further the
reform of the defendant." Id. (citing State v. Smith, 233 N.C. 68, 70, 62 S.E.2d 495, 496
(1950)); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.01 cmt. at 225 (1985) ("[I]t is better to
maintain the offender in the environment in which he must eventually learn to live rather
than to place him in one that contains all of the artificial, and potentially harmful, factors
of imprisonment."); CARNEY, supra note 501, at 84-86 (discussing the probative potential
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was much less expensive than incarceration," 6 probation became the
norm rather than the exception." Many probation statutes still state
that the purpose of probation is to rehabilitate the offender so that he
can lead a law-abiding life.508
to rehabilitate offenders); KILLINGER & CROMWELL, supra note 491, at 157 (noting
probation's promise to enable the offender to "learn how to live successfully in the
general community"); SOL RUBIN, THE LAW OF CRIMINAL CORRECTION 205 (2d ed.
1973) ("Probation is a disposition that allows the convicted offender to remain free in the
community while supervised by a person who attempts to help him lead a law-abiding
life."); Weissman, supra note 503, at 368-69 (noting that "[p]robation ... functions as the
prototypical alternative to incarceration for nonviolent, repetitive conduct"); Brilliant,
supra note 54, at 1368-70 (noting the rehabilitative purpose of probation).
The American Bar Association Standards Relating to Probation suggest several
reasons why probation is desirable:
(i) [It maximizes the liberty of the individual while at the same time vindicating
the authority of the law and effectively protecting the public from further
violations of the law;
(ii) it affirmatively promotes the rehabilitation of the offender by continuing
normal community contacts;
(iii) it avoids the negative and frequently stultifying effects of confinement which
often severely and unnecessarily complicate the reintegration of the offender
into the community;
(iv) it greatly reduces the financial costs to the public treasury of an effective
correctional system;
(v) it minimizes the impact of the conviction upon innocent dependents of the
offender.
A.B.A., PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO
PROBATION § 1.2 (1970) [hereinafter A.B.A. STANDARDS].
506. See CARNEY, supra note 501, at 128 (noting that it is estimated that to place an
offender on probation costs about one-tenth as much as it does to incarcerate him).
507. The Model Penal Code states:
The Court shall deal with a person who has been convicted of a crime
without imposing sentence of imprisonment unless...
(a) there is undue risk that during the period of a suspended sentence or
probation the defendant will commit another crime; or
(b) the defendant is in need of correctional treatment that can be
provided most effectively by his commitment to an institution; or
(c) a lesser sentence will depreciate the seriousness of the defendant's
crime.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.01(1) (1985). The Commentary to the code notes that on
September 1, 1976, "there were nearly one million ... adults on probation." Id. cmt. at
227 n.16 (quoting U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, LEAA STATE AND LOCAL PROBATION AND
PAROLE SYSTEMS 1 (1978)). The ABA Standards state that "[t]he legislature should
authorize the sentencing court in every case to impose a sentence of probation.
Exceptions to this principle are not favored and, if made, should be limited to the most
serious offenses." A.B.A. STANDARDS, supra note 505, at § 1.1(a).
508. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-303(a) (Michie 1997); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-
11-204(1) (1986 & Supp. 1996); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-30(a)(9) (West 1994 &
Supp. 1998); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4301 (1995); IOWA CODE ANN. § 907.6 (West
1994 & Supp. 1998); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 895 (West 1997 & Supp. 1998);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17A, § 1204-2-m (West 1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20-6(F)
(Michie 1994 & Supp. 1997); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 65.10(1) (McKinney 1998); OHIO REV.
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This view of probation, however, is not without its problems.
First, because of a lack of funding and support staff, probation as a
method of rehabilitation has not been nearly as effective as
commentators had hoped.509 Probationers are often released into the
same environment that encouraged their deviancy in the first place
and may not receive the support and guidance necessary to keep
them from committing future crimes.510
A second problem has been that treating probation as a method
of rehabilitation perpetuates the idea that probation is an act of
leniency, which ties into the "act of grace" argument.511 Thus a court
with this mind-set might be less likely to consider a challenge to
probation conditions. For example, courts will not entertain Eighth
Amendment challenges to probation conditions because, in their
view, these conditions do not constitute punishment.512 One student
commentator has noted that "[a] fundamental flaw in both scholarly
and judicial evaluations of probation conditions is the accepted
premise: It's probation, therefore it's not punishment. '" 513 Probation,
even when rehabilitation is its main goal, is not entirely devoid of
punitive elements.1 4 For example, some probation statutes allow a
CODE ANN. § 2951.02(C)(1)(a) (Anderson 1996 & Supp. 1997); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 137.540(2) (1997); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9754(c)(13) (West 1982); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 28, § 252(b)(15) (Supp. 1998); ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 27.1.
509. Even in the 1970s, when it was still generally recognized that probation had
rehabilitative potential, commentators argued that probation was not living up to this
potential. See, e.g., CARNEY, supra note 501, at 126; KILLINGER & CROMWELL, supra
note 491, at 168-69.
510. See KILLINGER & CROMWELL, supra note 491, at 158, 168-69.
511. See Higdon v. United States, 627 F.2d 893, 898 (9th Cir. 1980) ("Punishment of an
offender may not be the primary purpose of the judge's imposition of probation. Nor may
probation conditions be the vehicle for circumvention of statutory sentencing limits.")
(citing United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 266 (9th Cir. 1975) (en bane)).
The Higdon court held impermissible a probation condition requiring that the defendant
forfeit all assets, including his home, to the government and agree to work for charity for
three years without pay because it was not reasonably related to rehabilitation or to
protection of the public. See id. at 890-900.
512. See Springer v. United States, 148 F.2d 411, 415 (9th Cir. 1945) ("The conditions
of probation are not punitive in character and the question of whether or not the terms
are cruel and unusual and thus violative of the Constitution of the United States does not
arise for the reason that the Constitution applies only to punishment."); State v. Macy,
403 N.W.2d 743, 745 (S.D. 1987) (holding that because probation is not a sentence but a
sentence alternative, the Eighth Amendment does not apply); Koshy, supra note 485, at
168-69. Koshy distinguishes the "act of grace" theory from the argument that probation is
not punishment. See Koshy, supra note 485, at 168-69. However, though they are two
separate arguments, the "act of grace" theory sets the stage for a general unwillingness to
apply constitutional limitations to probation conditions.
513. Brilliant, supra note 54, at 1359.
514. See id. at 1358; see also Higdon, 627 F.2d at 898 n.8. ("We recognize ... that
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brief period of incarceration, even while purporting to achieve
rehabilitation as their purpose.5 15 Moreover, most probation statutes
require some kind of restitution,1 6 either monetary517 or from
community service.5 18 Perhaps instead of categorizing a condition as
either punitive or rehabilitative, courts should recognize that both
elements may be present. 19
A growing number of states52  as well as the federal
government,521 now consider probation a sentence, not an alternative
probation conditions may have an incidental punitive effect, in that any restriction of
liberty is in a sense a 'punishment.' "); In re Buehrer, 236 A.2d 592, 596 (N.J. 1967)
("Probation has an inherent sting, and restrictions upon the freedom of the probationer
are realistically punitive in quality."). Courts are divided on this issue. Compare
Springer, 148 F.2d at 415 ("The conditions of probation are not punitive in character."),
with Scheidt v. Meredith, 307 F. Supp. 63, 66 (D. Colo. 1970) (stating that probation
contains some punitive elements).
Also, although incarceration may not lead to rehabilitation, some commentators and
courts still believe that other forms of punishment may rehabilitate or reform. See, e.g.,
United States v. William Anderson Co., 698 F.2d 911, 913 (8th Cir. 1983); Goldschmitt v.
State, 490 So. 2d 123, 125-26 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Ballenger v. State, 436 S.E.2d 793,
794-95 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993); GIBBS, supra note 115, at 77-78; see also Paul H. Robinson &
John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 453, 491 (1997) (arguing that a
judge may "select a sanctioning method that will maximize rehabilitation" once the judge
has ensured "that the total amount of punishment is the amount deserved"); Lisa E.
Cowart, Comment, Legislative Prerogative vs. Judicial Discretion: California's Three
Strikes Law Takes a Hit, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 615, 651-53 (1998) (noting rehabilitative
potential for drug reporting centers and adult boot camps, two forms of alternative
sentencing); cf Alternative Punishments, supra note 147, at 1969 (arguing that sentencing
alternatives like shaming "promise to infuse new life into an otherwise stagnant criminal
law"). Such an analysis is contrary to Brilliant's view, for though he admits that probation
conditions have punitive elements, he contrasts punitive conditions with rehabilitative
conditions, suggesting that the two are distinct. See Brilliant, supra note 54, at 1358-59.
515. See NEIL B. COHEN & JAMES J. GOBERT, THE LAW OF PROBATION AND
PAROLE 4 (1983); Best & Birzon, supra note 497, at 60.
516. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1343(b)(9) (Supp. 1995); A.B.A. STANDARDS,
supra note 505, § 3.2(c)(viii); Best & Birzon, supra note 497, at 59-60.
517. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-303(d)(10) (Supp. 1995). For a discussion of
the problems of monetary restitution, see KILLINGER & CROMWELL, supra note 491, at
223.
518. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-303(d)(3); Weissman, supra note 503, at 390.
519. See Brilliant, supra note 54, at 1372. If a particular probation condition has both
punitive and rehabilitative elements, there is no reason why a court could not
simultaneously consider both a statutorily-based challenge to the condition on the basis
that it does not meet the rehabilitative purpose of probation and an Eighth Amendment
challenge that the condition constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.
520. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4302(14) (1995); 730 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN.
5/5-5-3(b)(1) (West 1997 & Supp. 1998); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4603d(a)(3) (1995 &
Supp. 1996); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2246(4) (1995); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 651:2(I)
(1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-2(b) (West 1995 & Supp. 1998).
521. See 18 U.S.C. § 3561 (1994) (calling probation a "sentence").
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to sentencing.' z Implicit in this change is the recognition that like
any punishment, probation must meet the statutory purposes of
sentencing. 523  Although rehabilitation may still be a goal of
probation524 in these jurisdictions, the emphasis is now on
punishment. 5 As one commentator has stated: "[I]f courts use
probation as a sentence, its function must expand to include
retribution and deterrence as well as its traditional goals of
rehabilitation and public protection. 5 26
How this shift in thinking will affect the analysis of probation
conditions by state courts remains to be seen. 27 Theoretically, this
shift should end all vestiges of the "act of grace" and "waiver"
theories of probation. Certainly, a probationer should be able to
challenge a probation sentence under the Eighth Amendment
because probation is now designated a form of punishment in these
jurisdictions.52 9  The standards for determining the legality of
522. For commentary that embraces this change, see COHEN & GOBERT, supra note
515, at 185 ("A more realistic approach would be to recognize that punishment, like
rehabilitation, can be a valid rationale for imposing a probation ... term. The two are not
mutually exclusive."); Filcik, supra note 54, at 300 (noting that "changing attitudes
suggest that... probation is evolving into a broad, flexible means of dispensing criminal
justice").
523. The Introductory Commentary to the probation section of the U.S. sentencing
guidelines states:
Probation may be used as an alternative to incarceration, provided that the
terms and conditions of probation can be fashioned so as to meet fully the
statutory purposes of sentencing, including promoting respect for law, providing
just punishment for the offense, achieving general deterrence, and protecting the
public from further crimes by the defendant.
18 U.S.C.A. app. § 5B1.1. (West 1996 & Supp. 1998).
524. Illinois still seems to emphasize rehabilitation as the primary goal of probation.
See, e.g., Illinois v. Meyer, 680 N.E.2d 315, 318 (III. 1997); supra notes 125-26 and
accompanying text (discussing Illinois case law).
525. See Weissman, supra note 503, at 367-68 ("Modem rehabilitative philosophy ...
is being discarded in favor of determinate sentencing values advocating retribution and
equality.... In essence, probation is becoming a 'just deserts' sanction to be applied
commensurately with the offender's misconduct." (footnotes omitted)).
526. Filcik, supra note 54, at 297.
527. One section of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, 18 U.S.C.A. § 5B1.3 (West 1996 &
Supp. 1998), now governs the standards that federal courts must apply when analyzing the
validity of probation conditions. See infra notes 562-66 and accompanying text
(discussing new standards).
528. Even if these doctrines have been "officially" discarded, courts may still show
their traditional reluctance to carefully scrutinize probation conditions. See supra notes
492-93 (discussing the reluctance of courts to scrutinize conditions).
529. See Filcik, supra note 54, at 316 & n.129 (citing State v. Brown, 326 S.E.2d 410,
412 (S.C. 1985), for the argument that castration as a probation condition would
constitute "cruel and unusual punishment").
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probation conditions, however, likely will undergo some changes. 30
C. Standards for Challenging the Legality of Probation Conditions
Legislatures have given trial courts great latitude in tailoring
probation conditions, but the courts' power has not been absolute
since the conditions must fulfill certain standards.53' The standards
have varied from jurisdiction to jurisdiction,5 32 and commentary on
the subject varies in the way that it describes the standards. 5 3  The
standards, most of which involve some kind of reasonableness
requirement, come from the probation statutes in a particular
jurisdiction or from case law.534
There are three basic categories of standards. The first category
merely requires that the probation condition be reasonable.5 35
530. This Comment proposes a standard for analyzing the legality of probation
conditions. See infra notes 598-604 and accompanying text.
531. See infra notes 535-67 and accompanying text (discussing various standards that
state and federal courts employ when analyzing challenges to probation conditions).
532. The standard sometimes varies within one jurisdiction. Compare Gilliam v. Los
Angeles Mun. Court, 159 Cal. Rptr. 74,77 (Ct. App. 1979) (noting that what is important
is not whether the probation condition infringes -upon constitutional rights but whether
the condition meets the reasonable-relations test), with In re White, 158 Cal. Rptr. 562,
566 (Ct. App. 1979) (noting that the trial courts' authority to create probation conditions
is "further circumscribed by constitutional safeguards"). It appears now that the
"constitutional safeguards" standard has been accepted. See People v. Hackler, 16 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 681, 686 (Ct. App. 1993); supra notes 51-76 and accompanying text (discussing
Hackler).
533. See Filcik, supra note 54, at 308-09 (describing the reasonableness test as applying
even when there are constitutional issues); Ginzberg, supra note 11, at 990-92 (describing
the reasonableness test as including both a reasonably related prong and a
constitutionality prong); Hurwitz, supra note 11, at 799 (describing the analysis used to
review probation conditions as a "balancing process"); James H. Taylor, Note, Court-
Ordered Contraception: Norplant as a Probation Condition in Child Abuse, 44 FLA. L.
REV. 379, 397-400 (1992) (discussing how courts employ both a reasonableness
requirement and a constitutional limits requirement).
534. Some of the standards discussed in this Part have not been replaced. The state
court standards, unless the citation states otherwise, are still valid. The federal court
standards have been replaced by 18 U.S.C. § 3563 (1994).
535. See United States v. Pastore, 537 F.2d 675, 683 (2d Cir. 1976) (holding that a
probation condition requiring an attorney not to practice law was "improper"); Sweeney
v. United States, 353 F.2d 10, 11 (7th Cir. 1965) (holding as unreasonable a probation
condition that a chronic alcoholic refrain from drinking); State v. Brown, 326 S.E.2d 410,
411 (S.C. 1985) (noting that judges cannot impose an illegal condition or a condition that
is void as against public policy and holding that castration as a condition of probation is
illegal); State v. Macy, 403 N.W.2d 743, 744 (S.D. 1987) (stating that "[t]he test is one of
reasonableness"); State v. Barklind, 532 P.2d 633, 637 (Wash. Ct. App. 1975)
("[R]easonableness is the test of the propriety of a condition of probation." (citing State
v. Langford, 529 P.2d 839, 840 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974))). The court in Barklind held that a
probation condition requiring the defendant to pay the county a fee as partial
reimbursement for his court-appointed lawyer was reasonable because it was reasonable
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Probation conditions may be voided if they are impossible to
follow,536 excessive,5 7 vague,538 or illegal.539
The second category of standards focuses on whether the
probation condition is reasonably related to rehabilitation.5 40 The
to believe that the condition would rehabilitate the defendant. See Barklind, 532 P.2d at
637.
536. See Sweeney, 353 F.2d at 11.
537. See Pastore, 537 F.2d at 683. The court in Pastore questioned whether a
probation condition requiring an attorney to stop practicing law was necessary for the
protection of the public, describing the condition as an "extreme sanction." Id. The court
stated: "Given the availability of alternative and well-defined procedures for expulsion
from the bar, which would have accorded appellant procedural rights here denied him, we
hold... that this particular condition of probation was improper." Id.
538. See, e.g., Williams v. State, 523 S.W.2d 953, 954 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975, no writ)
(holding probation condition that states the defendant" 'must not reenter without written
permission from this Court'" is so "vague and indefinite" as to be invalid (quoting trial
court)).
539. See Brown, 326 S.E.2d at 411. A condition may be illegal because it is otherwise
unconstitutional or against public policy. See id. For example, in Brown, South Carolina
Supreme Court struck down a probation condition requiring castration because castration
amounted to cruel and unusual punishment and therefore violated the Eighth
Amendment. See id. at 412. The South Carolina Supreme Court noted that public policy
is "derived by implication from the established law of the State, as found in its
Constitution, statutes, and judicial decisions." Id. An example of a probation void as
against public policy is banishment. See id. at 411-12 (citing Henry v. State, 280 S.E.2d
536, 536 (S.C. 1981)).
540. One commentator states that the standard originally was that a probation
condition "must be reasonably related to the crime for which the probationer was
convicted, to rehabilitation or to the public safety," but that the test now requires that the
condition be reasonably related to rehabilitation. Ginzberg, supra note 11, at 990-91. She
cites several standards for this proposition, including those enumerated in Higdon v.
United States, 627 F.2d 893, 898 (9th Cir. 1980), and People v. Dominguez, 64 Cal. Rptr.
290, 293-94 (Ct. App. 1967). See Ginzberg, supra note 11, at 990 n.56. As discussed
below, the Ninth Circuit's standard has changed. See infra notes 547-53 and
accompanying text.
It is true that the statute relied upon in Dominguez states that the court may impose
probation conditions that are reasonable so that" 'justice may be done, that amends may
be made to society for the breach of the law, for any injury done to any person resulting
from such breach and generally and specifically for the reformation and rehabilitation of
the probationer.'" Dominguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 293 (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.1
(current version at Cal. Penal Code § 1203.1 (West 1998))). This statement suggests that
the reasonable-relations test may not be tied to rehabilitation only. Yet the California
Supreme Court, as well as other state courts that have applied the Dominguez-Lent
standard, have applied it as a reasonably-related-to-rehabilitation test. See People v.
Lent, 541 P.2d 545, 548 (Cal. 1975); Rodriguez v. State, 378 So. 2d 7, 9 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1979) (citing A.B.A. STANDARDS, supra note 505, at § 3.2(B)) (holding that a probation
condition prohibiting the defendant from having custody of her children had a clear
relationship to the crime of child abuse and was therefore valid, but that conditions
prohibiting marriage and pregnancy did nothing to limit the chances of further child abuse
and were therefore invalid); State v. Livingston, 372 N.E.2d 1335,1337 n.2 (Ohio Ct. App.
1976) (noting that the ABA standards for criminal justice relating to probation
"specifically provides that conditions on probation should be reasonably related to the
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Dominguez-Lent test has been widely cited . 41 The test states that a
condition of probation is not reasonably related to rehabilitation and
is therefore invalid if it: "(1) has no relationship to the crime of
which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not
of itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not
reasonably related to future criminality." 542 This standard does not
consider the extent to which the probation condition infringes upon a
probationer's constitutional rights. One court has even gone so far as
to state: "In evaluating the validity of a condition of probation the
issue is not the impact of the condition on the defendant's
constitutional rights but its ability to meet the [Dominguez-Lent]
standard. ' 4 3  Some courts, however, have read a constitutional
requirement into the Dominguez-Lent standard.' 4
rehabilitation of a defendant and should not be unduly restrictive of his liberties or so
vague or ambiguous as to give no real guidance" (citing A.B.A. STANDARDS, supra note
505, at § 3.2(B)) (holding that a probation condition that forbade the defendant from
having another child during a five-year period was a violation of the defendant's right to
privacy and an abuse of the trial court's discretion).
541. See People v. Lent, 541 P.2d 545, 548 (Cal. 1975); People v. Dominguez, 64 Cal.
Rptr. 290,293-94 (Ct. App. 1967).
542. Dominguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 293 (cited with approval in Lent, 541 P.2d at 548); see
also Rodriguez, 378 So. 2d at 9 (applying the Dominguez-Lent standard); Livingston, 372
N.E.2d at 1337 (same); COHEN & GOBERT, supra note 515, at 209 (citing the Dominguez-
Lent test). The court in Dominguez held that a probation condition requiring a defendant
convicted of robbery not to become pregnant while unmarried was invalid because
pregnancy is unrelated to robbery. See Dominguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 293.
The California Supreme Court endorsed a slight variation of the Dominguez-Lent
standard for a short time. In People v. Mason, 488 P.2d 630 (Cal. 1971) (en banc), the
court stated that a probation condition would be considered invalid if it: "(1) has no
relationship to the crime of which the defendant is convicted; (2) relates to conduct that is
not itself criminal; or (3) requires or forbids conduct that is not reasonably related to
future criminality." Id. at 632; see also In re Bushman, 463 P.2d 727, 733 (Cal. 1970)
(applying this standard for the first time); In re Mannino, 92 Cal. Rptr. 880, 883 n.4 (Ct.
App. 1971) (applying the Bushman standard). However, in Lent, the California Supreme
Court corrected the phrasing in Mason: "In paraphrasing the foregoing quotation from
Dominguez ... we inadvertently stated the test in the disjunctive rather than the
conjunctive .... To this extent, Bushman and Mason are disapproved." Lent, 541 P.2d at
548 n.1.
543. Gilliam v. Los Angeles Mun. Court, 159 Cal. Rptr. 74,77 (Ct. App. 1979). But see
In re white, 158 Cal. Rptr. 562, 565 (Ct. App. 1979) ("[Tlhe discretion to impose
conditions of probation... is further circumscribed by constitutional safeguards. Human
liberty is involved. A probationer has the right to enjoy a significant degree of privacy, or
liberty, under the Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution."
(citing People v. Keller, 143 Cal. Rptr. 184, 187 (Ct. App. 1978))).
The California Court of Appeal, however, has revised its test and now takes
constitutional issues into consideration. For a discussion of People v. Beach, 195 Cal.
Rptr. 381 (Ct. App. 1983), which applies this revised test, see infra notes 558-60 and
accompanying text.
544. For example, the court in Livingston noted: "[T]he trial court is not free to
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The third category of standards takes into account the extent to
which probation conditions infringe upon constitutional rights. The
most common of these tests was adopted by the Ninth Circuit 545 in
United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez.5 46 The Ninth Circuit determined
that conditions impinging upon constitutional rights are properly
subject to strict scrutiny in order to ensure that they truly serve to
rehabilitate and protect the public.47 The actual test, described as a
"two-step process," was best explained by the Ninth Circuit in
Higdon v. United States.54 The court first must consider the reasons
why the trial court imposed the conditions, and then, if these reasons
are permissible, the court must determine whether the conditions are
reasonably related to these reasons.5 49 In the second step, the court
considers "the impact which the conditions have on the probationer's
rights. If the impact is substantially greater than is necessary to carr
out the purposes, the conditions are impermissible.""55 This standard,
as the Consuelo-Gonzalez court pointed out, is flexible. 55' Also, the
Ninth Circuit has emphasized that the standard does not create a
presumption against constitutional limitations: "Rather, it is
necessary to recognize that when fundamental rights are curbed it
must be done sensitively and with a keen appreciation that the
infringement must serve [probation's] broad purposes."'55
The Tenth Circuit applied a kind of "narrowly tailored" means
impose arbitrary conditions that significantly burden the defendant in the exercise of her
liberty and bearing only a remote relationship to the crime for which she was convicted
and to the objectives sought by probation of education and rehabilitation." Livingston,
372 N.E.2d at 1337.
545. California courts seem to be at the forefront of developing standards for
analyzing probation conditions, both at the federal and state levels. See, e.g., United
States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259,264 (9th Cir. 1975) (en banc); Dominguez, 159
Cal. Rptr. at 77.
546. 521 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1975) (en banc) (holding that a search of a probationer that
is not otherwise in compliance with the Fourth Amendment must be conducted by or
under the immediate personal supervision of a probation officer).
547. See id. at 265 ("Conditions that unquestionably restrict otherwise inviolable
constitutional rights may properly be subject to special scrutiny to determine whether the
limitation does in fact serve the dual objectives of rehabilitation and public safety.").
548. 627 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1980).
549. See id. at 897 (citing Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d at 263-64).
550. Id. Another factor considered is "the extent to which conditions serve legitimate
needs of law enforcement." Id. at 897 n.7. The importance of the law enforcement factor
seems primarily tied to search and seizure conditions. See id. The Fifth Circuit also has
adopted the Higdon test. See United States v. Tonry, 605 F.2d 144,150 (5th Cir. 1979).
551. See Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d at 264 (noting that flexibility is desired because
of courts' "uncertainty about how rehabilitation is to be accomplished").
552 Id. at 265.
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test in Porth v. Templar553 when it reviewed the constitutionality of
probation conditions that forbade a defendant from speaking,
writing, or handing out pamphlets in which he questioned the
constitutionality of the Federal Reserve System and the federal
income tax laws.554 The Tenth Circuit held that these probation
conditions violated the defendant's constitutional rights because they
prohibited conduct that was not per se harmful.515 Yet the court did
note that probationers do not have the same freedoms as ordinary
citizens: "[The probationer] forfeits much of his freedom of action
and even freedom of expression to the extent necessary to successful
rehabilitation and protection of the public. '5 6 The court held the
probation condition "invalid only to the extent that it prohibits the
expression of opinions as to invalidity or unconstitutionality of the
laws in question."'557
A new standard applied by the California Court of Appeal also
analyzes the extent to which a probation condition violates a
probationer's rights. The court in People v. Beach55 analyzed a
probation condition according to three criteria: (1) whether the
condition is reasonably related to the intent of the probation
statute;5 9 (2) whether "the value to the public of the imposition of
this condition manifestly outweighs any impairment of constitutional
rights"; and (3) whether there are any possible alternatives that
infringe less upon the probationer's constitutional rights which could
be narrowly drawn to correspond more precisely to the purposes of
the condition.5" Other state courts also have considered a
probationer's constitutional rights, though not with such a well-
defined test.561
553. 453 F.2d 330 (10th Cir. 1971).
554. See id. at 331.
555. See id. at 334 ("When the condition is examined in the abstract, namely speaking
or writing about the constitutionality of the laws in question, it appears to prohibit
conduct which is not per se harmful.").
556. Id.
557. Id.
558. 195 Cal. Rptr. 381 (Ct. App. 1983).
559. The California Penal Code allows a trial court to impose reasonable conditions
that are "fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done, that amends may be
made to society for the breach of the law, for any injury done to any person resulting from
that breach, and generally and specifically for the reformation and rehabilitation of the
probationer." CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.10) (West 1998).
560. See Beach, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 387 (citing In re White, 158 Cal. Rptr. 562, 568 (Ct.
App. 1979)).
561. See, e.g., State v. Mosburg, 768 P.2d 313, 314 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989) ("There are
... limitations on probation conditions that infringe on constitutionally protected
rights."); State v. Simpson, 25 N.C. App. 176, 179-80, 212 S.E.2d 566, 569 (1975) ("A
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The Federal Sentencing Guidelines 562 mandate the standard that
federal appellate courts must now apply when reviewing a sentence
of probation, which assures uniformity within the federal courts. The
probation condition must be reasonably related to the crime, both in
its nature and in its circumstances, and must be reasonably related to
the defendant's characteristics and history.563 Also, the probation
condition must be reasonably related to the purposes of sentencing,5"
and it must "involve only such deprivations of liberty or property as
are reasonably necessary to effect the purposes of sentencing." 565
Although the statute does not list rehabilitation as one of the
purposes of a probation sentence, the Ninth Circuit now appears to
apply a "reasonably related to rehabilitation and protection of the
public" test. 66
These standards are all tied to some type of reasonableness
requirement.567 Some of the tests require a consideration of the
probationer's constitutional rights, but some do not. Part V considers
the problems involved in basing a probationer's liberty interests on a
reasonableness standard and attempts to formulate a better standard.
V. DETERMINING A PROBATION STANDARD FOR SCARLET-LETtER
PROBATION CONDITIONS
A. Current Probation Standards-The Need for Adequate Protection
of a Probationer's First Amendment Right to Free Speech
It is not clear whether a reasonably related test alone can protect
a probationer's First Amendment right to free speech. An older free
condition which is a violation of the defendant's constitutional right and, therefore,
beyond the power of the court to impose is per se unreasonable." (citing State v. Caudle,
276 N.C. 550, 553, 173 S.E.2d 778, 781 (1970))). Also, the probationer "must not be
oppressed or unduly burdened by the [suspended sentence]." Simpson, 25 N.C. App. at
179-80, 212 S.E.2d at 569 (citing State v. Everett, 164 N.C. 399, 401, 79 S.E. 274, 275
(1913)).
562. See Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II,
§ 217(a), 98 Stat. 1976-2040 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 18, 21, 26, 28,
29 & 49 U.S.C.).
563. See 18 U.S.C.A. app. § 5B1.3(b) (West 1996 & Supp. 1998).
564. The purposes of sentencing under the Federal Guidelines are "promoting respect
for law, providing just punishment for the offense, achieving general deterrence, and
protecting the public from further crimes by the defendant." 18 U.S.C.A. § 5B1.1,
Introductory Commentary. Rehabilitation is not a listed purpose. See id.
565. 18 U.S.C.A. app. § 5B1.3(b).
566. United States v. Bolinger, 940 F.2d 478,480 (9th Cir. 1991).
567. See supra notes 531-66 and accompanying text.
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speech case, Beauharnais v. Illinois 6,5 s illustrates the dangers of
employing a rational review test where the state is abridging a
citizen's free speech. In this case, petitioner handed out lithographs
depicting African-Americans as immoral criminals and demanding
that the city of Chicago halt their "further encroachment,
harassment, and invasion" on white people's "property,
neighborhoods and persons." 569 He was convicted under a criminal
libel statute °.57  Rather than analyzing whether the statute violated
the petitioner's First Amendment rights of free speech, the Supreme
Court employed a Fourteenth Amendment rational-basis review of
the statute.571  The Court determined that the statute was
reasonable57 and noted that "it would be out of bounds for the
judiciary to deny the legislature a choice of policy, provided it is not
unrelated to the problem and not forbidden by some explicit
limitation on the State's power."573
In a scathing dissent, Justice Black argued that the majority's
holding "degrade[d] First Amendment freedoms to the 'rational
basis' level," leaving "the rights of assembly, petition, speech and
press almost completely at the mercy of state legislative, executive,
and judicial agencies."574 According to Justice Black, the majority's
holding contradicted the language in Barnette that "'distinguish[ed]
between the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as an
instrument for transmitting the principles of the First Amendment
and those cases in which it is applied for its own sake.' "57s
Beauharnais has been widely criticized,, and although it has never
been overruled, it is no longer regarded as good law.576 One problem
568. 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
569. Id. at 252.
570. See id. at 257.
571. See id. at 258 ("The precise question ... is whether the protection of 'liberty' in
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prevents a State from punishing
such libels.").
572. See id.
573. Id. at 262.
574. Id. at 269-70 (Black, J., dissenting).
575. Id. at 269 (Black, J., dissenting) (quoting West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943)). The Court in Barnette noted that "[t]he right of a
State to regulate, for example, a public utility may well include, so far as the due process
test is concerned, power to impose all of the restrictions which a legislature may have a
'rational basis' for adopting." Barnette, 319 U.S. at 639. However, "freedoms of speech
and of press, of assembly, and of worship may not be infringed on such slender grounds."
Id.
576. See, e.g., Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197,1205 (7th Cir. 1978) (holding in part that
an ordinance which prohibited the dissemination of materials prompting hatred toward
other persons on the basis of their heritage was unconstitutional); Tollett v. United States,
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with analyzing the First Amendment under either a reasonableness
or a reasonably related test is that such tests allow virtually any
infringement on a person's freedom of speech, no matter how broad
the infringement, as long as some reasonable person could find that it
relates to the goals of probation. Such tests may merely pay lip-
service to the idea that probationers have liberty interests.5 77
While it is true that the new federal test requires courts to
choose a probation condition that is the least restrictive of a
probationer's liberty interests,578 it is not clear whether the appellate
courts carefully scrutinize probation conditions that have not been
narrowly tailored. For example, the Seventh Circuit in United States
v. Showalter579 upheld a probation condition that required the
defendant, convicted of possession of an unregistered firearm, to
"avoid associating with other skinheads and neo-Nazis," despite the
485 F.2d 1087, 1093-94 (8th Cir. 1973) (holding in part that a statute which punished
defamatory words written on the outside of envelopes or on postcards violated the First
Amendment because protecting unwilling viewers from such offensive materials was not a
compelling governmental interest); Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith v. FCC, 403
F.2d 169, 174 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (Wright, J., concurring) (noting that "it is now doubtful
that the [Beauharnais] decision still represents the views of the Court"). The court in
B'nai B'rith held that there was substantial evidence to support the FCC's choice to renew
a broadcasting license when the evidence tended to show that the broadcasting company
offered the Anti-Defamation League free equal time in order to respond to a
commentator's paid broadcasts when he allegedly made anti-Semitic remarks. See B'nai
B'rith, 403 F.2d at 170.
577. Another problem is that courts often employ the reasonably related test where
the defendant has been incarcerated. See, e.g., Bazzetta v. McGinnis, 124 F.2d 774, 780
(6th Cir. 1997) (applying the reasonably related test to a prison regulation concerning
contact visits); Goodwin v. Turner, 908 F.2d 1395, 1396 (8th Cir. 1990) (applying the test
to the right to procreate). To give probationers only those constitutional rights prisoners
have is unfair because the whole idea behind probation is that it is a less severe
punishment than incarceration. The rebuttal to this assertion is that probationers
obviously have a less punitive sentence than prisoners because they are not in prison and
that the state may fairly infringe upon their constitutional liberties as much as it can
infringe upon the liberty interests of prisoners.
This argument sounds like the old "act of grace" rationale, however. See supra notes
483-93 and accompanying text. Furthermore, the state has a greater interest in infringing
upon a prisoner's constitutional rights because of prison security concerns. See Koshy,
supra note 485, at 464-66. Whatever the precise scope of a probationer's constitutional
rights, it seems logical that the measure of her rights should be somewhere between that
of a prisoner and that of a regular citizen.
"House arrests" are not included in this discussion of probation because they seem to
be a kind of hybrid between incarceration and probation and therefore deserve their own
discussion. For an interesting commentary on the constitutional questions raised by
house arrest, see generally Hurwitz, supra note 11.
578. See 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b) (1994) (stating that a probation condition must "involve
only such deprivations of liberty or property as are reasonably necessary to effect the
purposes [of the sentencing provisions]").
579. 933 F.2d 573 (7th Cir. 1991).
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defendant's arguments that the condition was unclear and not
specific. 8 The district court judge placed a similar condition on the
defendant between the time of his guilty plea and his sentencing
hearing and reprimanded the defendant at the hearing for writing a
letter to a newspaper that espoused his "white supremacist views."58'
The defendant replied that he thought the condition prohibited him
from associating with his skinhead friends but that he had not
thought that it prohibited offering an "opinion to a newspaper." 582
The Seventh Circuit noted that "[a]lthough the district court
seemed to think the conditions placed on [the defendant] prior to
sentencing should have at least discouraged him from writing
controversial letters to newspapers, there is nothing to that effect in
the [probation] conditions .... This incident illustrates the
importance of specificity in formulating [probation] conditions. '" 583
Despite this admonition to the district court, however, the Seventh
Circuit held that the condition provided sufficiently clear notice as to
which of the defendant's associational activities were restricted,5 4
and the court used the defendant's reply to prove that he understood
the probation condition.5 Certainly, this incident might illustrate
that the terms "neo-Nazis" and "skinheads" were specific enough
that the defendant knew with whom he was not to associate, but how
was the defendant to know whether he could express his views to a
newspaper without violating his probation condition? The Seventh
Circuit implied that the defendant should have known that he could
do so from the fact that the probation condition was silent about his
right to speak. 86 Yet because the district court had reprimanded him
for exercising his free speech rights under a similar condition,5 7 he
could have concluded that he was not allowed this right.
The point is not that the defendant in this case should have been
allowed to associate with skinheads, for the district court probably
rightly believed that the defendant's ties with white supremacist
groups would only lead him back into trouble. The Seventh Circuit
580. Id. It should be noted that Showalter showed a propensity to violence, refusing to
leave his apartment after being evicted and brandishing his weapon. See id. at 574. When
he refused to answer police officers' requests for him to come outside and drop his
weapon, they were forced to break in and arrest him. See id.
581. Id.
582 Id. at 575.
583. Id. at 574 n.1.
584. See id.
585. See id. at 574-75.
586. See id. at 574-75.
587. See id. at 574.
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should have clearly stated, though, that this probation condition did
not prohibit the defendant from expressing his opinions in the
newspaper. The probation condition, as construed by the district
court, broadly and unnecessarily chilled his rights to share his
political viewpoints.
A requirement that the trial court offer specific reasons why it is
imposing a special condition of probation that infringes on a
constitutional liberty is necessary in order for appellate courts to be
able to review probation conditions adequately. A fairly recent
federal case illustrates this need. In United States v. Bolinger,518 a
defendant was convicted for possession of a firearm. 89  One
condition of his supervised release was a prohibition against his
involvement in any motorcycle club activities, including "the Dirty
Dozen," of which he was evidently a member.59°  The defendant
argued that this condition was an impermissible infringement on his
First Amendment right to freedom of association. 91 In reviewing this
condition, the Ninth Circuit recognized a theoretical justification for
the trial court's broad prohibition, noting that the trial court could
have concluded that the defendant was more likely to return to his
former criminal activities if he renewed his earlier associations.5
The Ninth Circuit is correct that the district court could have
concluded this; however, the district court also could have imposed
an unnecessarily broad prohibition. This uncertainty illustrates a
problem with the reasonableness test: The reviewing court not only
will give great deference to the lower court's findings but also will
rely on any reasonable justification that it can identify to justify the
condition. 93
It is not the argument of this Comment that probationers have
the same constitutional freedoms as ordinary citizens. Even First
Amendment rights of association and free speech should be curtailed
588. 940 F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1991).
589. See id. at 479.
590. See id. at 480.
591. See id.
592. See id. The court noted that "[p]robation conditions may seek to prevent
reversion into a former crime-inducing lifestyle by barring contact with old haunts and
associates." Id.
593. This issue may occur in another situation in which appellate courts adopt a
reasonably related test: when analyzing a non-suspect classification statute under the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. See, for example, United States
Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980), in which the Court maintained
that it has never insisted that a legislative body articulate its reasons for enacting the
statute, and then put forth a theoretical justification for the statute's means. See id. at
179.
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in some instances. For example, to allow a defendant convicted of
tax evasion to advocate this behavior or to associate with groups
advocating this behavior would clearly negate the rehabilitative and
deterrent effects of probation. 94 As the Tenth Circuit in Porth v.
Templar595 concluded, however, not to allow such a probationer to
protest the constitutionality of the tax laws at all is to infringe
unnecessarily upon his right to free speech. 96  Such broad
prohibitions, if upheld, could conceivably turn probation conditions
into instruments by which the government can silence extremist
viewpoints. A relatively minor curtailment of a probationer's First
Amendment freedom of speech, however, would be reasonable 9.5
Furthermore, any test used to review the constitutionality of
probation conditions must allow for significant discretion. Although
courts may want to sketch the limits of the constitutionality of
probation conditions, per se rules might hinder the trial courts' ability
to tailor probation conditions for each individual probationer. Yet
courts should seriously consider the extent to which probation
conditions infringe on constitutional liberties and should be certain
that such conditions are as narrowly tailored as possible.
The test adopted by the California Court of Appeal in People v.
Beach598 requires courts to consider the probationer's constitutional
rights while still allowing flexibility.5 99 The first consideration under
this test is whether the probation condition reasonably relates to the
purpose of probation, regardless of whether that purpose is
rehabilitation, deterrence, or some other reason that the legislature
considers a valid purpose.00 This consideration is common in
probation standards,60 1 but the Beach test does not stop there. It also
considers whether the value to the public "manifestly outweigh[s]"
the curtailment of the probationer's constitutional liberty.6 2 Such a
standard allows the reviewing court to balance the probationer's
liberty interests against the value, if any, that society will reap from
594. See United States v. Schiff, 876 F.2d 272, 276 (2d Cir. 1989); United States v.
Lawson, 670 F.2d 923, 929-30 (10th Cir. 1982).
595. 453 F.2d 330 (10th Cir. 1971).
596. See id. at 334.
597. See id. ("[The probationer] forfeits much of his freedom of action and even
freedom of expression to the extent necessary to successful rehabilitation and protection
of the public programs.").
598. 195 Cal. Rptr. 381 (Ct. App. 1983).
599. See id. at 387 (citing In re White, 158 Cal. Rptr. 562, 568 (Ct. App. 1979)).
600. See iL
601. See supra notes 540-44 and accompanying text (discussing the reasonably related
test).
602. Beach, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 387.
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the infringement of the liberty. Finally, the test requires the court to
ask whether there is an alternative probation condition that will be
"less subversive of the constitutional right" and that will more closely
"correlate" with the legislatively dictated purposes of probation. 3 If
the trial court is required to offer reasons for imposing the condition,
the reviewing court may better ensure that the probation condition is
as narrowly tailored as possible.
Another requirement not included in the Beach test but
incorporated into the older Dominguez-Lent test is whether the
probation condition reasonably relates to the probationer's offense.6
Such a requirement easily could be incorporated into the Beach
standard and would further ensure that the trial court carefully tailors
probation conditions to meet both society's and the individual
probationer's needs. This revised Beach test still does not give
probationers the same constitutional rights as ordinary citizens: A
trial court is free to curtail a probationer's liberty interests, as long as
it offers a valid reason for the curtailment and does not restrict
activity that has nothing to do with the probationer's crime or with
the goals of probation.
B. Devising a First Amendment Compelled-Speech Standard for
Scarlet-Letter Probation Conditions
Even the revised Beach standard is not fully effective in
analyzing whether a scarlet-letter probation condition constitutes
compelled speech in violation of the First Amendment.0 5 The
problem is this: How does one narrowly tailor compelled speech? A
trial court can narrowly tailor an infringement on a probationer's
freedom to speak, for instance, by allowing the probationer to speak
against the legality of a law but prohibiting the probationer from
advocating non-compliance with that law.606 In a fundamental sense,
though, compelling speech admits to no gradations-one is either
forced to speak something or is not.
Perhaps the government should never be able to compel one of
603. Id.
604. See People v. Dominguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. 290,293 (Ct. App. 1967).
605. For a review of the compelled speech cases, see supra notes 364-461 and
accompanying text.
606. See. Porth v. Templar, 453 F.2d 330, 334 (10th Cir. 1971) (holding that a
probation condition could restrict the probationer's ability to advocate noncompliance of
the tax laws, but that it could not restrict his ability to argue that the tax laws are
unconstitutional). For further discussion of Porth, see supra notes 553-57 and
accompanying text.
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its citizens to speak, for there is something particularly invidious
about the state wielding its power over the individual in this
manner.6 7 As a practical matter, however, the government forces
citizens to speak facts about themselves all of the time: when
registering for the draft,6 °0 when filling out tax forms, 6 9 and when
being called into court as witnesses.610 There is certainly a difference,
however, between the government forcing all of its citizens to fill out
tax forms and forcing one defendant to advertise her own conviction.
The former is essential, whether for the smooth running of the
government, for the protection of the nation, or for the efficiency of
our criminal justice system, while the government cannot claim quite
as compelling an interest in the latter.
It may be permissible to force a probationer merely to speak
facts, but not to speak an ideological message. 611 Yet scarlet-letter
probation conditions compel more than facts. The context of this
forced speech is important. If these facts serve to humiliate a
probationer or to make him the object of ridicule, then the
Goldschmitt court was wrong in its conclusion that the scarlet-letter
probation in that case was not an ideological method.6 If scarlet-
letter probation conditions involved merely "facts," they would not
be shaming penalties, and they probably would not be employed. In
compelling a defendant to speak of his own conviction to the world at
large, the state is forcing him to convey a message: the ideology of
shame.
Wrapped up in this message are many "sub-messages." The
first, and most powerful, is that the defendant has done something
morally wrong and deserves to be punished.613 Within this message
607. See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 640-41 (1943)
(reviewing from a historical perspective the dangers of allowing the State to "coerce
uniformity of sentiment"); supra notes 364-78 and accompanying text (discussing
Barnette).
608. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 462(a) (1994) (making it a criminal offense to evade or
refuse the draft, punishable "by imprisonment for not more than five years or a fine of not
more than $10,000, or by both such fine and imprisonment").
609. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 7206(4) (1994) (making it a crime to conceal any goods or
commodities with the intent to evade tax collection).
610. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 45(e) ("Failure by any person without adequate excuse
to obey a subpoena served upon that person may be deemed a contempt of the court from
which the subpoena issued.").
611. This distinction was the conclusion of the Florida District Court of Appeal in
Goldschmitt v. State, 490 So. 2d 123, 125-26 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
612. See id.
613. See Kahan, supra note 201, at 636 (noting that one of the requirements of a
successful shaming condition is that it sends a message that the offender's conduct is
wrong); Persons, supra note 186, at 1535 (arguing that shaming punishments send a
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are two other messages: that there is a moral code in which our
society believes,"' and that the criminal laws reflect this code." 5
Also, the defendant is forced to acknowledge the authority of the
government both to enforce the laws and to force him to speak
against his own self-interest. Such a probation condition may
actually strengthen the government's authority because it reminds
other citizens that the government could compel them similarly. In
other words, scarlet-letter probation conditions impart the fact of
their own legality to the world at large.
Because of the powerful messages conveyed in a scarlet-letter
probation condition, perhaps there should be a blanket prohibition
against this kind of compelled speech. Justice Jackson noted in
Barnette that "[i]t would seem that involuntary affirmation could be
commanded only on even more immediate and urgent grounds than
silence. ' 616 Although a state may enforce its laws, when it coerces a
probationer to advertise unwillingly its authority over her, this seems
contrary to a basic tenet of the First Amendment: the right of
citizens to disagree with the State.617 As Justice Jackson eloquently
put it, "freedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter
much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its
substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the
existing order.' 618
Given the language in Riley v. National Federation of the
Blind61 9 -that for First Amendment purposes, the Court will treat the
right to speak and the right not to speak the same62 -it seems
unlikely that courts will find that the right not to speak is more
fundamental than the right to speak. Because courts can limit
probationers' freedom to speak, 621 courts theoretically can compel
message that the offender's conduct is not socially acceptable).
614. See Persons, supra note 186, at 1535 (noting that there are "shared moral
norms"). For an argument doubting the existence of such norms, see Massaro, supra note
12, at 1922-23.
615. See Kahan, supra note 201, at 639-40 (arguing that shaming penalties cause the
surrounding community to believe that the law accords with its moral values).
616. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,633 (1943).
617. See id. at 642.
618. Id. (emphasis added).
619. 487 U.S. 781 (1988).
620. See id. at 796-97.
621. See, e.g., United States v. Lawson, 670 F.2d 923, 929-30 (10th Cir. 1982) (holding
valid a probation condition that did not allow the defendant to advocate noncompliance
with tax laws); United States v. Smith, 618 F.2d 280, 282 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that,
where defendant was convicted of violating tax laws, a probation condition requiring him
to "refrain from making any statements to others advocating any disobedience of any
local state or federal law" was overbroad, but curing the condition by substituting "the
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probationers to advertise their own convictions. That is not to say,
however, that all scarlet-letter probation conditions are
constitutional: Courts must devise a way of narrowing compelled
speech. Three approaches will be considered, though each is in some
way problematic.
One way of narrowly tailoring compelled speech might be to
analyze the degree to which a scarlet-letter probation condition
causes the defendant to feel shamed. Conditions that severely shame
a defendant would be constitutionally suspect. Such a test would
allow appellate courts to invalidate scarlet-letter probation
conditions that were extremely harsh. A subjective test focusing on
the defendant's feelings, however, is flawed for a number of reasons.
Humiliation is a subjective experience and depends on cultural and
familial backgrounds, as well as general psychological makeup.6n A
subjective test that focuses on the degree to which the scarlet-letter
probation condition will degrade or ridicule the defendant potentially
treats differently two defendants who have committed the same
offense and who have been given the same scarlet-letter probation
condition.62
One solution to this problem would be to create a more
objective test that asks whether a reasonable person would consider
the particular scarlet-letter probation condition severely humiliating
and shameful. Determining what a reasonable person considers
shameful is difficult, if not impossible, however, in a society as
diverse as ours.624 Judges might ultimately impose their own notion
of what is shameful.' z Furthermore, all punishments potentially
shame offenders as a secondary effect.626 The difference between
scarlet-letter probation conditions and other forms of punishment,
such as incarceration or fines, is that the primary purpose of scarlet-
letter probation conditions is to shame the defendant publicly.627 As
Internal Revenue Code" for the phrase "any local, state, or federal law").
622- See supra notes 203-23 and accompanying text.
623. Here is an example: Two defendants are convicted for driving while intoxicated.
One is a college student; the other is a rabbi. Both are required as conditions of their
probation to publish apologies and their pictures in the local newspaper. The rabbi stands
to lose a lot more than the college student if forced to publish the apology, yet should a
court affirm the student's condition but hold the rabbi's condition unconstitutional? The
unfairness of such a situation seems obvious. For a discussion of the need to tailor
scarlet-letter probation conditions to the individual defendant, see supra note 212 and
accompanying text.
624. See Massaro, supra note 12, at 1922-23; supra note 210 and accompanying text.
625. See Massaro, supra note 12, at 1924.
626. See Kahan, supra note 201, at 641.
627. See People v. Hackler, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 681,686 (Ct. App. 1993); People v. Meyer,
860 [Vol. 77
1999] SCARLET-LETTER PROBATION CONDITIONS 861
such, scarlet-letter probation conditions have the potential not only
to shame the offender, but to separate the offender from the
community.6zs The problem, in other words, is not the evocation of
shame per se but the intent to cause shame and the degree to which
shame is evoked.
Of course, the main difficulty with analyzing the degree to which
a probation condition shames the defendant is that such an analysis
has no roots in the First Amendment. This analysis looks to the
content of the scarlet-letter probation condition only insofar as it
relates to the defendant's reaction to it. Traditionally, a First
Amendment analysis focuses on the message itself, not the speaker of
the message.629 Any workable test, therefore, must focus on the
probation condition itself. One possible analysis that does focus on
the scarlet-letter probation condition narrows the compelled speech
by shortening the time frame within which the defendant is forced to
speak. Under this analysis, compelled speech that lasts longer than a
certain period of time is prohibited. For example, according to this
analysis, a public apology in a local newspaper, which arguably lasts
only for the day that the apology is published, is more narrowly
tailored than forcing a defendant to post a sign in his yard. The
primary advantage of this test is that it gives trial courts a bright-line
test with which to work.
One problem with this kind of analysis is determining what is
constitutionally a proper time frame. The dilemma is compounded
by the fact that different offenses may warrant longer time periods.
Should courts have to set time limits for each kind of offense? This
requirement seems unworkable. Furthermore, bright-line tests limit
the trial courts' flexibility-which is necessary to tailor probation
conditions for each defendant. Another major difficulty is that the
duration of the compelled speech may not indicate the amount of
humiliation or harm done to the defendant. For example, a
defendant who lives miles away from her nearest neighbor will not be
particularly harmed by having to post a sign in her yard, while a
680 N.E.2d 315, 320 (Ill. 1997).
628. See Garvey, supra note 205, at 749. Indeed, one purpose for imposing a scarlet-
letter probation condition seems to be to warn the public about the offender. See, e.g.,
People v. Letterlough, 655 N.E.2d 146, 147 (N.Y. 1995) (where the trial court required the
defendant to place a fluorescent sign on his car about his DWI conviction in order to warn
the public); State v. Burdin, 924 S.W.2d 82, 84 (Tenn. 1996) (where the trial court
required the probationer to post a sign in his yard warning children and parents about the
probationer's conviction for child molestation).
629. See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group, 515 U.S.
557,559 (1995); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705,707 (1977).
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defendant who lives in a small town may lose significant social and
perhaps economic standing by having to publish an apology in a local
newspaper. Yet a time frame analysis states that the first condition is
unconstitutionally compelled speech, while the second is narrowly
drawn enough to pass scrutiny.
The best approach avoids these problems by focusing on several
factors. Under this analysis, a scarlet-letter probation condition that
is extremely long in duration, that might endanger the defendant's
safety,630 or that has content that states more than bare facts,631 is
constitutionally suspect. One advantage of this test is that it focuses
on the specific scarlet-letter probation condition but does not focus
on the subjective reaction of the individual defendant. The duration
of a scarlet-letter probation condition is relevant to a First
Amendment analysis because that is the length of time that the state
is compelling a defendant to speak. The scarlet-letter probation
condition's potential to cause physical harm to the defendant and the
degree to which the probation condition compels more than bare
facts are both relevant to a First Amendment analysis because they
both relate to the content of the compelled speech. This analysis
avoids bright-line determinations and gives trial courts greater
flexibility. The negative aspect of the test is that it will be difficult for
the trial courts to know when they are unconstitutionally compelling
speech. Still, by considering these three criteria in shaping scarlet-
letter probation conditions, trial courts will have more guidance than
they do at present.
CONCLUSION
Scarlet-letter probation conditions spark public interest because
they are court-created public spectacles that allow both courts and
630. Scarlet-letter probation conditions imposed for particularly heinous crimes, such
as sexual offenses, might provoke vigilante justice and outbreaks of violence. Persons
angry that the defendant was not incarcerated may decide to take matters into their own
hands. See, e.g., Booth Gunter, Sounding the Alarms on Sexual Predators, TAMPA TRIB.,
Mar. 2, 1997, at 1-Nation/World, available in 1997 WL 7037377 (noting that the
identification of a sexual predator "can lead to violence" and offering an example from
Trenton, New Jersey, where two men broke into the home of a suspected sexual predator
and beat up the wrong person); Ted Roelofs, Neighbors Right to Self-Protection or
Vigilantes?, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Apr. 9, 1995, at Al, available in 1995 WL 3014948
(relating that when residents in Lynnwood, Washington, learned that a child rapist was
being released from prison, someone burned down his house hours before he was to be
released, forcing him to leave the state).
631. See, e.g., State v. Bateman, 771 P.2d 314, 316 (Or. Ct. App. 1989) (en bane) (sign
proclaiming the defendant "dangerous"); State v. Burdin, 924 S.W.2d 82, 84 (Tenn. 1996)
(sign warning children and parents).
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the public to vent their frustration at a criminal justice system they
perceive to be inadequate.632 While such conditions are reminiscent
of colonial shaming penalties, unlike such penalties, they do not
occur in a culture that is close-knit and interdependent.63 For this
reason, their effects may be nothing more than retributive.63'
Although scarlet-letter probation conditions are clearly punishments
and are arguably cruel, such conditions probably will not violate the
Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.6 35 Such
conditions, however, do raise First Amendment concerns because
they compel the probationers to "speak" their own shame.6 6
The problem in challenging a scarlet-letter probation condition
is that courts traditionally have been unwilling to review the legality
of probation conditions.637 Even though courts now claim that
probationers have constitutional rights,638 with some exceptions, they
are reluctant to define these rights or to find a probation condition
invalid.639 The resulting standards for reviewing probation conditions
often fail to protect the probationer's rights adequately. 6 0
It is difficult to argue that present-day probation is an "act of
grace."'" In fact, probation conditions are becoming harsher and
more punitive.612  The need for adequate standards of review,
therefore, is even more serious. Although the state has a valid
interest in punishing criminals, it may not use this justification to
sweep away constitutional rights. As Justice Jackson wrote fifty-five
years ago, "validity of the asserted power to force an American
citizen publicly to profess any statement of belief ... presents
questions of power that must be considered independently of any
632. See supra notes 2-19 and accompanying text.
633. See supra notes 210-11 and accompanying text.
634. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
635. See supra notes 288-359 and accompanying text.
636. See supra notes 465-71, 611-15 and accompanying text.
637. See supra notes 483-504 and accompanying text.
638. See, e.g., Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 n.4 (1973) (holding that a
probationer is entitled to preliminary and final revocation hearings); Morrissey v. Brewer,
408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972) (holding that the liberty of a parolee is within the protection of
the Fourteenth Amendment); Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 137 (1967) (holding that an
indigent defendant is entitled to counsel when sentencing occurs after revocation of
probation); United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 265 (9th Cir. 1975) (en
bane) ("Conditions that unquestionably restrict otherwise inviolable constitutional rights
may properly be subject to special scrutiny to determine whether the limitation does in
fact serve the dual objectives of rehabilitation and public safety.").
639. See supra notes 531-67 and accompanying text.
640. See supra notes 568-87 and accompanying text.
641. For a discussion of this doctrine, see supra notes 483-93 and accompanying text.
642. See supra notes 11-12, 520-26 and accompanying text.
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idea we may have as to the utility of the ceremony in question. ' '643
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643. West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,634 (1943).
